Egypt – The Latest Wedge Exacerbating Somalia's Divisions
Somalia's chronic cleavages between the centre and periphery continue to deepen. The latest 'wedge issue' splitting the country is the announced deployment of thousands of Egyptian troops, which has badly inflamed rhetoric and divisions between those in the Ethiopian security orbit in southern Somalia and Mogadishu. Emboldened by Cairo's offer of military support, indignant federal officials are accusing those questioning Villa Somalia's trajectory of 'treason,' fuelling perceptions that the administration is a Hawiye-dominated administration out of touch with sentiments in the periphery. Already alienated from Puntland, the government's sabre-rattling at communities in South West, Hiiraan, and Gedo that are vocally supportive of the Ethiopian troop presence threatens to alienate Villa Somalia further.
In its attempts to undermine the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Somaliland and Ethiopia, the federal government is accelerating a process of fragmentation and division between itself and the Federal Member States (FMS) that has been ongoing for well over a year. Polarisation began in earnest with the public breakdown in relations between Puntland and Mogadishu in early 2023– which was further exacerbated by the May 2023 National Consultative Council (NCC) proposals to upend Somalia's electoral system. In March 2024, following the rushed passage of the sweeping electoral and governance changes in the federal parliament in a process marred by allegations of corruption, the Puntland regional administration withdrew recognition of the federal government. And Garowe and Mogadishu's vendetta shows no sign of easing, with both sides accusing the other of weaponising development and humanitarian funds for political ends.
In 2012, President Hassan Sheikh entered his first term of office as a reluctant federalist who had to be coaxed and cajoled into implementing Somalia's Provisional Constitution. In his second term, however, he appears to have abandoned any pretext of federalism, seeking to subjugate the FMSs to Villa Somalia's will and unilaterally redrafting the Constitution to reflect an authoritarian, centralist political vision. It is this monopolistic pursuit of power, rushing major political decisions without the requisite consensus-building, that has gutted the NCC of any meaningful role, driven Puntland into suspending cooperation with the federal government, and antagonised key constituencies across southern Somalia – including parts of the president's own Hawiye clan.
Foreign support for the federal government's altercation with Ethiopia and Somaliland has supercharged Villa Somalia's centralising inclinations and appetite for confrontation, which is threatening to strain Somalia's internal divisions to breaking point. Villa Somalia's persistent refusal to consider why Ethiopian troops might be welcome in southern Somalia reflects the extreme polarisation that it has played a central role in fostering. There is far greater support for the Ethiopian presence than Mogadishu would care to admit. Elders from the Bay, Bakool, and Hiiraan regions – among others - have been vocal about their preference for the protection of Ethiopian troops from Al-Shabaab and their concerns about the planned Egyptian deployment. Many of these relationships are decades old and pre-date the emergence of Al-Shabaab. Yet on Monday, the Lower House suspended its session after arguments erupted over the motion proposed against parliamentarians, mostly from South West State, to strip them of their immunity and hold them accountable for 'treason.' And yesterday's comments by Foreign Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi were some of the most unpleasant yet, where he accused lawmaker Sadiq Abdullah Abdi of being a 'Quisling' over his opposition to the proposed Egyptian deployment. The insulting term refers to a traitor who aids an enemy in taking control of their own country, originating from the Norwegian war-time ruler and Nazi collaborator Vidkun Quisling. Senior federal officials' cynical deployment of jingoism to quell legitimate dissent increasingly seems to be equating political cronyism with nationalism.
The concerns of such a strategy are not exclusively political. Well-armed militias from the Hawaadle and Leysan work cheek-and-jowl with the ENDF, defending arterial roads into places like Baidoa that would surely fall within weeks if Ethiopian troops were to withdraw entirely. Deployment of Egyptian or other foreign forces to these remote border areas, without Ethiopian overwatch and the support of local clans, would leave them exposed and vulnerable to Al-Shabaab attacks.
If forced to choose into a binary choice between Addis or Mogadishu, many of these communities are likely to side with the former. Consequently, if Egyptian forces are deployed to areas within the Ethiopian orbit, there is a real potential for Somalia to become explicitly split between competing spheres of foreign security influence. Ethiopia has signalled that it is unlikely to withdraw its troops entirely, increasing the possibility of Ethiopian and Egyptian troops ending up co-located in places like Baidoa. If this proves to be the case, the risks of violent escalation or miscalculation are extraordinarily high over issues such as regional presidential elections. Rival candidates might be supported, or competing polls could be held in Baidoa as well as Baraawe-- driving further fragmentation and undermining the quasi-legitimacy that FMS presidents enjoy. But it is Al-Shabaab that stands to gain as the principal beneficiary of any security deterioration by exploiting the growing gaps and enmity between the periphery and centre.
We are witnessing a siloed federal government, isolated from leadership in Puntland and Somaliland and increasingly from communities in South West State and Jubaland that is happy to internationalise its internal conflict and willing to risk greater instability by transforming the fragile country into a theatre for regional proxy conflicts. And the traditional moderators of political excess in Somalia and the region, including Kenya and the AU, have been usurped by Turkey and Egypt in Mogadishu. Those with influence must be aware that the brakes need to be applied immediately to this geopolitical freight train, not only to prevent possible conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia but also to stop the further disintegration of Somalia with potentially untold consequences.
By the Somali Wire team
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