Barre’s Dash to Baidoa
On Wednesday morning, Somalia's longest-serving Prime Minister, Hamza Abdi Barre, departed to Baidoa to soothe rising discontent between the South West State administration and Villa Somalia. Relations have badly deteriorated in recent weeks amid the furore surrounding the proposed deployment of Egyptian troops to Somalia and parallel demands for Ethiopian forces to withdraw. Among others, clan elders and parliamentarians from South West have repeatedly accused Mogadishu of riding roughshod over concerns that their marginalised communities will be left exposed to Al-Shabaab if Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) troops withdraw.
The mission doesn't appear to have gone well. Having already criticised the treatment of his parliamentarians, South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen publicly rebuked Barre in a speech yesterday. The FMS president criticised the 'hollow nationalism' of the federal government while mounting a strong defence of federalism– a clear rejection of Mogadishu's centralising instinct. Having bided his time on the issue, Laftagareen further said that it would be pointless to hold another National Consultative Council (NCC) without Puntland being represented. While Mogadishu, Cairo and Addis continue to publicly spar, within Somalia, a full-blown crisis between the centre and periphery is sparking.
Barre's visit to Baidoa also sheds light on the particular 'enforcer' role that the prime minister carved out during his time in office. The prime minister can say the 'quiet things out loud' that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) cannot. He has the license to go on the attack on a host of topics– particularly when it comes to bashing Mogadishu's opponents in Puntland and, more latterly, in Addis. Others, like Foreign Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi, play a similar role to Barre within the federal government. Barre's outspokenness and hardline Islamist positions have repeatedly proven controversial, however. In light of Israel's invasion of the Gaza Strip, he has called Jewish people the "children of pigs and monkeys," dismissed the notion that Hamas are a terrorist group, and most recently questioned the recognition of Israel as a sovereign state. But critically for the president, Barre is also seemingly happy to play second fiddle to HSM, even actively campaigning for a reduction in his responsibilities through the controversial amendments to the Provisional Constitution earlier this year.
Now the longest-serving prime minister, Barre's longevity is quite the departure from the typical political shelf-life of his predecessors. Since Somalia's transitional government was established in Arta in Djibouti over two decades ago, the country has seen 5 presidents but 15 prime ministers. Former Presidents Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), in his first term, each had three prime ministers, while Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo had two.
The reasons for the ousting of the different PMs are varied but have typically emerged from similar structural problems within Somalia's political system. Articles 90 and 100 in the Provisional Constitution lay out the roles, responsibilities, and powers of the president and PM– but are ambiguous and contradictory on the delineation of executive power. Other issues, such as competing technical teams within Villa Somalia, divided loyalties on the Council of Ministers, and a non-functional Constitutional Court, have all played a role in the churn of prime ministers. Though a president can appoint a prime minister, he must turn to parliament to table a vote of no-confidence to remove the latter, which has resulted in ugly political scraps.
Consequently, Barre's elevation in 2022 was considered a smart move by HSM to consolidate power within Villa Somalia and, with their relationship dating back over two decades, avoid possible scheming that could distract from his presidency. During HSM's first term between 2012 and 2017, Barre acted as secretary-general of their party– then known as the Peace and Development Party, today the Union of Peace and Development (UPD). He also latterly served as the chair of Jubaland's electoral commission, establishing a close relationship with regional President Ahmed Madoobe. Both the PM and Jubaland president are from the Reer Abdille, a sub-clan of the Mohamed Zubeyr of the Ogaden that holds influence in both Kenya and Ethiopia.
Barre was the first Ogadeni to be appointed PM– a break from the tradition of either the president or prime minister hailing from the Darood's Majerteen and the Marehaan clans. In the early weeks of his second term in May 2022, HSM came under pressure to appoint a Puntlander to the post, but he chose to reward loyalty and prioritise the Jubaland relationship instead. Then, it was perceived as a signal that the president was ready to repair the relationship between Mogadishu and Kismaayo, which had suffered badly under Farmaajo. Today, Barre's strong ties to Jubaland are being increasingly raised amid reports that Madoobe is gravely ill. There is no clear successor to the long-serving Jubaland president, and there is ongoing speculation that should the post suddenly become vacant, HSM may seek to insert his loyal ally into Kismaayo. Obtaining Kenya's backing will be critical, however, and Barre's outspokenness may spook Nairobi, which enjoys a close relationship with the incumbent.
In the meantime, it appears unlikely that Barre will be able to easily patch up relations with Laftagareen in Baidoa, upon who Mogadishu relies to lend a degree of legitimacy to its rewriting of Somalia's constitution and electoral system. Foreign Minister Ahmed Fiqi has also doubled down on the troop-contributing countries within the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), excluding Ethiopia and including Egypt. Restoring the elite-level pact may shore up the federal government's political position regarding its plan to deploy Egyptian troops in the interim. However, it will not change the military realities of an Ethiopian withdrawal nor soothe the anger in the Leysan and other Rahanweyne clans that work closely with the ENDF. A skilled politician, Barre has been able to survive in his position for so long because of his ease as the 'number two' in Villa Somalia, but tackling the government's mounting crises requires adept political compromise that does not come naturally to him. The political fallout from Barre's trip to Baidoa is yet to be seen, but one can hope that the prime minister was able to hear the concerns of the much-overlooked South West communities. There is still space for compromise and moderation, but it is rapidly shrinking.
By the Somali Wire team
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