The Breaking of the Baidoa Agreement
The Baidoa agreement has returned to bite President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM). Negotiated in February 2023 between South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen, HSM, the Speaker of Parliament Aden Madoobe, and regional opposition, the decision was made to postpone South West elections until later that year due to concerns of renewed political violence. Laftagareen was begrudgingly granted another term extension on the proviso that traditional polls would be held and that the opposition militia in Baidoa withdraw.
Yet clearly, the South West State presidential elections were never held, as HSM handed Laftagareen repeated political lifelines to delay the vote—through the National Consultative Council (NCC) agreement in May 2023, the unrealised promise of 'Phase II' military operations in southern Somalia, and the rewriting of the Provisional Constitution. Despite protestations from regional opposition, Laftagareen was essentially granted federally mandated term extensions in exchange for his political support for Mogadishu's sweeping constitutional and electoral agenda. The South West president was further given leeway to persecute his political opponents—including barring them from travelling to Baidoa, targeting the Leysan militia in Berdale in 2024, installing loyal district commissioners, and tightening his grip on power by amending the regional constitution in late February.
Today, with regional and domestic tensions ratcheting over the proposed deployment of Egyptian troops to Somalia, the leeway has only enabled and emboldened Laftagareen to diverge from the federal government position. But Laftagareen remains nothing if not a highly political being. He is keenly aware that the future of Ethiopian troops in South West State is fluid, and that there is only a certain extent to which he can rely upon them. The South West president's emphasis on patriotism and vocal backing of communities opposed to the Ethiopian withdrawal may have drawn internal support to his cause. However, many still understand that this political manoeuvring is not sustainable, and while long-marginalised communities like the Leysan are supportive of the Ethiopians remaining, it should not be taken as full-throated support for Laftagareen. The South West president has currently aligned himself with the Ethiopian position, but he may return to Villa Somalia if he senses he can better secure his political future there. This also brings complexities, and it is unclear what the Ethiopian reaction would be if Laftagareen switched to opposing their presence in Baidoa and elsewhere.
The ongoing internal wrangles have also upended Villa Somalia's plans to hold an NCC meeting. Laftagareen is currently unwilling to attend, though he is politically mercurial, Jubaland President Ahmed 'Madoobe' is still convalescing after a bout of illness, and their Puntland counterpart Said Abdullahi Deni remains absent as well. Consequently, if it were held, only Hawiye-majority Federal Member States would be represented at the NCC, something that even this government is unlikely to countenance.
Villa Somalia is attempting a carrot-and-stick approach with the South West president—seeking reconciliation while simultaneously entertaining the possibility of rival elections in Baraawe. Last week, Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre was dispatched to Baidoa to defuse tensions to no avail before the Speaker of Parliament, who hails from the Rahanweyne, also reached out to Laftagareen. This yielded no results, and General Mahad Abdirahman, the Commander of the Custodial Corps, has now travelled today to negotiate with Laftagareen in Baidoa. He also happens to be the South West State president's father-in-law.
At the same time, the federal government is seeking to secure its hold on the coastal town of Baraawe-- the regional capital of South West State. On Monday, Haram'ad Special Police and Gorgor commandos were deployed there, while a plane transporting South West and Ethiopian military officials from Baidoa was denied landing. The federal government is actively considering Baraawe as an alternate location to Baidoa for federally-directed parallel regional presidential elections if Laftagareen cannot be enticed back into the fold. But this has also forced Villa Somalia to return to the regional opposition that it snubbed for the best part of 18 months, who have little sympathy for the predicament the government has created for itself and previously warned of Laftagareen's nature.
Several names are being bandied about as possible candidates to challenge Laftagareen, including the former South West President Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden. However, the political game-changer would be reformed Al-Shabaab commander and federal Minister of Religion Mukhtar Robow. He comes from the Leysan, remains popular in South West, and has no love for Laftagareen, who helped engineer Robow's highly controversial jailing in December 2018 to deny his election as regional president.
Much remains uncertain, and it is far from decided whether the federal government will seek regional presidential elections to intensify pressure on Laftagareen. Moreover, the precise numbers and locations of Egyptian troops to be deployed in Somalia remain unknown, and it is unclear whether Baraawe would be a possible locale. If they are deployed to Baraawe, though, it would be potentially calamitous for South West as it could trigger violence between them and Ethiopian troops, who would be securing rival presidential elections. In the event of parallel elections, the legitimacy of any victor would be contested, and the federal government may well choose to strangle the Baidoa government of resources in favour of the Baraawe administration.
What was particularly concerning earlier this week was the federally-directed detention of the Huddur-based 9th Somali National Army Battalion Commander in Mogadishu as he travelled from Baidoa after meeting with Laftagreen. Though the Speaker of Parliament soon secured his release, it was an unseemly return to tactics once repeatedly employed by HSM's predecessor, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo. Preventing officials and military commanders from meeting with political opposition should not be countenanced by the federal government, though it is rather revealing about where their priorities currently lie.
The highly charged and polarised political environment consuming Somalia is hardly conducive to a resolution that will benefit communities in South West State. And it appears that many in the federal government are uninterested in finding one, as evidenced by the latest comments by Somali Civil Aviation Ministry Director General Bashir Moalim that those offering support for the Ethiopian troops are not Somali but rather the "children" of Ethiopian soldiers. The comments are not only distasteful but blatantly ignore Villa Somalia's own role in the fraught situation today and that many of these communities concerned about a resurgent Al-Shabaab have repeatedly raised the alarm to the federal government about Laftagareen's disinterest in tackling the extremist group. Above all, however, Villa Somalia's failure to abide by the Baidoa agreement is proving costly to itself and, once again, shows the dangers of unilateral term extensions in Somalia.
By the Somali Wire team
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