Issue No. 759

Published 25 Nov 2024

Madoobe Secures His Third Term In Jubaland

Published on 25 Nov 2024 16:58 min

Madoobe Secures His Third Term In Jubaland

This morning, Jubaland's 75 regional parliamentarians cast their vote for the next leader of their Federal Member State (FMS) for the coming 5 years. As anticipated, incumbent and long-serving President Ahmed Islam 'Madoobe' was easily re-elected with 55 votes, extending his reign over the southern region he has led since dislodging Al-Shabaab from Kismaayo with his Kenyan-backed Islamist Ras Kamboni militia in 2012. His closest challenger, Abubakar Omar Ali, received 16 votes, while the next candidate, Faysal Muktar, secured just four. Madoobe's victory had been all but guaranteed for several weeks, coming against a backdrop of an increasingly hostile Villa Somalia unable to prevent the re-election of their former ally. And despite external pressure from elements of the international community, the singular Jubaland president has now secured a third term-- possible after the regional constitution was amended in July-- extending his time in office until 2029.

The buildup to the polls had been increasingly acrimonious and unsettling after Madoobe walked out of the National Consultative Council (NCC) meeting in October, refusing Villa Somalia's offer of another term extension in exchange for support for its federally-overseen one-person, one-vote (OPOV) polls in 2025. The Jubaland president declined to extend his term again and lend legitimacy to Villa Somalia's sweeping constitutional agenda in the absence of Puntland, further asserting that OPOV elections are impossible in such an accelerated timeframe. But Madoobe also critically wanted to avoid tying his political fate to a massively abrogated OPOV system with bizarre, unclear modalities led by a centralising Villa Somalia. The alliance between Madoobe and Villa Somalia was a dam that was eventually bound to break, with the Jubaland president's and the federal government's electoral positions fundamentally incompatible. Considering that the Jubaland president has maintained a firm hold over Kismaayo with his predominantly Ogaadeen Daraawiish forces and has not entertained any aspirants to his position, it was always highly improbable that Madoobe would allow his future to be decided by others.

Within Jubaland, tensions have also risen as Villa Somalia has sought to capitalise on existing discontent with Madoobe's administration. Last week, Jubaland opposition groups, reportedly backed by Villa Somalia, elected Senator Ilyas Gaboose as their president, declaring a parallel parliament and selecting their own parliamentary speakers, further deepening the political standoff in Jubaland. Gaboose is a relatively unknown figure with no support base in Jubaland, never a likely serious contender for the presidency of the influential FMS. And following his 'election,' deadly clashes erupted on Saturday near the Agan Hotel in Kismaayo, where opposition politicians were meeting, between Gaboose's bodyguards and Jubaland police. The brief pretender to the throne has now already reportedly backed down, surrendering to Jubaland security forces in Kismaayo and withdrawing his claim to the presidency earlier today. The federal senator is expected to meet with Madoobe to pledge support to the re-elected president, diminishing the potential of broader violence in Kismaayo.

Still, others are likely to be frustrated with the Mohamed Zubeyr incumbent now being able to lead Jubaland for an unbroken 17 years when his latest term expires in 2029. The Mareehaan aspire to the presidency as well, and many believe that after many years of Ogaadeen dominance, one of their leaders should represent Jubaland as a whole. Other Ogaadeen sub-clans may also somewhat chafe at Madoobe's speedy re-election, though they are likely to rally behind the president in light of Villa Somalia's increasing wayward pressure on the FMS. Madoobe's bouts of ill health and time spent convalescing in Dubai in 2024 had raised speculation that the Jubaland president may consider stepping away, but the past few weeks have been a clear signal that he is going nowhere in a hurry. Kenya and Ethiopia, meanwhile, are sure to be content with Madoobe's re-election, with both Addis and Nairobi invested militarily in Jubaland and allies of the regional president. Neither capital wants to see Al-Shabaab further empowered in Jubaland, and there are concerns that any major destabilisation of the FMS could precipitate another offensive by the resurgent extremist group.

Since Madoobe disengaged from the NCC and particularly since he halted cooperation with the federal government, Villa Somalia has rapidly amped up its rhetoric and destabilisation tactics towards Kismaayo. Senior federal officials labelled the elections "theatrical," accused Madoobe of being an illegitimate president, and threatened to disregard the electoral results. Much of this has been couched in the language of implementing the federal government's OPOV system, dismissing the concerns surrounding its unimplementable modalities, the reality that Al-Shabaab still controls swathes of central and southern Somalia and a near-total lack of political and clan consensus.

What has also been concerning has been the ease with which Villa Somalia has looked to undermine the southernmost FMS's stability by appointing former Jubaland officials into key security posts. This morning, Mogadishu directed the airlifting of Somali National Army (SNA) troops to Ras Kamboni, a clear warning to the Kismaayo administration about the undermining role the federal government can still seek to play even if it cannot prevent Madoobe's re-election. And, over the weekend, Federal Minister of Internal Security Abdullahi Sheikh Fartaag made the extraordinary accusation that the fighting between Gaboose's bodyguards and Jubaland police was a "terrorist act" and evidence that Madoobe is seeking to "incite civil war in Jubaland."

The situation is eerily reminiscent of HSM's first term when, in 2013, Villa Somalia attempted to unseat Madoobe by providing military and financial support to his Jubaland rivals. The resulting clashes threatened to draw the federal government into a two-front conflict against both Jubaland and the other Darood-majority FMS of Puntland, prompting Ethiopia to mediate between the belligerents and calm the situation. Today, however, Ethiopia is no longer in a position to play such a role with relations so poor between Addis and Mogadishu and with many other international partners having chosen to align themselves with Villa Somalia, the risk of further escalation is greatly enhanced. In 2013, Jubaland prevailed over Villa Somalia, forcing President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to curb his centralist enthusiasm in favour of federalism. 

For different reasons, the recent Somaliland and Jubaland polls have been powerful symbols of just how impotent the federal government remains in actually governing the territory it claims to represent. And with the two Darood-majority FMS presidents of Said Abdullahi Deni and Madoobe having secured their political futures for the coming years and suspended cooperation, it has left Mogadishu adrift without the consensus needed to actually implement its major constitutional and electoral revisions.

The Jubaland president has been one of the few constants amid the tumult of Somali politics in recent years, remaining firm in his opposition to Al-Shabaab and oft-returning to his federalist principles. More than a decade after the violent scenes of 2013, Hassan Sheikh's government once again seems determined to bend Jubaland to its will-- no matter the cost. Whether or not it succeeds in doing so may well define the future of Somalia's federal project – and the nature of HSM's legacy as a two-term president.

By The Somali Wire Team

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