Issue No. 748

Published 28 Oct 2024

Somalia Needs Its Federal Member States

Published on 28 Oct 2024 14:08 min
Somalia Needs Its Federal Member States

At the start of his second non-consecutive term in office in 2022, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud promised to deliver federalism in Somalia. A reluctant federalist in his first term, the returning president publicly renewed his commitment to the unfulfilled model to decentralise power, reduce armed conflict, and facilitate development in the country's complex socio-political landscape. Several of his administration's most prominent goals were closely tied to federalism— including the defeat of Al-Shabaab, the finalisation of Somalia's Provisional Constitution, and democratic federal and state elections.

Today, the political and security landscape of Somalia is markedly different from those heady early months. Military progress against Al-Shabaab has been limited at best since early 2023, with crucial coordination with regional Daraawiish and the Ma'awiisley having been largely discarded. Much of the territorial successes against the extremist group in 2022 have been steadily rolled back, with communities being returned to the jihadist's grip. Nevertheless, there has been some recent limited progress in Galmudug and Middle Shabelle, where clan militia, Danaab and Gorgor special forces under the Somali National Army (SNA), and Turkish and US air support are working in tandem. It is important not to overstate these military gains, but from them, it is clear that when these forces work together with precise objectives, progress can still be made against Al-Shabaab. Replicating this support and coordination in half a dozen additional locations would be positive, but it would require genuine local and regional cooperation with the federal government to achieve this.

Yet securing this cooperation across Somalia is currently nigh-impossible amid the deepening rifts between the federal government and the leadership of the Federal Member States as well as the communities within them. The short-term incentives to individual political leaders may buy time at the National Consultative Committee (NCC), but they will not secure any decisive military victory. It is the co-opting and undermining of the NCC to consolidate, not decentralise, power in Mogadishu that has helped to drive the deepening political crisis that the federal government is still attempting to obscure. It has been used to force through amendments to Chapters 1-4 of the Provisional Consitution-- revisions dubious in both process and content. With regional leaders, barring Darood-majority Puntland and Jubaland, currently meeting in Mogadishu, Villa Somalia is seeking to use the NCC to whitewash attempts to manipulate both the timing and the nature of state-level elections.

Further, both Jubaland and South West State have strongly objected to the federal government's announced end-of-year eviction of essential Ethiopian forces from the next iteration of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), now known as the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), and their threatened replacement by Egyptian forces—ostensibly because of the evolving Memorandum of Understanding between Addis and Hargeisa. Since January, the accompanying rhetoric from senior federal officials in an attempt to undermine the deal has grown so toxic that it has driven political instability in multiple Somalia-Ethiopia border areas.

It seems only parts of Galmudug and Hirshabelle remain in Hassan Sheikh's camp, both politically and militarily. In fact, conservative estimates have Al-Shabaab currently controlling some 35% or more of South-Central Somalia. Without Puntland and Jubaland, the federal government only controls a fraction of the country-- but can still influence, if only negatively, large sections of it. Yet, at the same time, two and half years into Hassan Sheikh's current term, Somalia's President claims ever more dubious military, political and international successes. Somalia may have joined the East African Community, had loans forgiven and had UN arms sanctions lifted, but the majority of Somalis are still suffering from poverty, hunger, and climate catastrophes, while armed conflict and extremist control have not diminished. As Somalia steps into its temporary seat on the UN Security Council in January 2025 for two years, its international partners must truly take off the rose-coloured glasses. 

The Federal Government of Somalia has stayed afloat these past years due to the hundreds of millions of USD in military, governance, humanitarian, and development assistance from the international community. With support from the Gulf, Turkey, and Egypt increasingly challenging the objectives of this assistance, Somalia's Western partners must stand firm and unify their messaging, political support and funding to effectively aid good governance and security sector reform. The stakes couldn't be much higher.

Not only must Somalia's European and North American partners, along with the African Union, Intergovernmental Authority on Development and United Nations, coordinate themselves, they must actively engage with and support Somalia's local communities, districts and regions, as well as its Federal Member States, from the bottom up. Much of Somalia's limited, incremental state-building that has been sustained has come through engagement at this level. The rhetoric of federalism and decentralisation should not be accepted as the lip service of a re-centralising federal government-- they are the only way for Somalia to find its way past Al-Shabaab and into a democratic future.

By the Somali Wire Team

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