Kicking the Can Down the Federal Road: Somalia’s NCC in Crisis
During the first Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) administration, the National Consultative Council (NCC) worked as an influential formative mechanism for the federal system. Then known as either the National Leaders Forum or the National Consultative Forum, there were two largely distinguishable camps– the federal government and the opposition, comprised of the regional leadership. Through these iterations, crucial elements of the current federal model were hammered out, often in the face of extreme resistance from Villa Somalia. It was an essential check-and-balance each way, but particularly to reign in the centralising instincts of a government reluctant to implement a federal system. It was HSM's successor, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, however, who took a sledgehammer to the forum, removing the federalism element and installing several surrogates as Federal Member State (FMS) leaders to de-fang the body.
Upon his return to Villa Somalia in May 2022, HSM promised to return the NCC to a body designed to progress federalism through consensus. Intended to meet every other month, there was plenty to tackle- not least flushing out the federal model and finalising the Provisional Constitution. Instead, it has become a mechanism for either elite consensus to postpone elections or a battleground over federal and regional leaders' self-interested electoral models and timing. Repeat term extensions have been offered to highly unpopular FMS leaders facing significant internal political opposition in exchange for their often reluctant support for Villa Somalia's various agendas.
With every FMS leader unable to truly represent their body politic due to their particular clan heritage, i.e. Jubaland President Ahmed Madoobe hails from the Ogadeen, while a large proportion of the FMS is Mareehaan, the NCC itself is already a dubious representation of the country at best-- even leaving aside Puntland's absence. And three of the four regional leaders present, South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagreen and his counterparts in Galmudug, Ahmed Abdi Karie 'QoorQoor,' and Jubaland, Ahmed Madoobe, terms have expired, casting further doubt on any status of the body's elite pacts.
Without a secretariat, the NCC is convened at Villa Somalia's beck and call, which only chooses to hold them when it feels the political wind blowing in its direction. Months have gone by without the federal and regional leaders coming together, allowing progress on a host of topics, not least issues like fiscal federalism, to atrophy. The ad hoc, intermittent meetings have kicked the can down the road on pressing matters, allowed Villa Somalia to evade scrutiny on its unilaterally centralising agenda, and the FMS presidents to continue avoiding pressure on holding their own overdue presidential elections.
This week's meeting was little different, having been repeatedly delayed by the schism between the South West State administration led by Laftagareen and Villa Somalia, as well as Madoobe's ill health. As before, HSM once again offered the four FMS leaders another 12-month term extension before some version of one-person, one-vote polls could be held. It appears to have gone down poorly, though, with reports of a heated stand-off over the future of the regional presidential elections and the plan to consolidate federal authority over them.
Villa Somalia's repeat attempts to undermine the federal system, most notably through the sweeping changes to Chapters 1-4 of the Provisional Constitution rushed through parliament earlier this year, is drawing even some resistance from those like Laftagareen, who care little for the broader questions of federalism. But it was Madoobe yesterday who refused to agree to any concrete electoral decisions without Puntland's representation and walked out of the tense meeting. It is a still-evolving situation, but the discontent within the NCC reflects the broader issues with Villa Somalia's disinterest in reaching a consensus for its hyper-nationalist foreign policy agenda and aggressively centralising domestic policies.
The continued and conspicuous absence of Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni further calls into question the purpose of a diminished NCC. The Puntland leader has boycotted the forum since December 2023, and instead travelled to Bosasso this week to ostensibly launch military operations against Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia. Deni is also seeking to shore up support for his administration in the arterial port city following destabilising tensions between the Puntland Security Forces (PSF) and the Garowe-aligned Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF). Without the representation of one of the key pillars of Somalia, the legitimacy of the NCC's decisions can be called into question when it is not even a constitutional body and must rely on the federal parliament to lend a veneer of legitimacy to its decisions.
Rather than finding compromise, the NCC has become a co-opted and weakened body that does not reflect or attempt to tackle the crises within Somalia's peripheries. There is a backlog of political and security crises that are building, not least concerning the next iteration of the African Union peacekeeping mission scheduled to begin in 2025. Major sticking points about sourcing the funding and, particularly publicised, the troop-contributing countries remain, with the lack of internal consensus within the NCC and Somalia only fuelling the chaotic buildup. A credible, effective, strategic-thinking NCC would certainly have helped resolve this and other vexed issues facing the country.
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Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.