Waare's Honest Speech – Will Anyone Listen?
Over the weekend in Garowe, the Puntland Development and Research Centre (PDRC), a Somali research and advocacy organisation in Puntland, convened its annual conference to discuss peace and security dynamics in the Horn of Africa. One of the most interesting speeches was delivered by the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)'s deputy executive director and former president of Hirshabelle Mohammed Abdi Waare. He was among a handful of prominent Somali intellectuals and former leaders invited to the conference.
Waare's speech was unscripted and digressive but attracted plenty of attention for his refreshing honesty. In the first part of his speech, Waare launched a scathing attack on Somalia's political elite for squandering opportunities to make progress on good governance and institution-building and the escalating tensions between Mogadishu and the Federal Member State's leadership. "The current situation is extremely dire. To be honest, I fear for this country," he said. With the African Union still remaining absent from any serious intervention or commentary in the escalating tensions between Cairo, Mogadishu, and Addis, Waare's speech was a marked change from the inactivity of Africa's key multilaterals.
Before Waare spoke, Prof Abdirahman Baadiyow rose to the rostrum to provide a rosy picture of the situation. Baadiyow, a close ally of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), lauded the constitution review process-- which, of course, he chaired-- and the reforms to modernise the electoral system--designed to consolidate the power of the Islamist right. Baadiyow is an Islamist ideologue and senior figure within the Muslim Brotherhood-inspired Al-Islah movement, who writes about the need for an Islamic order and injecting Islamic moral values into Somali politics.
Waare's critique of Baadiyow was equally devastating. The call for Islamic values, he said, was misleading and insufficient to explain the current rot. It was not the lack of Islamic values that explains Somali political dysfunction, but the abundance of faux Islamism or, as he put it, the 'immorality' of failing to match values with action. He noted that traditional Islamic values like honesty, integrity, respect for public resources, and inclusivity were universal and not exclusively Islamic values. He also cited an unnamed study of ethical values, which showed that Malaysia is the closest any Muslim state has come to respecting those values. Waare said the top 30 states that conformed to or respected those values were majority Christian states in Scandinavia, Europe and North America. The irony he pointed out is that some Christian countries `were more respectful or conformed to traditional 'Islamic' values than many Muslim states.
Waare, a liberal US-educated Somali, is speaking for many increasingly disillusioned with Mogadishu's lurch to the Islamist right and the hyper-nationalism that has gripped the capital since January 2024 after Ethiopia signed a sea access deal with Somaliland. On Egypt and Somalia, Waare departed from Mogadishu's oft-repeated line that Cairo was an ally and an instrument to preserve Somalia's sovereignty against Ethiopian meddling. Egypt, he said, was an opportunistic power advancing its own national interest and not a closer 'brother' or ally than Ethiopia. He continued that the North African state had demonstrated little interest in helping Somalia in the last 30 years, and its renewed interest is motivated primarily by concerns over the Nile water basin and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) dispute with Addis. "Where was Egypt during the last 30 years when Somalia was struggling with all sorts of problems?" He warned Somalis against becoming entangled in a regional proxy war between Ethiopia and Egypt.
The warning on Egypt will likely fall on deaf ears. In actual fact, just as Waare was making his speech, an Egyptian cargo ship was docked at the Port of Mogadishu, carrying a large consignment of lethal weapons from Cairo. Widely circulating social media footage showed trucks towing artillery pieces and carrying munition boxes leaving the port.
Despite the latest injection of lethal aid, Egypt continues to overhype its intervention and capacity in Somalia. The North African state is a diminished power hemmed in by multiple crises, particularly the destabilisation of the Red Sea and the growing conflagration in the Middle East. While it is almost certainly unable to play an effective and constructive military role in Somalia, its capacity to play the 'spoiler' role is self-evident. A proliferation of lethal weapons in a context where the state is weak further adds to the glut in the grey arms market and could foment armed violence between clans and regions if the weapons go unchecked. A week earlier, Ethiopia is also reported to have sent an unspecified quantity of weapons and ammunition to Puntland. Federal officials have responded angrily to the reported delivery of arms to Puntland, overlooking their own role in August's Abduwaaq arms scandal.
Waare is no longer a Somali official, and the original decision to back his candidature for the IGAD post was primarily motivated by HSM's desire to neuter or defang possible critics. An Abgaal intellectual with roots in the Shabelle, Waare's views carry some weight within the Hawiye clan but also remain influential at the national level. Mogadishu cannot easily cast off his opinion, as it has sought to do so with other critics. The former Hirshabelle president helped facilitate IGAD Executive Director Workneh Gebeyehu's recent visit to Mogadishu after months of somewhat fraught relations between the body and the federal government. An IGAD Climate Change Centre of Excellence is also slated to be built in Somalia's capital, a project that will attract both attention and funding. Consequently, Mogadishu will likely calculate that it cannot afford to upset the balance, even if it may be frustrated by Waare's stinging critiques of the government's Islamist tendencies and foreign policy choices.
By the Somali Wire team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
Today marks exactly two months since Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) unveiled his unilateral one-year term extension. While it is too early to draw definitive conclusions, HSM has evidently survived, rebounded, and consolidated power in ways that defy earlier predictions. A leader whom many had been wont to dismiss as too tarnished to retain executive power beyond May 2026 remains firmly in the saddle, holding the political initiative and dictating terms. His opponents, meanwhile, are in deep disarray. Their cohesion is fracturing, they lack a coherent, unified strategy, and they are locked in a dialogue of attrition designed to wear down their will and force their capitulation.
The Somaliland–Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was hailed as a historic breakthrough. In reality, it was a strategic gamble built on contradictions—and its apparent failure may prove to be a blessing in disguise for Somaliland and Ethiopia.
For the first time in over six decades, Somalia has overhauled its foundational criminal law - the 1962 Law No. 5. Now awaiting parliamentary and presidential approval, the Draft Somali Penal Code (SPC) nonetheless struggles with multiple hurdles and will likely face significant objection, not least, from Somalia’s Western partners and liberal-minded younger generation of Somalis disappointed with the new text’s failure to break away from its historical illiberal roots.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has published a new Draft Somalia Penal Code (SPC) - marking its first comprehensive legal overhaul in 64 years. The 136-page draft was first submitted to Parliament in January 2026 and underwent its first reading but the process of endorsing it became entangled with the escalating electoral and constitutional dispute, forcing the government to shelve it. The changes aim to update the 1962 Law No. 5 Penal Code and codify Islamic criminal law (uqubat). If endorsed by parliament and approved by the President, they will formally embed the three pillars of the Sharia punitive framework into the statute - fixed punishments (hudud), retributive justice (qisas), and statutory judicial discretion (ta'zir).
A president does not pay a visit to Wajir by accident. When William Samoei Ruto chose Wajir as the centre stage for Kenya’s Madaraka Day celebrations on 1 June — the first sitting president to do so — he was not merely varying the ceremonial calendar. He was making a premeditated statement about who belongs at the centre of Kenya’s state and who no longer belongs at its margins. The message was not merely ‘taking Nairobi to NorthEastern.’ It was the centring and mainstreaming of an ethnic Somali-dominated region that, for much of Kenya’s post-colonial history, has been treated as a security issue rather than a political constituency.
Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro’s trip to Israel in June (from 14-17) was far more than symbolism. Not only was it a calculated strategic diplomatic play, and a chance for Somaliland to appear on the world stage, but also an opportunity for Somaliland to present itself as a fully-functional state, able to conduct foreign relations and cut bilateral deals. Irro, a seasoned former diplomat, navigated the intricate demands of state protocol with remarkable ease - cutting an immaculate, regal figure in his navy-blue suit. Accorded full head-of-state honours, he laid a wreath at the Theodore Herzl mausoleum, engaged in high-level talks with President Isaac Herzog and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, opened the new Somaliland embassy in Jerusalem and convened meetings with Knesset members, senior officials, and business leaders. For Israel, hosting President Abdirahman Irro in Jerusalem functioned to signal its strong commitment to deepening strategic ties while also countering perceptions of waning diplomatic momentum.
Never interrupt your enemy when they are making a mistake. Napoleon Bonaparte’s classic rule of combat seems to be the guiding doctrine behind Al-Shabaab’s sudden, uncharacteristic radio silence as Mogadishu’s political elite tear themselves apart. As the ‘government-in-waiting’, one would have assumed the militants would take full advantage of its adversaries’ internal divisions, maximising the propaganda opportunities this offers, and campaign for their own cause. Typically quick to weaponise any intra-Somali division, the militant group's decision to sit out the latest intra-Somali fracturing is intriguing. By withholding its usual blitz of propaganda, the group is playing a longer, quieter game - waiting for the federal house to implode further before stepping in.
While much international attention is on Mogadishu – understandably so - another electoral crisis is brewing in the regional state of Galmudug. Historically unstable, prone to Al-Shabaab violence and destabilisation and wracked by chronic inter-clan frictions and periodic armed hostilities, the looming vote appears likely to aggravate the situation and foment more divisions.
Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.