Fractured Alliances
Less than three years ago, ex-President Mohamed Abdullahi 'Farmaajo' and his intelligence chief Fahad Yasin were Somalia's two most powerful men. Backed by Qatar, the two had overseen the rise of the insurgent populist Nabad iyo Noyool movement that propelled Farmaajo into Villa Somalia in 2017. The subsequent 5 years of the Farmaajo-Fahad duo took a sledgehammer to Somalia’s nascent institutions. Federalism, free and fair elections, the war on Al-Shabaab, and the country’s international and regional standing all suffered during their authoritarian-inclined tenure. But the days of their Qatari-backed collaboration may be over following a 1 September public announcement of political divorce by Fahad.
Thanking Farmaajo for his past support and government positions, Fahad said that his decision to break from the former president was made not out of personal but for national interest. The former Al-I'tisaam Al-Islamiyah (AIAI) acolyte and Al Jazeera journalist said he would consult with allies before making any decisions about his own political trajectory. What an ignominious end to one of the most consequential alliances in modern Somali politics. And of course, this fuels speculation that both men may seek the presidency in Somalia’s 2026 federal elections.
Fahad was initially Farmaajo's campaign manager, and the dispenser of Qatari funds, during the corrupt 2017 presidential election. Upon the new president's arrival in Villa Somalia, Fahad was first appointed chief of staff before being shuffled to the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) in August 2018. It was during his time in NISA that Fahad established a reputation as an authoritarian and Al-Shabaab-inclined figure. There were numerous scandals under his leadership, including the murder of Ikran Tahlil, the young NISA analyst who disappeared in 2021. Tahlil is thought to have had information concerning the clandestine dispatch of several thousand Somali recruits to Eritrea-- another brainchild of Fahad. The recruits later participated in Eritrean fighting in the Tigray war. It is widely believed that it was Fahad who orchestrated Ikran’s disappearance. NISA was also inflitrated by Al-Shabaab during Fahad's tenure, with extremists who had 'defected' appointed to senior positions.
At the heart of Fahad’s partnership with Farmaajo—and its unravelling— is Qatar, whose influence has loomed large over Somali politics for many years. Through Fahad, Qatari funds and influence flowed into Farmaajo's administration, as Doha established itself as the power behind the throne, and steered the federal government on key issues. This included Mogadishu siding with Qatar, despite public neutrality, during the Gulf Cooperation Council crisis, during which Saudi Arabia and the UAE imposed a blockade on Qatar. Particularly pertinent today were Doha's attempts to steer the Federal Government of Somalia towards Al-Shabaab. However, Fahad and Farmaajo ran out of time to bring the jihadists into the capital before they lost their next election. In recent months, it appears that Doha has returned to the corridors of Villa Somalia pushing for peace 'negotiations' between Villa Somalia and Al-Shabaab once again.
Given the murky nature of Somali politics, the question remains whether the announcement of a split between Fahad Yasin and Farmaajo is genuine or a tactical ploy. Elections are scheduled for 2026, and both Farmaajo and Fahad have recently emerged from political hibernation in Qatar to criticise President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's constitutional, among other, ambitions. Yet both remain highly controversial figures in Somalia, tainted by their desperate attempts to cling to power in 2022. Somali political history is rife with orchestrated conflicts designed to confuse opponents and manipulate electoral outcomes. But this one just could be genuine.
Once an indispensable ally to Qatar, Fahad became a liability in Farmaajo's presidency, costing Doha significant political capital and diminishing its influence in Somalia. Reports indicate that pressure from within Farmaajo's Marehan clan, including influential businessmen, has urged him to distance himself from former allies, including Fahad, to restore his political image. While Farmaajo has yet to comment on Fahad's recent political fallout, he has been discreetly working to attract new allies and rehabilitate his standing for several months.
If Qatar ultimately distances itself from Fahad, it would mark a significant shift that could reshape Somalia's political landscape, leading to new alliances and coalitions. However, Qatar, known for its strategy of supporting multiple candidates to secure its interests, might choose to back a new figure through Fahad while continuing to provide some level of support to Farmaajo. Whether Fahad’s split from Farmaajo is a genuine fracture, the question remains, is this the final act for the once-powerful duo, or merely another scene in the ongoing drama of Nabad iyo Nolol?
By the Somali Wire team
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