Issue No. 752

Tensions Spark in Sool Before Somaliland Elections
 

At the end of October, deadly violence flared once again between SSC-Khaatumo forces commanded by Abdi Madoobe against Habar Je'elo militia and the Somaliland army in southern Togdheer. Intermittent clashes between bordering Dhulbahante and Habar Je'elo communities are nothing new, but the presence of Madoobe– a known Al-Shabaab commander– stoking violence ahead of the joint party and presidential elections in Somaliland on 13 November raises several concerns.

Tensions in and around Laas Aanood, the city in Sool controlled by a Dhulbahante administration following the uprising in late 2022, have ebbed and flowed over recent months. To the west, on the border of Dhulbahante territory, Habar Je'elo militias have raised significant diaspora funds, arming themselves heavily and threatening conflict. There have been signs of fragmentation within the Dhulbahante as well, with Madoobe's well-armed forces in Buhoodle flexing their strength in Laas Aanood to the displeasure of the formal SSC-Khaatumo administration. Meanwhile, SSC-Khaatumo leader Abdikhadir Ahmed Aw-Ali 'Firdhiye' has courted Villa Somalia for the territory's incorporation into Somalia's federation as another Federal Member State (FMS) to the chagrin of the Al-Shabaab presence in Sool. At the same time, the highly secretive and wealthy Islamist movement Al-I'tisaam b'il Kitaab wa Sunna has sought to act as a peacemaker between some of these forces, including Al-Shabaab.

Abdi Madoobe's forces, mostly made up of Dhulbahante sub-clan Ali Gheri fighters, appear to have initiated the latest episode of violence, attacking positions in Qorilugud and Shangeed on the same day. While these are not areas with a significant Somaliland army presence, a major response was mobilised, and intense fighting followed which left dozens dead, particularly on the Madoobe side. It is unclear if these attacks were sanctioned by SSC-Khaatumo administration leadership, but the heavy losses inflicted on the forces prompted at least one Ali Gheri elder to call for an end to the violence. Among those killed on 1 November in Qorilugud was Abdigani Sulub, a deputy of Madoobe. Celebrated by Somaliland, Sulub's death also sparked another bout of drum-beating online, with pro-SSC-Khaatumo accounts pushing for a broader offensive towards the town of Eerigabo in Sanaag, which also saw nearby violence at the end of August. Yet Al-Shabaab's presence in Laas Aanood and its environs remains deeply controversial and denied by those sympathetic to the Dhulbahante's grievances against Hargeisa. Though dismissed by Madoobe, he and other senior Dhulbahante commanders in his forces have known links to Al-Shabaab and collectively have spent several months in and around Jilib in southern Somalia.

Consequently, the latest bout of violence should be understood in the history of Al-Shabaab seeking to undermine Somaliland during election periods. Notable, if intermittent, attacks in the 2000s were carried out against the polity in a bid to disrupt or delegitimise elections, but the extremist group was quietened in the polity by Somaliland security forces for much of the 2010s. Nevertheless, it continued to covertly work to exploit Dhulbahante grievances in Sool to destabilise Somaliland. Indeed, the origins of the Laas Aanood conflict partially lie in the targeted campaign of assassinations of Dhulbahante officials, politicians, and businesspeople that were furtively carried out by Al-Shabaab but ascribed to Hargeisa.

In the wake of the recent violence, Somaliland accused Mogadishu of seeking to destabilise elections and accusing it of "terror tactics" on 2 November. There are yet unconfirmed reports of ties between Somalia's federal government and the latest clashes, but it is beyond apparent that Villa Somalia has a clear interest in wielding SSC-Khaatumo to undermine both Puntland and Somaliland. The robustness of Somaliland's electoral system when compared to the contentious and unfeasible 'one-person, one-vote' plans in Somalia remains deeply uncomfortable for Mogadishu. And while the federal government may not be able to actually govern in the Sool region, it does have the potential to destabilise and has sought to do so amid the downturn in relations with Hargeisa, as well as with FMS leadership in Garowe and Kismaayo. 

With Somali National Army (SNA) operations stagnant and rather than actively combating Al-Shabaab, Villa Somalia has also instead worked to undermine Puntland and Jubaland through its security appointments of Asad Osman Abdullahi 'Diyaano' as Somali Police Chief and Jubaland's former spy chief as the new land force commander. We are yet to see how effective these destabilisation tactics may be, but in Puntland, dividing Bosasso could well complicate the launching of military operations in the Bari region against Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State-Somalia. Despite the rhetoric of defeating Al-Shabaab and liberating the country, federal officials are doing the precise opposite, enabling the jihadist group to take advantage of division and instability to covertly expand its presence. Regarding the destabilisation of Somaliland, the ugly marriage of convenience between Al-Shabaab and Mogadishu has raised its head once again.

The resurgent violence has also cast a spotlight on the feasibility of Somaliland's elections next Wednesday in the contested Sool region. The National Electoral Commission (NEC) has taken several approaches over the years to allow these Dhulbahante-majority communities to participate in the elections, including placing ballot boxes on the edge of territory where voting is uncontentious. On 13 November, voting will occur in Eerigabo and a couple of nearby districts, but it will likely be heavily curtailed in Sool, with tensions so inflamed.

The presidential elections appear to be on a knife-edge, with Waddani and Kulmiye fighting a close race. Without the gluttony of polling in the US elections, it is difficult to say who will prevail. But whoever assumes the presidency for the next term, either incumbent President Muse Bihi or Waddani's Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi 'Irro,' face an enormous task in resolving the conflict and discontent in Sool. Those in Laas Aanood, Mogadishu, and Jilib will be watching carefully.

The Somali Wire Team