Issue No. 725

Published 30 Aug 2024

Suicide Drones in Puntland: The Al-Shabaab-Houthi Connection?

Published on 30 Aug 2024 14:12 min

Suicide Drones in Puntland: The Al-Shabaab-Houthi Connection?


Puntland now finds itself beset by security challenges across and adjacent to its territory. To the west, in Somaliland's Sanaag region, Mogadishu's attempts to foment destabilisation in both polities have seemingly borne fruit, with renewed deadly clashes taking place near Erigavo after SSC-Khaatumo forces attacked military positions earlier this week. On the Indian Ocean, while a spate of pirate incidents has dwindled since the beginning of 2024, the issues of a peripheral Puntland government presence and impoverishment that have driven the phenomenon remain. But what has garnered particular attention and concern in recent weeks has been the alleged ties between Houthi rebels in Yemen and Al-Shabaab. And these hefty challenges come amid badly deteriorated relations between the Puntland administration and Mogadishu.
 
On Monday, in a concerning first for Somalia, Puntland authorities reported that they had captured 5 'suicide drones' on the road between Garowe and Galkayo, having been likely smuggled through the port of Bosasso. Little information has been publicly disclosed about the intended origin and destination of these drones, but they come amid broader warnings regarding a developing relationship between Iran-backed, Yemen-based Houthi rebels and Al-Shabaab. Since October 2023, Houthis have shot to prominence for their campaign against ostensibly Israel-connected ships in response to Israel's obliteration of Gaza. They have fired hundreds of missiles and launched drones against an array of maritime vessels, though only a handful have been badly damaged.
 
However, the Greek-flagged MV Sounion, carrying over 150,000 tonnes of crude oil, was struck by Houthis last Wednesday, and there are growing fears that the vessel could cause an ecological disaster in the Red Sea. It is, therefore, unsurprising that the possible proliferation of this kind of aerial explosive capacity has been on the radar of several intelligence agencies, with the US publicly warning in June that Al-Shabaab and Houthi rebels had established relations.
 
But it has proven difficult to precisely ascertain the degree of relations between Houthis and Al-Shabaab, with conflicting reports about training and supply of more advanced explosives to the Somalia-based jihadists. While it is yet unclear if the recently captured suicide drones are related to a Houthi-Al-Shabaab connection, the possible development of an Al-Shabaab aerial capacity is of great concern. To date, Al-Shabaab has been known to use drones sourced from East Asia only for aerial reconnaissance and propaganda filming; their deployment of weaponised drones with explosives could be a game-changer. Considering that Somalia's arrayed security forces struggle to contend with vehicle-borne IEDs, explosives strapped to a commercial drone could prove even more challenging.
 
More informal links between Al-Shabaab and Houthi rebels certainly do exist through the steady stream of weapons and people across the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Though the vast majority of weapons and people smuggling comes from non-Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen to Puntland and Southern Somalia, this does not mean that Houthis are unaware or not taxing the trade. And if Al-Shabaab and Houthi rebels have established more formal ties, it would not be the first time AS has reached out to jihadists beyond Somalia, having previously done so with Nigeria-based Islamic extremists of Boko Haram. Then as today, fears of possible relations were related to potential increase in the regional jihadist threat. However, any substantial agreement between Houthis and Al-Shabaab would suggest that a degree of pragmatism is trumping ideology within the latter, with an interest in acquiring more advanced technology superseding their Sunni-Shia split.
 
Suicide drones should not be considered the only way in which Houthis could develop Al-Shabaab capacity. More advanced explosives with targeting systems could be utilised with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as well as more precise mortar attacks on Aden Adde Airport or other key strategic locations. The opening up of new lines of lethal equipment could also provide Al-Shabaab with access to armour-penetrating explosives. With details being withheld by intelligence services, however, it remains difficult to accurately predict what further dangers could stem from a Houthi-Al-Shabaab relationship, or what that relationship might come to be.
 
That the drones were captured along the Galkayo to Garowe road implies they were intended to reach central or southern Somalia. It also highlights that while Al-Shabaab's presence in the northern and most stable Federal Member State of Somalia is limited, it is not absent. Earlier this month, several Al-Shabaab militants awaiting execution in Galkayo escaped a high-security prison-- the second such incident in the city since July 2022. On 24 August, the regional administration executed 10 alleged Al-Shabaab militants there, despite protests by several organisations that stated a number of the executed had been minors when carrying out their crimes. Meanwhile, Al-Shabaab continues to carry out 'extortion' in communities in several parts of Puntland and continually clashes with its Islamic State in Somalia rivals over territory and influence there.
 
With a dearth of information, it is perhaps easy to overexaggerate the depth and nature of the relations between the Houthi rebels and Al-Shabaab. There is one there, and it does appear that their ties are developing alongside the sharing of materiel and training. But even if the recently recovered suicide drones are revealed to have emerged from Al-Shabaab's workings, produced by their experienced explosives department, and not provided by the Houthis, it should be of immense concern. Previously secure locales in Mogadishu could be put under new threat, and with Somalia's security forces still disarrayed and politics divided over the future of the Ethiopian troops, Al-Shabaab's suicide drones are the last thing the country needs.

By the Somali Wire team 

To continue reading, create a free account or log in.

Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.

Create your Sahan account Login

Unlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content

You may also be interested in

Issue No. 959
Mogadishu on the Edge: The Danger Has Not Passed
The Somali Wire

Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.


10:12 min read 08 Jun
Issue No. 958
Deni and the Tough Road Back to Mogadishu
The Somali Wire

Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.


8:08 min read 03 Jun
Issue No. 128
The US Eritrea Pivot – Opportunities, Risks, Dilemma
The Horn Edition

A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.


34:56 min read 29 May
Issue No. 957
How Somalia's South West Vote Went South
The Somali Wire

On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.


17:12 min read 27 May
Issue No. 956
The Perils of a Grey Transition
The Somali Wire

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.


0 min read 20 May
Issue No. 955
Averting Disorder: The Case for External Mediation in Somalia
The Somali Wire

Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.


0 min read 14 May
Issue No. 127
Total War in the Horn of Africa
The Horn Edition

'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.


27:16 min read 30 Apr
Issue No. 954
The Malian Mirror
The Somali Wire

A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.


10:18 min read 29 Apr
Issue No. 329
Washington eyes Asmara
The Ethiopian Cable

Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.


0 min read 28 Apr
Scroll