Issue No. 758

ISIS in Somalia: Localised threat or new wave of global jihadism

The Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) has evolved from a small, localised faction into a pivotal element of the global Islamic State (ISIS) network. While its operations remain largely confined to the Cal Miskaat Mountains of Puntland, ISS plays an increasingly strategic role within ISIS' global framework. At the heart of its influence is the Al-Karrar office, which has operated in Somalia since at least 2018. This hub oversees ISIS operations across eastern, central, and southern Africa, serving as a command centre that facilitates communication, coordinates logistics, and allocates resources among ISIS affiliates. These include the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), active in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo; the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), operating in the Lake Chad Basin; and the Islamic State Sinai Province (ISSP), based in Egypt. Together, these affiliates reinforce ISIS’ expansion strategy, with the Islamic State in Somalia playing a critical role in strengthening the group’s presence across the continent.

Through its operational connections with affiliates like ISCAP, ISS has amplified its regional significance. Leaked documents reveal that groups such as ISCAP routinely submit status updates to Al-Karrar, reflecting ISS’ role in managing broader logistical and tactical operations. This coordination signals a strategic shift by ISIS, moving away from a Middle Eastern-centric model and instead empowering affiliates like ISS to sustain and advance the network’s global objectives. 

Under the leadership of Abdulqadir Mumin, ISS has expanded both its manpower and operational scope. The group’s estimated 700 fighters represent a marked increase, driven by a steady stream of foreign recruits. Ethiopian nationals, particularly from the Oromo and Amhara ethnic groups, along with recruits from Tanzania and other East African countries, have joined its ranks. Political instability, economic deprivation, and unresolved local grievances make these communities especially susceptible to ISS recruitment efforts. Despite the harsh realities of life in its mountainous stronghold, ISS offers recruits a powerful incentive: competitive salaries exceeding USD 200 per month. These wages are reflective of the group’s financial stability, which not only sustains its operations but also attracts fighters from across the region, further strengthening its foothold in Africa. 

Efforts to counter ISS are hindered by Somalia’s fragmented governance and persistent regional disputes. The Somali federal government and Puntland authorities have been unable to coordinate a unified strategy, leaving governance gaps that ISS has skillfully exploited. In October, Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni announced an offensive against the group. However, ISS’ adaptability and resilience, even in the face of leadership losses and external pressure, have allowed it to endure. Somalia’s weak state institutions, pervasive corruption, and the broader instability of the Horn of Africa further complicate counterterrorism measures. ISS has also enhanced its influence through sophisticated propaganda and operational tactics, enabling it to recruit fighters and sustain its ranks. Its ties to Somali diaspora communities, particularly in Western nations, amplify concerns over the potential for international terrorism planning and execution, underscoring the enduring challenge it poses to both regional and global security. If left unchecked, ISS could herald a resurgence of global jihadism in Somalia. Its integration into ISIS’ broader network, robust recruitment strategies, and financial independence make it a significant threat to both regional and international stability. Like other ISIS affiliates, ISS has exploited weak governance, local grievances, and ungoverned spaces to entrench its influence.

Bridging the gap between Somalia’s Federal Government (FGS) and Puntland is key to tackling the growing threat of the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS). Puntland’s decision to pull out of the National Consultative Council in September 2023 has only deepened the divide, creating openings that ISS has been quick to exploit. Without a united front, the fight against the group risks falling apart. A joint approach between Somalia’s federal and regional governments, along with other players in the Horn of Africa, is essential. Tackling local economic grievances and encouraging fighters to defect from ISS could cut into the group’s recruitment pipeline and disrupt its operations. Addressing these issues on the ground could start to loosen ISS’ grip on vulnerable communities. International support will also be critical. Sharing intelligence, building capacity, and carrying out coordinated counterterrorism operations could help dismantle ISS’ network and limit its reach across borders. A combined effort that brings together local, regional, and global players is the only way to push back against ISS and stop it from becoming an even bigger threat.

The Somali Wire Team