The Road to 2026: Farmaajo's Doha Launch
Last month in Doha, behind closed doors in conference and hotel rooms at the Somali Diaspora Conference, the summit was widely referred to as the starting pistol of former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo's 2026 presidential campaign. In Qatar, Farmaajo's home since his chafing loss to incumbent President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) in 2022, he held several meetings with the gathered power brokers and influential politicians. And Farmaajo is not the only recognisable face from 2022 that appears to be positioning himself ahead of the next federal elections, with former PM Hassan Ali Khaire, MP Abdirahman Abdishakur, former President Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed, Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni, and former spy chief Fahad Yasin and others all jostling.
For the first year of HSM's term, Farmaajo remained largely quiet amid the successes of the Ma'awiisley uprising, which drove the most significant territorial gains against Al-Shabaab in years. Having invested USD millions into Farmaajo and Fahad's government, Qatar nonetheless quietly withdrew its full-blooded support for the two men after 2022. Still, remnants of Farmaajo's Nabad iyo Noyol coalition remained alive and kicking in Mogadishu, and critically, this has included elements believed to be still pushing peace negotiations with Al-Shabaab. It was only a matter of time that prevented Farmaajo from striking a Qatar-brokered deal with the extremist group.
In recent months, spying opportunities to restore his image and tarnish the government, Farmaajo has turned increasingly critical, despite the rank hypocrisy of his statements. In particular, he has attacked the controversial amendments to Chapters 1-4 of the Provisional Constitution that seek to centralise power in the presidency. In March, Farmaajo briefly aligned with his old rival, former President Sheikh Sherif, to push back against Villa Somalia's 'one-person, one-vote' (OPOV) campaign to rewrite the electoral and governance systems of the country. And he has alighted on other populist 'wedge' issues to divide him from the federal government, including offering vocal support for the Dhulbahante SSC-Khaatumo administration that controls Laas Aanood and parts of the Sool region.
Most recently, Farmaajo slammed the treatment of Mogadishu's auto-rickshaw drivers following heavy-handed policing at their protests over rate increases and discrimination. The former president has not had a Damascene conversion to the side of the underprivileged– this is pure politics. And his former spy chief and enforcer Fahad Yasin, too, has taken to regularly criticising the federal government on X on largely constitutional grounds, which is rather ironic considering his central role in various schemes to delay or overturn federal and regional election results unconstitutionally.
Unsurprisingly, Farmaajo's return comes amid major questions swirling around Somalia's electoral system and accusations that Hassan Sheikh is looking to extend his term beyond 2026. Villa Somalia is seeking to impose a dubious OPOV structure against public backlash from Puntland and quiet resistance from regional leaders. Part of this rationale appears to be about establishing new guardrails to protect against the jeopardy of 4.5 federal elections. In particular, this has included the revival of the limiting of political parties in Somalia to just two in the recently tabled elections and political parties bill. After pushback from parliamentarians earlier this year during the passage of Chapters 1-4, this was changed from two to three, but it appears Villa Somalia has reneged on the commitment. How this may impact the federal elections remains to be seen, and there is every possibility the federal government will have to negotiate from its current position. Still, the prospect of potential contenders such as Deni and Abdishakur having to join one of two federally mandated parties would radically overhaul the 4.5 system.
Another serious question mark hanging over the 2026 presidential elections is the role of Qatar. Since the re-deployment of the senior Damul Jadiid figure and trusted Hassan Sheikh ally Mohamed Sh. Doodishe from the Ministry of Internal Security to Qatar's Ambassador in November 2023, Villa Somalia has pursued a far closer relationship with Doha, somewhat at the cost of its ties with UAE. Several bilateral cooperation agreements have been signed, covering, among other topics, parliamentary and legal cooperation, while senior federal officials have increasingly sought counsel from their Qatari counterparts. In this context, the recent diaspora conference was widely reported for another reason– that Qatar was using the event to push the opening of secretive negotiations between the federal government and Al-Shabaab. It has been confirmed that there were militant operatives present in the city who met with federal officials at the sidelines of the conference.
Talks in and of themselves between insurgent forces and governments do not necessarily signal that a peace agreement is impending, as they can be intelligence-gathering operations or even seeking to drive a wedge within the insurgent leadership. But with Qatar seemingly still wedded to extracting a negotiated 'peace,' which would by no means stabilise Somalia, this too would likely upend the structure and timings of the 2026 federal elections. Al-Shabaab remains fundamentally antithetical to the prospect of universal franchise and democracy, as well as the federal structure of the country. And returning to Qatar, it remains to be seen whether Doha sticks or twists with its backing of HSM and Farmaajo, or even potentially Fahad, its former 'man in Mogadishu.'
Guessing the future and nature of Somalia's elections is a fraught business, and there are likely 'unknown unknowns' on the horizon that could upend the 2026 elections on top of electoral reform, Qatar's influence, and Al-Shabaab's consolidating presence. And no serious contender for the presidency, barring the incumbent, is likely to announce their candidacy this early in the cycle with so much undecided. But with Farmaajo setting his ducks in a row, it is more than possible that we could see a repeat of some of the major frontrunners in the 2022 presidential elections– Deni, Farmaajo, and Hassan Sheikh.
By the Somali Wire team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.