Reports of Ethiopian forces seizing the Luuq airport in Somalia's Gedo region marks a dangerous new flashpoint in the unravelling relationship between the two countries. In what has been the most volatile week yet, tensions have reached fever pitch, with warlike rhetoric and assertive declarations of ‘sovereignty’ signalling a dangerous descent into further confrontation. This bold and calculated gamble by Addis signals a stark shift from rhetoric to decisive action, testing Somalia’s resolve but also setting a dangerous precedent for further escalation.
Ethiopia’s military involvement in Somalia began in 2006 and continued with its integration into the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in 2012. Its role as a frontline force against al-Shabaab has proven critical, with Ethiopian forces not only countering insurgents but securing borders and providing essential support to local Somali authorities. Over the years, Ethiopia has built strong ties with clan populations, forging relationships based on mutual trust. These deep-rooted local connections are difficult to replicate, and any replacement of Ethiopian forces— particularly by Egyptian forces— would likely leave the newcomers isolated and susceptible to Al-Shabaab attacks.
A generally pro-Ethiopia, anti-Egypt sentiment in Somalia's South West State and Gedo reflects Ethiopia’s deep-rooted connections. Regional lawmakers and other citizens have openly expressed their support for Ethiopian forces, with protesters in South West State holding signs proclaiming, "Masar Ma Rabno (We Don’t Need Egypt)’. Local administrations for Hudur and Wajid issued a joint statement lauding Ethiopian soldiers for their sacrifice and long-standing cooperation with the community in defending against their enemies.
Tensions in Somalia’s Lower House of Parliament reached a breaking point following the pro-Ethiopia protests, with South West State MPs defending their constituents' rejection of Egyptian forces, and Hawiye MPs filing a motion accusing them of treason. After two sessions were postponed amidst heated debate, the Speaker intervened and both sides agreed to "uphold Somalia’s unity and sovereignty." But within days, South West President Abdiaziz Laftagareen praised the South West State lawmakers for supporting the pro-Ethiopia protesters, framing their actions as patriotic, in stark contrast to the federal government's portrayal of the lawmakers as treasonous.
Somalia's Minister of Defence Abdulkadir Mohamed Noor then issued a stern warning to Laftagareen, emphasizing that the people of South West State should not be subjected to the authority of what he termed a "historical enemy." Shortly after that, in a press briefing, Prime Minister Hamza Barre delivered his most blistering critique of Ethiopia to date, accusing the neighbouring state of harbouring an aggressive ambition. He said, “Ethiopia wants to either take our waters by force or force us to accept an agreement they made with Somaliland.” Neither of these, he vowed, would succeed under his administration. The South West State administration's stance reveals a federal government increasingly isolated from its regions and highlights the ongoing battle over the narrative of sovereignty and national unity. While Mogadishu currently perceives support for Ethiopian forces as a betrayal of national sovereignty, Laftagareen perceives it as necessary and patriotic, to ensure the security and stability of both South West State and Somalia as a whole.
As could be expected, Ethiopia has responded assertively, blending diplomatic defiance with gunboat diplomacy. Over the past week, Addis has issued a series of indirect but still pointed warnings to both Mogadishu and Cairo. The Ethiopian Air Force, in a show of strength, announced heightened vigilance over the country’s eastern airspace, demonstrating it is fully prepared to carry out its national duty. In a Sovereignty Day address, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed reinforced this stance, stating that Ethiopia has never initiated invasions but it has always defended itself against foreign threats. His warning was clear: any attempt to violate Ethiopian sovereignty would be met with serious resistance. In a more diplomatic move, Ethiopia formally rejected Egypt's accusations regarding Nile water usage in its letter to the UN Security Council. It asserted that the management of natural resources falls strictly within its national jurisdiction.
At the recently concluded China-Africa Cooperation Summit in Beijing, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud reportedly declined to meet with Prime Minister Abiy, despite diplomatic overtures made by Djiboutian and Mauritanian presidents, former Nigerian President Obasanjo, and Kenya’s President William Ruto. To hold public or off-the-record sidebar discussions at such a forum is normal, so Hassan Sheikh’s rejection holds weight.
The fracture between Ethiopia and Somalia has also exposed an unsettling silence at regional and international bodies, including the African Union and IGAD, casting doubt on their abilities to fulfil their roles. And as tensions escalate, the fate of the Ankara talks slated for next week remains uncertain. The urgency for effective diplomacy has never been greater. It is crucial for these organizations, alongside the Somali federal government and its federal member states, to actively engage in meaningful dialogue and mediation to prevent further escalation and stabilize the region.
By the Somali Wire team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.