Returning Somali Refugees from Germany
In a trip to Germany early this month, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud attended the Africa Trade Summit in Berlin, where he held bilateral talks with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. During the meeting, the two leaders announced plans for the repatriation of undocumented Somali migrants in Germany – the agreement outlined the deportation of Somalis who had forfeited their asylum rights, with HSM declaring Somalia’s willingness to welcome them back. Chancellor Scholz emphasised that the initiative would prioritise the deportation of individuals involved in serious criminal offences while safeguarding the rights of law-abiding Somalis contributing positively to German society.
The agreement sparked significant backlash on Somali social media, with many accusing the government of neglecting its duty to ensure national security and pointing to persistent political divisions as major barriers to safe repatriation. Former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire denounced the deal as "irresponsible," citing ongoing instability that continues to force Somalis to seek refuge abroad. Puntland Information Minister Eng Dirir added to the criticism, accusing HSM of endorsing the deportation of Somalis seeking asylum. In response to public outcry, the Somali government issued a clarification, reframing the agreement as voluntary and strictly limited to individuals without valid asylum claims. Yet, with Somalia already grappling to provide even basic social and economic security for its citizens, questions loom about its readiness to accommodate returning migrants.
In a 5 November interview with the German newspaper Bild, HSM encouraged Somalis who have lost their asylum rights in Germany to come home to reunite with their families and contribute to Somalia’s development, going as far as to say “our country has become safer; we're no longer just a civil war zone.” However, the timing of this appeal seems ironic given the harsh realities on the ground in Somalia. While the president encourages the return of migrants, Somalia continues to face ongoing security threats, a lack of jobs, and environmental crises. In Mogadishu, forced evictions and the demolition of homes have left many without options. The federal government’s limited capacity to support those already living in Somalia raises serious concerns about its ability to effectively accommodate returnees.
Challenges to the repatriation of Somalis also expose the lasting impact of Germany’s landmark 2015 decision to accept over one million refugees, with many fleeing conflicts in Syria and Iraq. While Germany’s humanitarian gesture was widely lauded at the time, it has since had profound political ramifications, including fuelling the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party. The AfD has capitalised on public fear over integration, security and the economic burden of migration, significantly shifting Germany’s political discourse. What began as a fringe movement is now a prominent force in German politics, with anti-immigrant rhetoric central to its platform.
The broader shift in global migration patterns reflects a growing unwillingness among Western countries to accommodate asylum seekers. Policies like the European Commission’s July 2024 proposal to tighten visa regulations for Somalia— intended to encourage cooperation on the readmission of undocumented nationals— are part of this larger trend. Countries such as Finland have pursued similar measures with Somalia, signalling a global climate that increasingly discourages migration, particularly from countries facing instability.
In response to these changing dynamics, some members of the Somali diaspora, often educated and financially well-off, have opted to return to their homeland, hoping to invest in and contribute to Somalia’s rebuilding. However, this return has created a new class of elites, further exacerbating existing social and economic inequalities. Armed with global connections and financial resources, these returnees frequently dominate business opportunities and secure influential positions within government, side-lining Somalis who have remained behind, enduring years of conflict. This dynamic has deepened economic and political divides in the country, leaving those who remained behind struggling to compete in an increasingly unequal landscape.
Somali refugee returnees face entrenched challenges rooted in the country’s historical, political and socio-economic vulnerabilities. Weak social protection systems and clan-based networks often fail to provide inclusive support, leaving returnees stigmatised and perceived as ‘foreigners’ disconnected from their communities after years spent abroad. This alienation is compounded by the strain on traditional support systems already weakened by conflict and political instability. Somalia’s fragile governance and underdeveloped institutions offer limited access to jobs or financial resources, with many returnees finding their skills incompatible with an economy dominated by traditional trade. Psychological challenges also weigh heavily on returnees, particularly those who grew up abroad. For them, reintegration often involves grappling with loss of identity, unfamiliarity with local culture, and language barriers. These vulnerabilities create openings for exploitation by extremist groups like Al-Shabaab, which prey on feelings of alienation by offering financial support, as well as a sense of purpose and belonging.
Instead of prioritising international agreements driven by political objectives— such as the initiative to repatriate undocumented migrants from Germany— greater focus should be placed on addressing the systemic challenges that hinder Somalia’s ability to support its people. Strengthening social protection systems, generating economic opportunities and fostering inclusive community programs are critical steps. Such measures would not only provide more effective support for returnees but also lay the groundwork for Somalia’s long-term stability and sustainable development.
The Somali Wire Team
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