A near-continuous stretch of Somali authorities from Somaliland down to Jubaland along the Ethiopian border has either quietly or publicly fallen in line behind Addis. Beyond a mere security buffer zone – though it is tied to the Ethiopian military support for many of these communities – it is a reflection of just how fractured Somalia both remains and is increasingly becoming. Amid the collapse in relations between Mogadishu and Addis and a centralising federal government, the latest community to disengage from Villa Somalia's political orbit is the Hawaadle – the Hawiye sub-clan that inhabits much of the Hiiraan region in Hirshabelle.
Since the middle of October, following brief, deadly clashes between Hirshabelle forces loyal to Federal Member State (FMS) President Ali Abdullahi Hussein 'Guudlawe' and Hawaadle militia, the clamouring for an independent 'Hiiraan State' has been revived once again. While the Hawaadle have long advocated for their own FMS, distinct from Hirshabelle, other influential leaders have declared their backing, including Hirshaballe's first President, Ali Abdullahi Osoble. Benefiting from the rich, fertile lands of the Shabelle Valley, the Hawaadle have campaigned for 'Hiiraan State' since the gradual implementation of the federal system under former President Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed. These views were ignored, however, and in accordance with a constitutional requirement that each FMS comprise two or more administrative regions, Hiiraan was obliged to merge with Abgaal-dominated Middle Shabelle in October 2016 to form Hirshabelle-- the youngest FMS. Eight years later, the repercussions of this hasty state formation are still being keenly felt in the politics of Hirshabelle and Hiiraan. To lessen the fraught Abgaal-Hawaadle divisions, Jowhar was declared the state capital, while the Hawaadle were awarded the presidency - a post they expected to hold as long as the Abgaal possessed the state capital. Yet this cycle was immediately upended in 2020, when an Abgaal, the incumbent Guudlawe, became Hirshabelle president in a highly controversial process directed from Villa Somalia.
Since then, the relationship between Guudlawe's administration in Jowhar and the Hawaadle political elite in Beledweyne has remained prickly at best. After his controversial election, the Hawaadle mobilised militia near Beledweyne in late 2020 to advocate for a separate Hiiraan FMS and deny Hirshabelle officials access to the city near the Ethiopian border. Only after federal troops were deployed to Beledweyne was Guudlawe's inauguration able to take place in February 2022.
The latest campaign for a 'Hiiraan State' is more than a reflection of poor Abgaal-Hawaadle relations and Guudlawe's unpopularity as FMS president; it is also linked to Mogadishu's failure to sustain the military momentum against Al-Shabaab since early 2023. The Hawaadle militia led by the popular former Hiiraan Governor Ali Osman Jeyte were some of the principal forces in the early Ma'awiisley uprising in mid-2022 that displaced Al-Shabaab from large parts of Hiiraan. A mercurial and inspirational figure, Jeyte was removed by Guudlawe in June 2023, triggering an outpouring of anger in Beledweyne, with the ex-governor declaring himself the interim president of the new Hiiraan administration. Jeyte's appointment by the federal government in late October 2023 as the coordinator of the Ma'awiisley laid dormant the Hawaadle's political ambitions for a period but have now been revived as the political settlement in Somalia crumbles further.
Despite his appointment, Jeyte received virtually no support from Villa Somalia, not even being provided with a physical office to restart operations. Still, much like the Leysan in South West State, Hawaadle militias and political leadership enjoy a close relationship with the Ethiopians in their fight against Al-Shabaab. The resurfacing of 'Hiiraan State,' while hyper-nationalists in Villa Somalia seek to compel Ethiopian troop withdrawal by year's end, is likely no coincidence. These are communities that have faced intense persecution and attacks from Al-Shabaab and will vehemently resist any attempt by the insurgent group to reassert itself over their hard-fought territory. A total withdrawal of Ethiopian troops would undoubtedly imperil the Hawaadle.
The demands of the Hawaadle for an FMS also reflect Hiiraan's and Hirshabelle's inequities. The Hawaadle were violently displaced from Mogadishu in the early 1990s, prompting them to consolidate in their home region of Hiiraan. Today, the region itself is roughly split between the Gaalje'el to the west and the Hawaadle to the east, with other sub-clans and groups largely aligned with either. It is the Hawaadle that has particularly profited from Hiiraan's development in recent years, with the only tarmac road running on the eastern side of the Shabelle River, allowing these fertile communities to benefit from the trade between Mogadishu and northern Somalia. International aid has also been focused on these more accessible areas and not western Hiiraan, leading to grievances among clans such as the Jajele, Baddi'adde, and the Gaalje'el that the extremists have been able to exploit. And the marginalisation of Bantu riverine communities has also opened the door for the jihadists to mobilise support and recruit from these communities.
Guudlawe's repeated attempts to reassert control over Beledweyne, often forcefully, have failed each time and only further entrenched the divisions within Hirshabelle. His visit in May to Mataaban, occupied mainly by the Habar Gidir sub-clan of the Hawiye, was derided as a potent symbol of just how feeble his administration has become. With Beledweyne and other Hawaadle areas largely split from the control of the Hirshabelle administration, Guudlawe has essentially been relegated to an Abgaal chieftain and the quasi-commissioner of Jowhar, beholden to Villa Somalia.
The re-emergence of 'Hiiraan State' comes at a precarious inflexion point for President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's administration. As Somalia's federal architecture splinters and fractures, the federal government is increasingly at risk of being reduced to a single constituency-- the Hawiye. Notably, with the exception of South West State President Abdiaziz Lafatgareen, the only elected politicians to attend this week's National Consultative Council meeting were Hawiye. Somalia's two Darood-dominated states, Puntland and Jubaland, have suspended cooperation with Mogadishu. The Digil-Mirifle communities of South West State, who broadly oppose Mogadishu's demand that Ethiopian troops withdraw from their territory, are almost certain to be next. The defection of the Hawaadle now threatens to subdivide even the Hawiye, leaving Villa Somalia with little more than an Abgaal political base and a tenuous alliance with the Habar Gidir of Galmudug. Unless the federal government's monopolisation of power and resources in the capital can be reversed, the president may soon find himself labelled the 'Mayor of Mogadishu.'
By the Somali Wire team
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