Issue No. 760

The Rise and Rise of the 'Moderate' Islamists

When Hassan Sheikh Mohamud returned to Villa Somalia in May 2022, it also marked the restoration of his Damul Jadiid (New Blood) Muslim Brotherhood faction to power. At the time, little was made of the return of the supposedly moderate group, coming in the wake of the assertive Salafist elements of the outgoing Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo government and in the expectation that the returning president would restore temperance to Mogadishu. Much of those early months of his second, non-consecutive term were optimistic, bringing about the most consequential territorial gains against Al-Shabaab in Hirshabelle and Galmudug in years, backed by the rhetoric of an 'all-out war' against the jihadists. Islamic sheikhs and imams sought to form a more coordinated religious front against Al-Shabaab, while reformed extremist leader Mukhtar Robow was appointed as minister of religion. Since then, however, and particularly in 2024, this initial lustre has faded as a far more assertive, centralising Islamism has been wielded against the political opponents of Villa Somalia.

Over several years, the Damul Jadiid movement born from Al-Islah has quietly established itself as one of the pre-eminent political and economic forces in the country today. Significant wealth has steadily accrued among those tied to the group, particularly through business and patronage links to Ankara, Doha, and Cairo. Yet it remains small in nature, with Damul Jadiid unable to claim it represents a significant constituency in Somalia, which will be crucial for any possible future political negotiations with Al-Shabaab. And, of course, it is far from the only assertive Islamist political force operating in the country. Across four successive federal administrations since 2009, various Islamist coalitions have accessed power in Mogadishu, including the Salafist Al-I'tisaam hardliners through former spy chief and Qatari ally Fahad Yasin. 

Apart from the president, key members of Damul Jadiid include Farah Abdiqadir, the education minister and close ally of PM Hamza Abdi Barre, as well as former Minister of Internal Security and current Ambassador to Qatar, Ahmed Sheikh Ali Doodishe. In November 2023, Doodishe was shuffled from his docket to Doha in an attempt to restore closer ties with Qatar, a strong partner of the former Farmaajo government. Since then, the secretive hand of Doha has returned to the fore in Mogadishu, with bilateral judicial, parliamentary, and economic agreements all signed. Many further spied the hand of Doha in the Islamisation and centralisation of the first four chapters of the heavily amended Provisional Constitution at the beginning of 2024.

Hand-in-hand with the increasingly aggressive political centralisation has come a redeployment of government-aligned religious figures against its opposition. For instance, in a recent interview with Shabelle TV, one closely government-aligned figure, Sheikh Ali Wajis, called any individual who resisted the proposed one-person, one-vote (OPOV) transition in Somalia an "extremist" and outside the principles of Islamic law. It was an extraordinary intervention-- and moved the debate away from serious questions of electoral modalities and their impact on Somalia's federal system. Earlier this year, Wajis came to the defence of Villa Somalia, decreeing that the controversial exhumation of bodies from the School Polizia cemetery in Mogadishu was permitted under Islamic law. Most concerning, though, was his urging of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to disarm all regional leaders who opposed his dubious OPOV plans. His remarks are seemingly currently coming to pass in Ras Kambooni in Jubaland, with Villa Somalia having deployed a significant number of Gorgor and Haramad forces since the re-election of Ahmed Madoobe on Monday. The possibilities of broader conflict between Jubaland and Mogadishu are rapidly escalating but have not come from thin air. It is the latest chapter of an unrestrained federal government intent on bending Jubaland and others to its will.

Another key component within the federal government is the allied Daljir party, which is formed around the Aala Sheikh faction and combines both Sufi and Ikhwani principles. In 2018, the Daljir party launched the Union for Peace and Development Party with Hassan Sheikh's Peace and Development Party. The principal minister from Daljir in the federal government is Foreign Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi, who is particularly known for his hardline anti-Ethiopian stances and vigorous defences of his administration. Much like PM Barre, Fiqi is allowed to lead the rhetorical pack, dictating many of the hardline talking points of the federal government, including most recently chastising Western diplomats in the wake of the successful Somaliland election.

Fiqi's anti-Ethiopian stances should be understood in the context of his history as a former leader within the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), and his connection to the armed resistance against the Ethiopian invasion in Mogadishu. At the Somali Diaspora Conference in Doha in July, Fiqi rewrote the invasion, asserting that Somalia "defeated" Ethiopian troops from 2006-2008. It was a bizarre claim, one at the time that was largely overshadowed by speculation Qatar was using the conference to revive its dormant ambitions of mediating talks between Al-Shabaab and Villa Somalia. It was also a strange comment considering that Fiqi is now serving in the federal government, which directly emerged from the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) that took power after the defeat of the ICU.

Both at home and abroad, the current federal administration has become clearly more assertive in its Islamist tendencies, abandoning the moderation Damul Jadiid is supposed to emulate. The movement explicitly does not endorse the use of violence, yet in the past 11 months, Villa Somalia has stoked conflict in the Sool region, imported weapons for allied Galmudug militia leader Liban 'Shuluq,' and now is apparently seeking to oust Madoobe, which could yet trigger much broader conflict. There is little 'moderate' about much of this. What we are currently witnessing in Jubaland is the culmination of a years-long process of an unchecked government and the uncomfortable reality that Islamists perceived as democratic partners are advancing a destabilising 'state-building' agenda. Whether Somalia's elites ever pursued a liberal, democratising agenda remains up for debate. Today, though, the effort has stalled entirely in favour of an alternative Islamist model that threatens to plunge the country into further calamity.

By the Somali Wire Team