Issue No. 750

Published 04 Nov 2024

The Risk of Collapse (Again)

Published on 04 Nov 2024 18:52 min
The Risk of Collapse (Again)

Somalia's delicate post-civil war political contract, theoretically based on decentralisation and clan inclusivity, is under severe strain. The risk of another major unravelling of the Somali political settlement and the state has never been more apparent. While political turmoil continues to roil the country, Villa Somalia remains embarked on a path certain to lead to further discontent and fragmentation at a highly delicate moment. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's (HSM) re-centralisation, select and dubious constitutional gerrymandering, experimental gambit to fast-track Somalia into representative democracy and direct elections, and blanket term extension for regional presidents have all contributed to a rapid collapse of trust in the central authority and galvanised the country's centrifugal instinct. Now, with Somalia just one month away from a security transition that would place a heavier burden on Somali forces, the potential for further consolidation of Al-Shabaab power remains high.

The last two weeks brought all these negative trends together. Against all sensible advice, HSM cut yet another deal with the presidents of Galmudug, Hirshabelle and South West State (SWS) for unilateral term extensions under the dubious guise of 'one-person, one-vote' (OPOV) elections. Under the terms of HSM's latest agreement with the three regional presidents, the Federal Member State (FMS) leaders have been handed another one-year term extension. In theory, local elections will be conducted in June 2025, and regional presidential polls in September 2025. The new timetable is almost a replica of an earlier one agreed upon by the NCC in May 2023, which has since lapsed, that started the ball rolling on the sweeping rewrite of Chapters 1-4 of the Provisional Constitution. But with the leaders of Darood-majority Puntland and Jubaland opting to stay away from the proceedings, any outcome has been effectively rendered illegitimate. 

The regional presidents are not the only check-and-balance to face co-opting by Villa Somalia. Last week, HSM hosted a rare dinner for members of Somalia's bicameral parliament and opposition leaders in a bid to convince them that holding OPOV elections within the year is feasible. In a speech, the president implored them to postpone their scheduled recess by one month so as to pass the electoral bills on the OPOV modalities. Yet these modalities are also highly contentious and centralising in nature, placing the regional elections under the authority of a federally-appointed committee. Moreover, rushing contradictory legislation through parliament does not change the security realities that it will be impossible to conduct elections in large swathes of south-central Somalia due to the presence of Al-Shabaab.

Prominent opposition leaders have criticised the new agreement between HSM and some regional leaders as both unconstitutional and unworkable. Former President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed dismissed it as wishful thinking while accusing the incumbent president of misleading the nation on the feasibility of OPOV, stoking division, and undermining confidence in Somali state-building. These sentiments were also echoed in a joint statement with prominent opposition leader Abdirahman Abdishakur and former PM Hassan Ali Khaire.

Meanwhile, the Mogadishu-Kismaayo schism continues to deepen. In the last 24 hours, two junior ministers from Jubaland resigned from the HSM administration, citing their principled objection to the country's trajectory. On Sunday evening, Jubaland President Ahmed Madoobe called on all Jubaland representatives serving in the federal parliament in Mogadishu to return to Kismaayo for consultations. This, in itself, is unprecedented. The prospect of Madoobe pulling out of an administration led by one of his protégés, PM Hamza Abdi Barre, and ally Hassan Sheikh would have been inconceivable just a few months ago. And to the north, it is clear that the Puntland administration feels vindicated by what is happening in Mogadishu, having withdrawn from the NCC in January 2023. It feels strengthened by the fact that Madoobe and Jubaland are arriving at the same conclusion they have come to-- that HSM is instinctively anti-federalist and seeking to dismantle years of painstaking Somali state-building and incremental democratic change.

Amid the domestic and regional turmoil, the Somali president has travelled to Europe and is scheduled to appear at an investor conference in Frankfurt. HSM usually wields such events to showcase Somalia as a country on a solid path to peace and prosperity. Yet the events last week, including government soldiers clashing over clearances on public land and another shelling of Halane, should surely dent the 'Somalia Rising' narrative beloved by the nationalists and some internationals ensconced in the Halane compound.

For more than a year, the risks inherent in HSM's flawed electoral plan and constitutional review, as well as the destabilising resurgence of the Islamist far-right and Somali nationalists who now form his core support constituency, have been clear. Yet it has taken Somalia to reach the edge of the precipice and the threat of regional war for some in the international community to wake up to the dangerous course Mogadishu has embarked upon. The situation today is also a reflection of the repeated unseized moments by those with influence to steer the administration towards more realistic and viable electoral models.

The route to stability starts with HSM acknowledging reality and changing tack. He will need to return back to the old path of painstaking but necessary Somali clan consensus and contract to rebuild cohesion. To begin with, HSM will need to bring Puntland and Jubaland back to the fold and cease the attempts to undermine his political opponents. But Villa Somalia must also acknowledge that, despite their rhetoric, genuine OPOV that can be considered 'free and fair' across Somalia remains unachievable. For the moment, a system of enhanced democracy is plausible - a hybrid electoral model that has progressive modern features and is also underpinned by Somali clan representation-- but even that will require hard work and acceptance, which is badly amiss. However, to abandon the disliked 4.5 clan system now without a viable and realistically achievable model in the absence of broad national consensus is to put the country on extremely shaky grounds-- to say the least.

The Somali Wire Team 

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