Madoobe Charts His Own Course
The latest National Consultative Council (NCC) saga rumbles on. This afternoon, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is expected to return to Mogadishu after formalising the anti-Ethiopian 'Tripartite Alliance' between Somalia, Egypt, and Eritrea in Asmara. Awaiting him are the regional presidents of Galmudug, South West State, and Hirshabelle for further talks. Their long-serving Jubaland counterpart, Ahmed 'Madoobe,' remains conspicuously absent, having travelled to Kismaayo following the breakdown of the NCC talks. It appears increasingly unlikely that Hassan Sheikh will be able to salvage last week's meeting, where Madoobe rejected his offer of a one-year term extension for federally orchestrated 'one-person, one-vote' elections.
Historically a bulwark against the centralising ambitions of successive federal administrations, Madoobe rejected his ally's offer on several grounds, including the continued absence of the other Darood-majority Federal Member State (FMS) of Puntland from the NCC. Yet despite his return to Kismaayo last week, Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre publicly insisted that the NCC talks were not yet over, and both he and the Somali president have sought to entice Madoobe back to the capital to thrash out an acceptable deal. Madoobe has rebuffed these, however, and now appears to be preparing for his own regional presidential elections to secure his political future —likely for a 5-year term and organised by his own administration- without the federal government.
Yesterday, addressing members of his cabinet, Madoobe insisted that his FMS would not be involved in any further term extensions, emphasising that the state-level election will be held 'on time' and independently. Though he overstayed his term and amended the regional constitution in July to allow him to serve a third term, Madoobe told his cabinet that any further term extensions would not benefit Somalia. He also asserted that it is currently impossible to hold direct elections in Somalia without the necessary preconditions in place, namely the liberation of the country from Al-Shabaab, requisite reconciliation among the Somali people, and an agreement on the election process. And, quite correctly, Madoobe noted that Hassan Sheikh's proposed one-year extension would not be enough time to organise a popular election in the country. Subsequently, he has directed his electoral commission to begin preparing for indirect elections, with the likelihood of his re-election all but certain considering his grip on Kismaayo and Jubaland's politics.
Hassan Sheikh is in a bind, facing little to no ability to compel Madoobe to return to Mogadishu and strike a deal. Subsequently, either he criticises the Jubaland president as looking to frustrate the 'will of the people' by holding indirect elections– and looks weak because of it– or Hassan Sheikh lets Madoobe continue with elections– and also looks weak.
Meanwhile, South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen and his Galmudug counterpart Ahmed Abdi Karie 'QoorQoor' are still in Mogadishu. With Hassan Sheikh currently isolated from Puntland and Jubaland, their logic is self-evident– that with the president in dire need of domestic allies, they can likely extract greater political concessions from him. It is the highest order of short-termist politics. If Hassan Sheikh cannot bring together the one-year term extension for the 'one-person, one-vote elections' plan, he may go with his 'Plan B' and seek to bring about elections in South West State and Galmudug as well. In the former, the federal government is unlikely to have any real say in any indirect polls, with the Ethiopians fully in control of Baidoa's airport, another potent symbol of Villa Somalia's continued lack of influence in key cities in the country, including Kismaayo and Garowe.
Galmudug is a different story, however. QoorQoor is unlikely to be the favoured candidate of Villa Somalia, with both Mahad Salad and Liban Shuluq the front-runners for that position. Salad has a particularly close relationship with the Egyptians, having previously served as an informant for their intelligence service, and much of his family remains in Cairo. He also belongs to the Ayr sub-clan of the Habar Gedir, next up on the unofficial rotation of the regional presidency between the three major sub-clans. Shuluq, meanwhile, has been stoking discontent and actively preparing for the long-overdue elections.
The absence of the two-majority Darood FMS from the NCC, though it is unclear if Madoobe will remain on the sidelines, is an unmitigated crisis for Villa Somalia. The perception of the federal government as Hawiye-dominated has steadily built in the past year, only ameliorated by Madoobe's continued support for his allies in Villa Somalia. That has now shattered. While Villa Somalia has deepened its ties with Asmara and Ankara and developed a new destabilising relationship with Cairo, domestically, it has lacked focus and direction for some time now, opening up new fronts of internal political conflict that it cannot win or fixing up short-term political compromises that cannot hold. It had been abundantly clear for several months that Madoobe or Laftagareen, or both, would likely split from the federal government's one-person, one-vote plan and conduct their own elections. Madoobe's withdrawal can be read as both a strong defence of federalism and a self-interested move to secure re-election without the oversight of a federal electoral body. Moving forward, whatever Villa Somalia decides next, the trap it has forged for itself has left no palatable choices.
By the Somali Wire
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