Issue No. 755

Published 15 Nov 2024

Echoes of Farmaajo in Villa Somalia's Centralising Gambit

Published on 15 Nov 2024 12:10 min
Echoes of Farmaajo in Villa Somalia's Centralising Gambit
 
The political brinkmanship over the future of Somalia's elections continues. Mediation efforts have so far failed to bridge the divide between Kismaayo and Mogadishu, as Jubaland President Ahmed Madoobe continues to organise his own regional presidential elections with support from the national opposition. Simultaneously, the federal parliamentary leadership, which has delayed recess, is proceeding with plans to table key electoral bills as well as the revised Chapters 5-9 of the Provisional Constitution. Although mounting pressure would suggest an inflexion point is nearing for the federal government, the Hassan Sheikh administration, emboldened by Turkish, Eritrean, and Egyptian support, remains uninterested in fostering broader consensus for its sweeping agenda.

A growing chorus of parliamentarians has now pledged to boycott any debates or sessions on constitutional amendments and election laws. With the support from their regional presidents, over 50 MPs and Senators from Puntland and Jubaland have promised to reject amendments to current electoral laws, insisting that the Provisional Constitution remains pre-eminent. However, with the bicameral parliamentary leadership co-opted by Villa Somalia's agenda, Speaker Adan Mohamed Nur Madobe, currently in London, appears unconcerned about these latest blows to its legitimacy. Even officials from SSC-Khaatumo, the administration that controls Laas Aanood in the Sool region and aspires to become a Federal Member State (FMS) in Somalia, have criticised the federal government's attempts to unilaterally rewrite the Provisional Constitution.

This week, the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission (ICRIC) met with civil society representatives in SSC-Khaatumo territory to discuss the proposed amendments to Chapters 5-9. ICRIC has historically been a well-regarded body perceived as technocratic and largely impartial, but the manner in which the revisions of large sections of Chapters 1-4 were approached earlier this year has diminished its credibility. Despite the gravity of the proposed changes, the absence of meaningful consultation, parliamentary debate, and consensus has undermined what was initially presented as a 'straightforward' constitutional review process. Several articles within the coming chapters may be entirely revised, such as Article 97, which vests Somalia's executive power in the Council of Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister. If the current centralising trajectory of Villa Somalia is anything to go on, then it is highly probable that executive power will be delivered to President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud instead.

While the federal government continues full-steam with its sweeping electoral and constitutional agenda, it has not abandoned attempts to return Madoobe to the table, even while attacking the Jubaland president. A senior delegation of Kenyan diplomats travelled to Kismaayo and Mogadishu this week to meet with both Madoobe and PM Hamza Abdi Barre. But plans for the weakened Barre to visit Kismaayo fell apart when Madoobe ordered his troops to take control of the city's airport and block federal officials from entering. It is quite the about-turn that Barre– who served as chair of the Jubaland Independent Boundaries and Electoral Commission in 2019-2020– is now on the other side of the fence, seemingly unable to even travel to Jubaland. 

Indeed, the occupants of Villa Somalia were staunchly in favour of Madoobe's re-election in August 2019 when former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo attempted to deploy troops to Kismaayo and stoke unrest to unseat the long-serving Jubaland president. The latest rift between Madoobe and the federal government as he seeks to curb its excesses has also drawn in support from across the political spectrum, including from Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni and former President Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed. 

Inch-by-inch, the federal government have returned to many of the same tactics that its senior ministers were decrying just a couple of years ago. In that vein, there were reports this week that the federal government might even seek to deploy federal troops to Kismaayo via the sea to prevent elections moving forward, which would mark an extraordinary and dangerous escalation. Jubaland's Daraawiish forces, largely composed of members from the former Ras Kamboni militia and Madoobe's clan, ensure the president's near-absolute control over Kismaayo. Attempts to deploy federal troops to the port city could easily trigger serious violence.

While the Mogadishu-Kismaayo rift deepens, South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen continues to play a delicate balancing act to protect his own political future. Laftagareen is now the only non-Hawiye elected member of the National Consultative Council (NCC), lending only a slither of legitimacy that Villa Somalia badly needs. Unlike Madoobe, whose administration benefits from Kismaayo's deep-sea port, Laftagareen requires largesse from Villa Somalia to sustain his political budget and patron networks. And he clearly remains averse to the prospect of holding regional presidential elections, having seized upon Mogadishu's deals of term extensions as part of the Baidoa agreement, the May 2023 NCC agreement, and now the latest pact. But Laftagareen is also aware that Ethiopian troops are essential for securing his administrative capital of Baidoa-- what happens to the Leysan-occupied territory has never been a concern for the South West State president. With the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) deployments expected to remain there for some time to come, Laftagareen may eventually be forced to pick a side if relations remain so poor between the two capitals.

Much of Laftagareen's considerable regional opposition is also frustrated, as Villa Somalia re-engaged with them in September only to insist on waiting for questionable 'one-person, one-vote' (OPOV) elections in September 2025. As Villa Somalia lambasts Madoobe for holding elections while also having his term expire, it is the federal government that has provided Laftagareen with the barest of political cover to allow him to delay votes and replace elected officials at will.

The mechanisms and checks and balances through which the Farmaajo government was forced to the table are worryingly absent today. Though the former president was able to take a sledgehammer to many of Somalia's nascent institutions, parts of parliament, former PM Mohamed Hussein Roble, and others, including belated elements of the international community, were able to pull the country back from the brink at several moments. At that time, one of the most critical and influential voices in the national opposition was President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud himself. The volte-face to the unilateral actions particularly pursued in 2024 have confused large swathes of Somalia's political establishment and country. Villa Somalia must hear the chorus of opposition against it and understand that even if it is wedded to its electoral agenda, it will go nowhere if it does not return to consensus-based politics.

The Somali Wire Team 

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