Suicide Drones in Puntland: The Al-Shabaab-Houthi Connection?
Puntland now finds itself beset by security challenges across and adjacent to its territory. To the west, in Somaliland's Sanaag region, Mogadishu's attempts to foment destabilisation in both polities have seemingly borne fruit, with renewed deadly clashes taking place near Erigavo after SSC-Khaatumo forces attacked military positions earlier this week. On the Indian Ocean, while a spate of pirate incidents has dwindled since the beginning of 2024, the issues of a peripheral Puntland government presence and impoverishment that have driven the phenomenon remain. But what has garnered particular attention and concern in recent weeks has been the alleged ties between Houthi rebels in Yemen and Al-Shabaab. And these hefty challenges come amid badly deteriorated relations between the Puntland administration and Mogadishu.
On Monday, in a concerning first for Somalia, Puntland authorities reported that they had captured 5 'suicide drones' on the road between Garowe and Galkayo, having been likely smuggled through the port of Bosasso. Little information has been publicly disclosed about the intended origin and destination of these drones, but they come amid broader warnings regarding a developing relationship between Iran-backed, Yemen-based Houthi rebels and Al-Shabaab. Since October 2023, Houthis have shot to prominence for their campaign against ostensibly Israel-connected ships in response to Israel's obliteration of Gaza. They have fired hundreds of missiles and launched drones against an array of maritime vessels, though only a handful have been badly damaged.
However, the Greek-flagged MV Sounion, carrying over 150,000 tonnes of crude oil, was struck by Houthis last Wednesday, and there are growing fears that the vessel could cause an ecological disaster in the Red Sea. It is, therefore, unsurprising that the possible proliferation of this kind of aerial explosive capacity has been on the radar of several intelligence agencies, with the US publicly warning in June that Al-Shabaab and Houthi rebels had established relations.
But it has proven difficult to precisely ascertain the degree of relations between Houthis and Al-Shabaab, with conflicting reports about training and supply of more advanced explosives to the Somalia-based jihadists. While it is yet unclear if the recently captured suicide drones are related to a Houthi-Al-Shabaab connection, the possible development of an Al-Shabaab aerial capacity is of great concern. To date, Al-Shabaab has been known to use drones sourced from East Asia only for aerial reconnaissance and propaganda filming; their deployment of weaponised drones with explosives could be a game-changer. Considering that Somalia's arrayed security forces struggle to contend with vehicle-borne IEDs, explosives strapped to a commercial drone could prove even more challenging.
More informal links between Al-Shabaab and Houthi rebels certainly do exist through the steady stream of weapons and people across the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Though the vast majority of weapons and people smuggling comes from non-Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen to Puntland and Southern Somalia, this does not mean that Houthis are unaware or not taxing the trade. And if Al-Shabaab and Houthi rebels have established more formal ties, it would not be the first time AS has reached out to jihadists beyond Somalia, having previously done so with Nigeria-based Islamic extremists of Boko Haram. Then as today, fears of possible relations were related to potential increase in the regional jihadist threat. However, any substantial agreement between Houthis and Al-Shabaab would suggest that a degree of pragmatism is trumping ideology within the latter, with an interest in acquiring more advanced technology superseding their Sunni-Shia split.
Suicide drones should not be considered the only way in which Houthis could develop Al-Shabaab capacity. More advanced explosives with targeting systems could be utilised with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as well as more precise mortar attacks on Aden Adde Airport or other key strategic locations. The opening up of new lines of lethal equipment could also provide Al-Shabaab with access to armour-penetrating explosives. With details being withheld by intelligence services, however, it remains difficult to accurately predict what further dangers could stem from a Houthi-Al-Shabaab relationship, or what that relationship might come to be.
That the drones were captured along the Galkayo to Garowe road implies they were intended to reach central or southern Somalia. It also highlights that while Al-Shabaab's presence in the northern and most stable Federal Member State of Somalia is limited, it is not absent. Earlier this month, several Al-Shabaab militants awaiting execution in Galkayo escaped a high-security prison-- the second such incident in the city since July 2022. On 24 August, the regional administration executed 10 alleged Al-Shabaab militants there, despite protests by several organisations that stated a number of the executed had been minors when carrying out their crimes. Meanwhile, Al-Shabaab continues to carry out 'extortion' in communities in several parts of Puntland and continually clashes with its Islamic State in Somalia rivals over territory and influence there.
With a dearth of information, it is perhaps easy to overexaggerate the depth and nature of the relations between the Houthi rebels and Al-Shabaab. There is one there, and it does appear that their ties are developing alongside the sharing of materiel and training. But even if the recently recovered suicide drones are revealed to have emerged from Al-Shabaab's workings, produced by their experienced explosives department, and not provided by the Houthis, it should be of immense concern. Previously secure locales in Mogadishu could be put under new threat, and with Somalia's security forces still disarrayed and politics divided over the future of the Ethiopian troops, Al-Shabaab's suicide drones are the last thing the country needs.
By the Somali Wire team
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