Issue No. 720

The State of Somalia’s Political Settlement

Today's editorial in The Somali Wire is written by Professor Ken Menkhaus
 
We would like to extend an invitation to others who may wish to contribute to the Somali Wire in the future. We appreciate insightful perspectives on topics concerning Somalia crafted as editorials.
Please contact us for more information if interested.

Over the past three decades, the concept of the ‘political settlement’ has been repeatedly wielded in analysing dozens of fragile states. The much-touted framework has examined how elites establish basic norms and ‘rules of the road’ to govern relations between rival leaders in contexts emerging from violent conflict. While it has its weaknesses and critics, it has proven to be a useful and durable tool to contribute to our understanding of how countries do, or do not, successfully emerge out of, and then stay out of, armed conflict. The question for Somalia is, what is the state of its political statement today? And does it even exist anymore?

Somalia is currently in a trap. Key pillars of the old political settlement that allowed it to end its long period of state collapse and revive a semi-functional government are now in tatters and viewed by many Somalis as impediments. But no new political settlement has as yet emerged to take its place. The Italian political scientist Antonio Gramsci’s famous 1930 quote may seem melodramatic, but it is not too wide off the mark for Somalia today– “The old world is dying and the new world cannot yet be born.”

The political settlement that initially helped lift Somalia out of civil war and state collapse consisted of a crude elite bargain, a cake-cutting exercise to divvy up power and resources to reach a deal on a transitional government. Initially, its two main pillars were the ‘4.5 formula,’ which parcelled up positions in the legislative and executive branches along clan lines, and federalism, which accorded major clans a geographic zone which they controlled and from which they derived ‘rent,’ mainly in the form of foreign aid and seaport customs.

Over time, the Somali political settlement came to include three additional pillars. The first was the implicit agreements to rotate control of the Presidency between the most powerful clans both in Federal Member States (FMS) and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). The second was the maintenance of a balance in the number of FMS between the Darood and Hawiye clan families. And the third was the dual executive system of rule in the FGS, which guaranteed that the Hawiye and Darood would both hold a top position in government and share power. Gradually, other norms and rules, written and unwritten, have informed Somalia’s political settlement, but these have been the most visible and consequential pillars of the elite contract.

For a time, this political settlement helped revive the state by reducing areas of conflict over resources and power. It kept the peace– for the most part. But it was always clear that the pillars on which the settlement was based were temporary mechanisms, not long-term foundations for a functional state and society. In particular, critics argued that they institutionalised clan divisions rather than overcoming them.

Over the past decade, all 5 pillars have been challenged and eroded. There is a broad consensus in Somalia that the time has come to retire the 4.5 formula and replace it with one-person-one-vote elections, even if security and logistical challenges currently make that impossible. The failure to fully implement federalism has also come under attack for keeping the country divided and politically paralysed, and for contributing to a culture of ethnic exclusionism that permeates every region, district, and town. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has controversially proposed modifying the dual executive model in a manner that would concentrate power in the hands of the Presidency. 

So too, has the balancing of Hawiye and Darood FMS been thrown into question by SSC-Khaatumo’s demands, the militia that controls Laas Aanood and its environs in Sool, to be recognised as a federal state, which in turn elevates the question of the status of Banaadir region. And the informal practice of rotating presidencies among powerful rival clans has been undercut by dubious term extensions, election delays, or incumbent victories in Puntland, South West State, and Jubaland.

What this means is that the old rules and norms for sharing power and access to resources have become increasingly frayed. The gaping inequalities in Somalia are only broadening and deepening, while continued inter-elite divisions have run political development aground. And Somalia is at sea amidst a particularly troublesome moment across the Horn of Africa that is wrestling with political and economic discontent in every corner, as well as sustained violent extremism and armed conflict. With greater climactic, security, and political pressures likely to be exerted on Somalia in the coming years, without a new, more inclusive political settlement, the country is at much greater risk of further violent protests, armed conflict, and political divorce.

Gramsci’s famous quote ends ominously– “Now is the time of monsters.” Somalia’s political class needs to recognise the danger the country faces and work in good faith to build trust, effective transitional strategies, and ‘rules of the road’ for a new political settlement. In the current context, the settlement does not have to be perfect, but it must be one that can keep the monsters at bay, keep the peace, and provide a more viable, democratic, and cosmopolitan foundation for good governance in Somalia.

Ken Menkaus is a Professor of Political Science at Davison College. He is a specialist on the Horn of Africa with a focus on peacebuilding and state-building, conflict analysis, humanitarian response, and Islamic politics.