Issue No. 726

Published 01 Sep 2024

Al-Shabaab Encroaches on Mogadishu

Published on 01 Sep 2024 17:23 min

Al-Shabaab Encroaches on Mogadishu
 

In recent weeks, barely a day or two has gone by without Al-Shabaab staging a major attack in Mogadishu or on its outskirts. The mass-casualty incident at Lido Beach on 2 August that left over three dozen dead has precipitated a wave of violence, including several improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on both civilian and military targets. To date, this has included the bombings of a tea shop in Dayniile, three markets near Mogadishu, and a security checkpoint in the capital.
 
Under the current African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) structure, most of Banaadir and parts of Lower Shabelle security fall under 'Sector 1' and the responsibility of the Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF). In June 2024, two of the Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) operated by the UPDF, including Bariire, were handed over to the Somali National Army (SNA) as their troop presence was reduced as part of the wider ATMIS draw-down. With the reduction of the UPDF presence, the security of Mogadishu's outskirts and towards Bal'ad now predominantly falls to the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), a handful of UAE-supported SNA brigades that are essentially acting as military police, and the Somali Police Force, including the special police units known as Harama'ad. This may have been enough if SNA and Danab forces had not been repositioned to the central Somalia campaign north of the capital, which has left the area badly exposed to Al-Shabaab infiltration.
 
And it is not just Mogadishu that is coming under increasing pressure, but the area around Bal'ad as well, which could spell future trouble for the currently considered 'safe rear area' of the stalled military campaign. This is not an immediate timeline, but 6 months from now if the threat is not taken sufficiently seriously. Keeping the road between Bal'ad and Jowhar open is critical to maintaining logistical supply and supporting the security of Mogadishu. If severed due to the threat of Al-Shabaab's ambushes or IEDs, government officials and military will also be forced to fly to Jowhar, as they did prior to the Badbaadho campaign in 2020.
 
This opens up other areas to possible attack by Al-Shabaab, including Adan Yabaal. Lying to the north of Jowhar in southeastern Middle Shabelle, the town was one of the jewels of the 2022 offensive and remains heavily guarded by a significant SNA presence. Currently, it is not under major threat, but if Middle Shabelle is hollowed out and Al-Shabaab can increase its presence nearby, the town may come back under contention. If logistics cannot be provided to support Adan Yabaal, then government forces will likely struggle to defend it from concerted pressure.
 
Similarly, the more Al-Shabaab can penetrate Lower and Middle Shabelle, the likelihood of 'green-on-green' fighting between clan militias will grow as the extremists can stoke violence. To reduce this threat, the SNA needs to build relations with key local clans and their militias, as the UPDF was already doing with the Biamal sub-clan of the Dir in Lower Shabelle, for example. This is particularly urgent where clans are already fighting, such as in Qoryoley. Al-Shabaab may or may not be behind these clashes, but either way, it will make it easier for them to infiltrate and establish a presence. Critically, the SNA cannot build these political and security relations alone- other federal and regional leaders need to be involved.
 
More broadly, as Al-Shabaab consolidates its presence in central and southern Somalia, the SNA and government presence may become predominantly siloed into the country's major urban areas– Mogadishu, Kismaayo, Baidoa, and others. The return to a pre-2020 dynamic would be disastrous for a number of reasons. Rural areas would fall back under Al-Shabaab control, allowing the extremists to exert their authority over everything from education to justice. Onerous taxation on particular communities that have resisted the jihadist group would likely come back into play, as well as retribution on specific leaders and elders who directed their clans to fight Al-Shabaab. Towns and cities, too, would come under increased pressure, with Al-Shabaab able to conduct attacks at whim, as we are currently witnessing in Mogadishu. Blockades could be established with ease, and the humanitarian conditions in the peripheral areas of urban centres would deteriorate further.
 
Yet, at this current juncture, while the security auspices are certainly bleak, Al-Shabaab would not be able to take Mogadishu unless something radically alters. Nor does it appear interested in doing so, content on placing additional pressure on federal and regional forces to undermine the government's presentation of a rosy forecast. Taking any city is often a bloody, high-casualty affair, requiring significant numbers of fighters and an appetite for street-by-street clashes. Somalia's capital is no stranger to this either; remember the scenes in Mogadishu in 1993 between US troops and Somali militia or the more recent retaking of the capital from Al-Shabaab in 2011 by African Union troops. To reclaim Mogadishu by force, Al-Shabaab would have to take key installations and intersections, a dynamic we are seeing no indication of. Instead, the extremist group is seeking to increasingly pin down forces in urban areas and claim the periphery, as was the case between 2012 and 2020.
 
To backfill the role of the UPDF, the SNA now needs to actively patrol the peripheries of towns as well as main supply routes to keep Al-Shabaab from the edge of urban centres and prevent their infiltration at night. In other words, they shouldn't just become siloed in FOBs as they are often prone to do. The SNA 'hold' efforts in the area need to be complemented by regular disruption operations by NISA, the Somali Police Force, and Harama'ad. The Ministry of Defence and SNA leadership must determine how to cycle different forces through the SNA hold efforts rather than leaving a single unit in place for too long, which leads to force degradation, with Al-Shabaab able to wait for resources, personnel, and morale to deteriorate before pouncing. This won't win the war, but it will help keep the extremists at bay from the capital and other key urban areas.
 
However, there is little suggestion that the federal government and military leadership have this short and long-term strategic planning in mind. Instead, they appear hell-bent on sacrificing national security on the altar of 'sovereignty' by inviting Egyptian troops into Somalia and deliberately inflaming regional tensions with Ethiopia. No good can come of this, and all the while, Mogadishu's markets, checkpoints, hotels, and tea shops are coming under rising threat from Al-Shabaab.

By the Somali Wire team 

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