Issue No. 753

Second FMS Breaks From Villa Somalia
 

On 10 November, Jubaland became the second Federal Member State (FMS) in Somalia to suspend all cooperation with the federal government in 2024. While it has not gone as far as the other Darood-majority FMS of Puntland to 'withdraw recognition' from the federal government, the realities are little different. Villa Somalia's centralising plans, riding rough-shod over the Provisional Constitution and the country's political settlement to push forward with its unachievable 'one-person, one-vote' (OPOV) elections, eventually proved too much for its former ally, Jubaland's President Ahmed Islam 'Madoobe.' 

The statement by Jubaland's Interior Ministry released on 10 November was damning, criticising the federal government's failure to "comply" with the Constitution and respect Jubaland's autonomy. The severing comes after weeks of ratcheting tensions between Kismaayo and Mogadishu after the start of a calamitous National Consultative Council (NCC) meeting in early October that Madoobe walked out of. Having been silent for much of 2024, the Jubaland president refused to submit to Villa Somalia's latest OPOV plans for elections in the FMSs in September 2025, barring Puntland, under the supervision of a federal committee, and hand yet another unilateral term extension to regional leaders. Instead, after returning to Kismaayo, Madoobe began directing his administration to prepare for conducting his own regional presidential elections that will likely take place before the year's end. As many predicted, Madoobe has moved to secure his political future without the federal government.

The Jubaland president has appointed a 7-member electoral committee to oversee the preparations for regional presidential elections, which the Jubaland parliament has already approved. Though nominally 'independent,' there is little serious competition for the presidency, and the manner in which Madoobe has directed the commencement of elections clearly indicates who still calls the shots in Kismaayo. In turn, the federal Interior Minister has not held back in its criticisms of the electoral committee, calling it illegal and insisting that Jubaland follow the NCC electoral agreements that it was not party to. Notably, the statement also highlighted that Madoobe's presidential term expired in August 2023. While true, the ironies of the federal government criticising Madoobe's term having expired beggar belief. It has just orchestrated yet another term extension for the presidents of Galmudug, South West State, and Hirshabelle through the NCC, a non-constitutional body, with the widespread belief that Villa Somalia, too, will seek one in exchange at a later date. Since May 2022, when Hassan Sheikh Mohamud started his second, non-consecutive presidential term, only Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni has conducted elections in the face of opposition from Mogadishu in January 2024.

Since Madoobe withdrew, Villa Somalia has returned to its ineffective 'carrot-and-stick' method to try and return the Jubaland president to the weeks-long NCC meeting in Mogadishu. Kenya, which maintains a close political and security relationship with Madoobe and the Jubaland administration, was called upon to mediate. Subsequently, Madoobe travelled to meet with Kenyan President William Ruto in Eldoret, while senior Kenyan former diplomats and intermediaries also travelled to Kismaayo to broker a possible deal. But with Villa Somalia remaining entrenched in its position that it will conduct OPOV elections next year and Madoobe unwilling to entertain the charade any longer, there has been little space for mediation. Particularly important is that having established a strong relationship in the retaking of Kismaayo from Al-Shabaab in 2012 and sustained over successive Kenyan administrations, Nairobi trusts Madoobe and understands the limits of its influence. The last few weeks have been another potent example of how the Jubaland president will continue to chart his own course regardless of external pressures.

The 'stick' has come in several forms, including on the security front. In early November, land force commander Brigadier General Dayah Abdi Abdulle was replaced by Colonel Khalid Abdullahi Omar, the former head of the Jubaland Intelligence and Security Agency. The appointment of Omar was straight from the same destabilisation playbook as the installation of former Puntland Security Force (PSF) commander Asad 'Diyaano' as Somali Police Chief just a few weeks ago. Even more blatant came through the accusation this weekend from the Jubaland security ministry, which asserted that the federal government had financially incentivised the unplanned withdrawal of Somali National Army (SNA) troops to Kismaayo during military operations between 6 and 9 November in Orgiyow and Bula-Haji. If true, it would mean actively endangering the lives of Jubaland Daraawiish for political considerations and hijacking the SNA in a manner eerily reminiscent of former Somali President Mohamud Abdullahi Farmaajo.

Kismaayo's withdrawal of cooperation is expected to extend to the federal parliament as well. Well over two dozen Jubaland federal parliamentarians have travelled to the regional capital despite opposition from Speaker Aden Madobe and Villa Somalia. Threats to block their departure eventually did not come to pass after the lawmakers warned of parliamentary disorder if the Speaker attempted to deny their travel, as the federal government had done with South West State MPs to Baidoa. In the coming days, the Jubaland lawmakers will likely withdraw entirely from the parliamentary session that was hastily extended to theoretically pass election-related bills at the bequest of Villa Somalia. Yet the federal government's plan to plough on with the questionable OPOV framework has already hit another stumbling block in parliament, with members of the parliamentary committee formed to establish the electoral model voicing concerns.

Jubaland's withdrawal from its relationship with Mogadishu is an unmitigated crisis for Villa Somalia– despite its rhetoric to the contrary. It has major ramifications for a host of issues, but it has also arguably rendered pointless Jubaland PM Hamza Abdi Barre, who was partially appointed due to his close relationship with Madoobe. Instead, with Jubaland's exit, he has been essentially reduced to a loyalist enforcer position for the federal government.

The cyclical nature of crises and elite mediation in Somali politics works as if by clockwork, with a federal government empowered by a foreign nation or nations seeking to centralise authority against the wishes of the periphery. But Hassan Sheikh may have moved too soon, and the withdrawal of both Darood-majority FMSs from the federation makes it extremely difficult for Villa Somalia to convincingly argue it is representing the entire nation and acting as per the Provisional Constitution. Moreover, Somalia's political settlement is not elastic; the actions of the federal government may push it too far, and another elite pact at the 11th hour may not be able to easily restore a flawed status quo. The withdrawal of Madoobe's Jubaland from cooperation with the federal government is the latest evidence of a settlement driven to breaking point by a centralising federal government.

The Somali Wire Team