Issue No. 741

UNdone: The End of UNSOM

In May, a letter from Somalia's Foreign Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi to the UN Security Council (UNSC) surfaced, proposing the termination of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) when its mandate ended in October 2024. It came shortly after Catriona Laing's departure as the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) to Somalia and caught most by surprise. A chaotic back-and-forth followed, eventually resulting in an agreed two-year transition from a UN political office to a country one. Experienced US diplomat and former SRSG to Somalia Jim Swan has been brought back to oversee the transition.
 
From November onwards, after 11 years, UNSOM will be rebranded as the UN Assistance Transition Mission in Somalia (UNATMIS), a clear nod to the African Union peacekeeping mission also set to transition at the end of 2024. Why the federal government would want to reference the peacekeeping mission is unclear, but the end of UNSOM has been touted as the next step in Somalia's state-building trajectory. Federal officials have repeatedly asserted that now is the time to step in and assume a host of responsibilities from the UN-- and take greater control of the money that comes with it. Fiqi's initial letter that proposed UNSOM's conclusion also aligns with the broader 'Mogadishu Rising' narrative that Somalia has turned a definitive corner. Anything to the contrary is doom and gloom from naysayers looking to undermine the country.
 
The outlines of the transition by a joint UN-federal committee have been published and, while still negotiable, are revealing about the federal government's priorities. For the next two years, a quasi-political office will remain, but the central tenets of the proposed transition appear to be 1) to reduce scrutiny of the federal government and 2) to sustain the flow of financial support from the international community. A key question is whether the UN mission will retain its convening political power, with it currently allowed to involve itself in political reconciliation, even when the federal government opposes it. If this facilitatory capacity is removed, it will seriously neuter the UN mission's capacity as an independent body. Moreover, according to the document, the SRSG will hold just a single closed UNSC briefing session per year, drastically diminishing one of the central public-facing analyses of Somalia's political, security, and humanitarian situation. These briefings have rankled successive federal administrations, with Laing's perceived outspokenness at the UNSC one of the principal reasons Villa Somalia successfully lobbied against her term renewal. On the funding side, the UN will also support Somalia's federal government in accessing donor funding that aligns with its 'development priorities.'
 
According to the proposal document, the UN will continue supporting the constitutional review and electoral processes. Electorally, this will take the form of largely financial and technical assistance. Yet the constitutional review process, after years of painstaking technical support, has been co-opted at the 11th hour by Villa Somalia and used to push its radically centralising agenda. The controversial passage of the heavily revised Chapters 1-4 of the Provisional Constitution in parliament triggered Puntland's withdrawal of recognition of the federal government earlier this year. And the likelihood of Somalia's federal government conducting 'one-person, one-vote' elections of any convincing quality in the next year remains essentially zero. While the UN will likely be asked to continue footing the bill for these dubious exercises, their capacity to critique the proceedings will be diminished.
 
Other areas also highlighted for the federal government to assume control over include stabilisation, climate adaptation and resilience, and women's representation and participation, though it acknowledges it will require support from other UN agencies. Here, one can expect UN scrutiny to be diminished as well. Regarding women's representation and participation, the federal administration has shown little interest in advancing either—removing all reference to the 30% quota in politics from the Provisional Constitution and appointing a general to the renamed Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development-- now the Ministry of Family.
 
More broadly, the politicisation of development funds through the federal government should also raise alarms about this transition. Villa Somalia has blatantly weaponised development money intended for Puntland to pressure the regional administration amid their political dispute over the country's direction. Though the UN and the Puntland administration have agreed to work together, directing funds into the coffers of Villa Somalia could further embolden the government to continue its centralising agenda with carte blanche. The question now is whether this pattern could extend to Jubaland, with regional President Ahmed 'Madoobe' publicly withdrawing from last week's National Consultative Council meeting.
 
Fundamentally, the federal government still lacks the capacity to absorb and implement the UN's responsibilities. While there can be a certain degree of paternalism when discussing Somalia, the state's functions and architecture remain extremely limited in many departments. At the heart of this is the contradiction of the international community having recognised the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2012 prematurely, without the real foundations of a political settlement in place. Consequently, UNSOM, and others in the international community, have suffered from their clunky mandate, having to support successive administrations in 'state-building' while its occupants seek to politicise or undermine the limited progress made. Still, much remains to be seen whether the UN can effectively respond to its mandate and personnel being reduced. Keeping the right personnel and capabilities will be critical, though this is infamously difficult in the restrictive UN system. But the UNSOM transition comes at a moment of a confluence of rising political and security crises for Somalia, with more scrutiny, not less, truly needed.
 
 By the Somali Wire team