Issue No. 754

Somaliland Goes To The Polls 
 

Today, 13 November, Somalilanders go to the polls to elect their president for the coming 5 years and the three political parties that will represent them for the next decade. It marks the fourth 'one-person, one-vote' (OPOV) presidential election since 2003, as incumbent President Muse Bihi Abdi seeks re-election on his 2017 win. Much has changed in the unrecognised polity in the past 7 years, however, and the stakes of this election could not be much higher, with Somaliland's long search for sovereign recognition, the crisis of Laas Aanood, and escalating regional tensions casting shadows over the vote.

The atmosphere ahead of the polls has been tense at moments, with the race for the presidency believed to be close between Bihi and Waddani party leader Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi 'Irro.' Though the Kulmiye party has held the presidency since 2010, it is difficult to predict who will come out on top, in part due to the absence of polling. There have been multiple twists and turns in recent months, the latest being Somaliland's Vice President Abdirahman Abdillahi Ismail Saylici throwing his weight behind Waddani this week. Expectations that the slow-moving Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that has generated immense regional churn would be realised have not come to fruition, which may prove fatal for Bihi's chances at re-election. Some have regarded Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed's recent comments about the MoU to his parliament as a sign that Addis is in no rush to recognise Somaliland.

So far, voting has been peaceful, with lines of voters turning out in Burao, Hargeisa, Berbera and elsewhere. According to the Somaliland National Electoral Commission (NEC), over 1 million people are registered and eligible to vote, which will be signified by a marking of fingers with indelible ink, preventing multiple votes. Dozens of international observers have been invited to spectate these elections, including from South Africa's Brenthurst Foundation and a multi-faith delegation from Kenya. Still, as anticipated, due to security considerations surrounding the SSC-Khaatumo administration control of Laas Aanood and its environs, voting will not occur in Buuhoodle and Sool. Consequently, many Dhulbahante will be unable to participate in the voting, though the disenchantment with Hargeisa would probably have resulted in some communities boycotting the vote.

Like his predecessors, Bihi extended his term by two years, which sparked controversy and also influenced that, for the first time, the political association and presidential elections will be held on the same day. In the former, the jostling for the three political party positions amongst the political associations has several sub-plots. Notably, the Awdal region's and Hilaac party's Ahmed Ismail Samatar withdrew from the race in July, citing the monopolisation of the political space by the Isaaq-- UCID, Kulmiye, and Waddani's bases are all predominantly Isaaq. Meanwhile, Waddani and Kaah are collaborating, with the latter backing Irro in the presidential elections, likely for positions within the government if he wins today. And the smaller UCID party is unlikely to hold on to the third spot.

Somaliland has a long, proud history of competitive but generally peaceful democratic polls. Barring Kenya, the unrecognised polity consistently ranks as the most free and fair in the Horn of Africa, far surpassing Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti. This is a testament to the strong civic society that exists within Somaliland and the successes of the NEC, which has had to navigate pressures from politicians with a small budget. The last elections held in Somaliland were parliamentary and local polls in 2021, which were peaceful and immediately accepted by all major parties. These votes proved to be bruising for Kulmiye, with Waddani usurping the ruling party as the largest parliamentary bloc. 

If the vote is close, as it often has been in Somaliland's short history, it may take multiple days for the picture to become clearer. One hopes that Bihi and Irro will take the example of former Somaliland President Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud Silanyo, who peacefully conceded the 2002 presidential election to President Dahir Rayaale Kahin after losing by just a few dozen votes. But the political space since 2017 has become decidedly more polarised in Somaliland. Clan and sub-clan identity has hardened, including between the Habar Yunis-majority Waddani as well as the allied Habar Awal and Habar Je'elo of Kulmiye. Moreover, the Laas Aanood conflict has harshened the positions of many Dhulbahante towards Hargeisa. 

The political jockeying will also not end with the vote but will likely continue to rumble on for several weeks. In 2017, Waddani initially refused to accept the NEC's results, claiming electoral fraud, before later agreeing to recognise them "for the country." Unlike Somalia, Somaliland does not necessitate that all clans be represented in specific roles within the government, so painstaking negotiations and competition for positions will likely follow between elites to incorporate the major clan constituencies.

In the next 5 years, Somaliland will have to contend with an increasingly authoritarian and unstable region on the coal face of shifting geo-political trends. Internally, the next president will have to deal with the simmering crisis and intermittent clashes that continue over the control of the Sool region. The Bihi administration has pledged to resolve the conflict through dialogue if it is re-elected, but with violence sparking on the edges of SSC-Khaatumo territory, the dangers of larger conflict re-erupting are real.

The MoU will also have significant ramifications for any incoming government, as its realisation would mark the first recognition of Somaliland since it declared independence in 1991. Waddani's position has been more obscure on the MoU, but Irro has pledged to implement the accord, as has UCID Chairman Faysal Ali Warabe. If the MoU collapses, however, it could set back Somaliland's quest for independence years and fracture the polity, as Djibouti and Mogadishu have sought to stoke in 2024. All three major parties are publicly committed to the question of independence for Somaliland. And all are also likely buoyed by the return of US President Donald Trump to the White House, whose ad hoc foreign policy and the presence of Somaliland sympathising diplomats in his first administration making recognition arguably more likely. The status of Somaliland-Somalia negotiations may also revive, which have been frozen since late 2023, with Irro pledging to reopen talks with Mogadishu. What is abundantly clear is that whoever wins the presidency today will arrive at Hargeia's presidential palace with no shortage of issues to tackle. First, though, is securing Somaliland's history of peaceful transitions of power and elections, no matter the outcome.