Somaliland Elections: Less Than 3 Months Away
While the world has its eyes trained on the tumult of the US elections, it's important to remember that Somaliland will also go to the polls in November. With consequential elections in Britain, India, and the EU already occurring in 2024, who cares about such a seemingly insignificant vote in a small corner of East Africa? To start, Mogadishu, Addis, and Djibouti, not to mention anyone interested in regional security and maritime commerce.
Earlier this month, negotiations between Mogadishu and Addis in Ankara were held-- then concluded without success-- principally over the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Addis and Hargeisa, which would see Ethiopia lease land along Somaliland's coastline in exchange for formal recognition of the latter. In early August, Ethiopia appointed a new Ambassador to Hargeisa, Teshome Shunde, who committed to bilateral cooperation on security and trade, among other common interests. At the same time, Somaliland established a ministerial-level 'recognition taskforce,' which its Foreign Ministry said would align with "ongoing diplomatic initiatives, including the recent MoU with Ethiopia for sea access." Still, public progress on the MoU has been slow, with Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi's re-election chances arguably hinging on its finalisation before the November polls. If the MoU is realised-- and more specifically, if Ethiopia recognises Somaliland-- some analysts have said that this is 'his election to lose.'
Meanwhile, campaigning is now in full swing in Somaliland, with Bihi recently touring the centre and east to reach out to disaffected communities, many of whom are frustrated with his ruling Kulmiye party. In a well-coordinated series of public events, Bihi glad-handed with critical voting blocs, including a group of women in Burao, emphasising their importance in the upcoming elections. The President has also been campaigning for support in Sanaag and Sool, where several rounds of brutal fighting erupted between SSC-Khaatumo (SSC-K) local militia and Somaliland Armed Forces in February 2023, mainly in and around Laas Aanood.
The control of Laas Aanood remains a central issue in these elections following the chastening routing of Somaliland forces at Goojaade last August. Both Bihi and UCID party Chair Feisal Ali Warabe have visited Somaliland's principal army base in Oog during their eastern circuits and vowed to retake the territory in Sool. The situation remains fraught. Spying an opportunity to undermine both Somaliland and Puntland, Mogadishu has entertained SSC-K's aspirations to become another Federal Member State of Somalia, recognising the 'interim' administration in October 2023 and opening an immigration office in Laas Aanood this month. And, most recently, SSC-K spokesman Najib Barkhad Warsame vowed that the regional militia would "respond with full force" should Hargeisa attempt to retake Laas Aanood. Despite the drum-beating, it is in neither's interest to resume fighting at this moment, with SSC-K also wrestling with an assertive Al-Shabaab contingent led by Abdi Madoobe on the city's outskirts. For the second time, the Dhulbahante movement recently banned the unauthorised carrying of weapons in Laas Aanood amid Madoobe's heavily armed forces flexing their military strength in the town.
Bihi's well-orchestrated tour could draw some support to the ruling party if he makes genuine and overdue commitments to aid and development for these Warsengeli and Dhulbahante communities. While Kulmiye has historically done well amongst these communities, and particularly with the Isaaq sub-clan Habar Je'elo that forms part of its base, the impact of the Sool instability lingers in the east to the detriment of Bihi. It is further expected that in the coming days, Waddani will dispatch a contingent of senior leadership to counter Bihi's tour and rally its growing support base. It would also be wise for the President and the opposition to tour the Awdal region in western Somaliland, another area of economic and political discontent that could play a crucial role in the presidential elections this November.
Voters in November will choose Somaliland's next leader from the three official parties-- the incumbent Kulmiye, principal challenger Waddani, and the smaller UCID party. For the first time, the electorate will simultaneously also decide from a short list of political associations to become the next three official parties. Though the official list of the National Electoral Commission-selected 10 associations competing has not yet been approved, there have already been a few interesting political developments among them. Notably, Waddani and Kaah have announced in recent weeks their collaboration for the November elections following an agreement between Kaah's Mahamud Hashi Abdi and Waddani's leaders. Kaah is now expected to back Irro in the presidential polls for a stake in a possible new government if Waddani does come out on top.
Simultaneously, the Ogaal and Mideeye associations are said to be merging with Kulmiye. Others have already withdrawn from the race, including the Awdal region's Ahmed Ismail Samatar, who leads the Hilaac party. Upon his exit in July, Samatar cited the Isaaq's monopolisation of Somaliland's politics as the reason for his withdrawal-- UCID, Waddani, and Kulmiye are all Isaaq-dominated. It has also been reported that Horseed has withdrawn, citing concerns about fairness and transparency in the electoral process, while Shacabka, too, is expected to leave the race. Of the remaining approved associations, most are likely too small to win a slot among the next three official parties. The same may be true for UCID, signalling what could be a new chapter for veteran politician and UCID party leader Feisal Ali Warabe.
What does this mean for November? Most likely, there will be a close race between Kulmiye and Waddani for the presidency, with the two remaining among the three official parties going forward. The race for third appears still up for grabs. If Bihi retains the presidency, the Addis-Hargeisa MoU will certainly have contributed. If the MoU is not completed-- in some form-- by 13 November, though Bihi enjoys the benefits of incumbency, victory is far from certain.
Where does it leave the region? Ethiopia and Somaliland's neighbours, and those further afield, are on tenterhooks on whether the MoU will continue to progress with Addis and Hargeisa currently wrangling over port access and recognition. In its attempts to sabotage the deal, Mogadishu is ever more aggressively rhetorically targeting both Addis and Hargeisa to protect Somalia's 'unity' and 'sovereignty' to no avail. In the meantime, despite its challenges in Awdal and Sool, the clock is ticking on Somaliland's elections, with just 79 days to go in the most stable and democratic polity in the Horn. And no matter whether Bihi or Irro triumphs in November, the uncertainties surrounding the MoU, Laas Aanood, and a hostile Mogadishu will continue.
By the Somali Wire team
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