The Road to 2026: Farmaajo's Doha Launch
Last month in Doha, behind closed doors in conference and hotel rooms at the Somali Diaspora Conference, the summit was widely referred to as the starting pistol of former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo's 2026 presidential campaign. In Qatar, Farmaajo's home since his chafing loss to incumbent President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) in 2022, he held several meetings with the gathered power brokers and influential politicians. And Farmaajo is not the only recognisable face from 2022 that appears to be positioning himself ahead of the next federal elections, with former PM Hassan Ali Khaire, MP Abdirahman Abdishakur, former President Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed, Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni, and former spy chief Fahad Yasin and others all jostling.
For the first year of HSM's term, Farmaajo remained largely quiet amid the successes of the Ma'awiisley uprising, which drove the most significant territorial gains against Al-Shabaab in years. Having invested USD millions into Farmaajo and Fahad's government, Qatar nonetheless quietly withdrew its full-blooded support for the two men after 2022. Still, remnants of Farmaajo's Nabad iyo Noyol coalition remained alive and kicking in Mogadishu, and critically, this has included elements believed to be still pushing peace negotiations with Al-Shabaab. It was only a matter of time that prevented Farmaajo from striking a Qatar-brokered deal with the extremist group.
In recent months, spying opportunities to restore his image and tarnish the government, Farmaajo has turned increasingly critical, despite the rank hypocrisy of his statements. In particular, he has attacked the controversial amendments to Chapters 1-4 of the Provisional Constitution that seek to centralise power in the presidency. In March, Farmaajo briefly aligned with his old rival, former President Sheikh Sherif, to push back against Villa Somalia's 'one-person, one-vote' (OPOV) campaign to rewrite the electoral and governance systems of the country. And he has alighted on other populist 'wedge' issues to divide him from the federal government, including offering vocal support for the Dhulbahante SSC-Khaatumo administration that controls Laas Aanood and parts of the Sool region.
Most recently, Farmaajo slammed the treatment of Mogadishu's auto-rickshaw drivers following heavy-handed policing at their protests over rate increases and discrimination. The former president has not had a Damascene conversion to the side of the underprivileged– this is pure politics. And his former spy chief and enforcer Fahad Yasin, too, has taken to regularly criticising the federal government on X on largely constitutional grounds, which is rather ironic considering his central role in various schemes to delay or overturn federal and regional election results unconstitutionally.
Unsurprisingly, Farmaajo's return comes amid major questions swirling around Somalia's electoral system and accusations that Hassan Sheikh is looking to extend his term beyond 2026. Villa Somalia is seeking to impose a dubious OPOV structure against public backlash from Puntland and quiet resistance from regional leaders. Part of this rationale appears to be about establishing new guardrails to protect against the jeopardy of 4.5 federal elections. In particular, this has included the revival of the limiting of political parties in Somalia to just two in the recently tabled elections and political parties bill. After pushback from parliamentarians earlier this year during the passage of Chapters 1-4, this was changed from two to three, but it appears Villa Somalia has reneged on the commitment. How this may impact the federal elections remains to be seen, and there is every possibility the federal government will have to negotiate from its current position. Still, the prospect of potential contenders such as Deni and Abdishakur having to join one of two federally mandated parties would radically overhaul the 4.5 system.
Another serious question mark hanging over the 2026 presidential elections is the role of Qatar. Since the re-deployment of the senior Damul Jadiid figure and trusted Hassan Sheikh ally Mohamed Sh. Doodishe from the Ministry of Internal Security to Qatar's Ambassador in November 2023, Villa Somalia has pursued a far closer relationship with Doha, somewhat at the cost of its ties with UAE. Several bilateral cooperation agreements have been signed, covering, among other topics, parliamentary and legal cooperation, while senior federal officials have increasingly sought counsel from their Qatari counterparts. In this context, the recent diaspora conference was widely reported for another reason– that Qatar was using the event to push the opening of secretive negotiations between the federal government and Al-Shabaab. It has been confirmed that there were militant operatives present in the city who met with federal officials at the sidelines of the conference.
Talks in and of themselves between insurgent forces and governments do not necessarily signal that a peace agreement is impending, as they can be intelligence-gathering operations or even seeking to drive a wedge within the insurgent leadership. But with Qatar seemingly still wedded to extracting a negotiated 'peace,' which would by no means stabilise Somalia, this too would likely upend the structure and timings of the 2026 federal elections. Al-Shabaab remains fundamentally antithetical to the prospect of universal franchise and democracy, as well as the federal structure of the country. And returning to Qatar, it remains to be seen whether Doha sticks or twists with its backing of HSM and Farmaajo, or even potentially Fahad, its former 'man in Mogadishu.'
Guessing the future and nature of Somalia's elections is a fraught business, and there are likely 'unknown unknowns' on the horizon that could upend the 2026 elections on top of electoral reform, Qatar's influence, and Al-Shabaab's consolidating presence. And no serious contender for the presidency, barring the incumbent, is likely to announce their candidacy this early in the cycle with so much undecided. But with Farmaajo setting his ducks in a row, it is more than possible that we could see a repeat of some of the major frontrunners in the 2022 presidential elections– Deni, Farmaajo, and Hassan Sheikh.
By the Somali Wire team
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