Somalia's Humanitarian Crisis: Need and Greed
Decades of armed conflict, climate catastrophes, and famine have left nearly four million people displaced in Somalia. They overwhelmingly reside in almost 2,400 internally displaced person (IDP) camps dotted across the country. While these IDP camps, 85% of which are informal settlements on private land in urban areas, are supported by international donors, the current need far outstrips provision and capacity. Meanwhile, Somalia's various administrations are often reluctant to integrate IDPs into urban areas for a variety of reasons.
Cyclical and entrenched displacement in Somalia has formed particular ecosystems of corruption in these camps that impact aid distribution and day-to-day living. With the creation of informal settlements on peri-urban land owned by other clans, there is space rife for exploitation and siphoning off of money and aid. In late 2023, a UN investigation uncovered widespread theft of assistance by a number of actors along the humanitarian 'food chain.' In particular, IDP camp managers were singled out for charging rent on the land, insisting that IDPs surrender a portion of their food aid to camp officials in lieu of monetary payment. Two displaced persons described how they were lured to a camp with promises of a better life, only to have their financial aid siphoned off by the camp manager. One IDP said, "We were promised USD 130 but received only half." Ironically, the move to cash aid in Somalia was prompted by an earlier corruption scandal, but with camp visits by international humanitarian personnel restricted by insecurity, monitoring of humanitarian distribution remains far from robust.
In recent years, direct cash assistance has been increasingly touted as a solution to some of these issues, with the understanding that displaced and vulnerable communities know their needs better than external actors. In Somalia, though, this has also been implicated in corruption scandals where local officials tasked with identifying beneficiaries manipulate the system for personal gain, at times adding their families and friends to the recipient list. These officials, known as 'chairs' of constituents, are responsible for identifying vulnerable individuals, including orphans and people with disabilities, within their constituencies to receive financial assistance. While cash vouchers are supposed to be distributed to be exchanged for food, a portion of these funds are frequently withheld by the distributing partner. In some cases, these officials have coerced people into registering unrelated children as their own to secure additional aid.
Despite reform after reform and years of institutional knowledge, delivering aid, in whatever form, remains an immensely complex procedure in Somalia. However robust the mechanism established to prevent aid diversion, it is nigh impossible to stop the seeping of aid through one avenue or another. Even the Danab, the best-trained special forces in the Somali National Army, are not insulated from the country's political economy. And it is not just Somalia that has been embroiled in corruption scandals in the Horn lately, with senior federal Ethiopian officials too implicated in the massive diversion of humanitarian aid in 2023. Still, practical steps can always be taken to prevent aid diversion, including introducing extra oversight into the aid distribution process and better vetting of organisations tasked with aid distribution.
How years of displacement and aid have contributed to the formation of a highly-exploited urban underclass made up of disenfranchised youth more susceptible to violent extremism and crime has been much overlooked. While the Somali Bantu have long faced discrimination on ethnic grounds, their displacement from rural to urban has refracted these dynamics in new and disturbing ways as these disparate groups have gradually moved from agrarian communities to densely populated slums, working manual jobs that are perceived as low-worth by ethnic Somalis. The Somali Bantu, comprised of several distinct groups in southern Somalia, increasingly view themselves as a united and politically active force.
Last August, when the Bantu military officer Sheegow Ahmed Ali was arrested in Mogadishu for operating an armed group, protests erupted in both Baidoa and the capital. It signalled that the most marginalised group in Somalia was both increasingly armed and operating under a cohesive identity. And, subsequently, after decades of violent exploitation, it is becoming readily apparent that continuing to ignore these communities in IDP camps across central and southern Somalia is no longer sustainable. Engaging with the Bantu and others as equals, not using them as humanitarian bait or manual labour, cannot wait. Tackling the perennial corruption and malpractice in IDP camps across Somalia would be one place to start.
By the Somali Wire team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.
Last weekend, the Murusade, a major sub-clan of the powerful Hawiye clan family, staged one of the largest and most colourful coronations of a clan chief in recent memory in Mogadishu. The caleemasarka (enthronement) of Ugaas Abdirizaq Ugaas Abdullahi Ugaas Haashi, the new Ugaas or sultan of the Murusade, was attended by thousands of delegates from all parts of Somalia. Conducted next to the imposing and magnificent Ottomanesque Ali Jim'ale Mosque, on the Muslim day of rest, Friday, the occasion blended the Islamic, the regal and the customary; a restatement of an ancient tradition very much alive and vibrant.
With all eyes trained on the Strait of Hormuz blockades and their geopolitical convulsions, discussions and concerns, too, have risen about the perils of other globalised chokepoints, not least the Bab al-Mandab. The threats to the stability of the Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea may not arise principally from the escalatory logic that the US, Iran, and Israel have been locked in, but the threats posed from collapse and contested sovereignty offer little relief. Off Somalia's northern coastline in particular, it is transnational criminal networks — expressed in smuggling, piracy, and, less visibly but no less consequentially, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing — that define the character of offshore insecurity. It is this last phenomenon that provides the foundation on which much of Somalia's maritime disorder is built, and which remains the most consistently neglected.
In the past months, a number of unsettling images and videos have emerged from the Russian frontlines in the Ukraine war. Within the horrors of the grinding "kill zone," where kamikaze drones strafe the sky for any signs of movement, yet another concerning dimension has emerged—the use of African recruits by Moscow in the conflict, often under false pretences. Particularly drawn from Kenya, many reportedly believed they were signing contracts to work as drivers or security guards, only to be shipped to the front lines upon arrival. Such activities are illustrative of several issues, including Russia's relationship with countries in the Horn of Africa, one shaped more by opportunistic realpolitik than genuine partnership.
Villa Somalia's triumph in Baidoa may yet turn to ashes. Since the ousting of wary friend-turned-foe, Abdiaziz Laftagareen, in late March, the federal government has ploughed ahead with preparations for state- and district-level elections in South West. Nominally scheduled for next week, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has chosen to reward his stalwart parliamentary ally, Aden Madoobe from the Rahanweyne/Hadaamo, with the regional presidency after some vacillation, naming him the sole Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) candidate
Another showdown over Tigray's political architecture is unfolding, with the future of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) once again at stake. For much of this year, fears of renewed war have loomed over Ethiopia's northernmost region, with the federal government mobilising substantial forces to the edges of Tigray.
In Act III, Scene I of William Shakespeare's tragedy Coriolanus, the tribune Sicinius addresses the gathered representatives and, rejecting the disdain the titular character displays towards plebeians, defends them, stating, "What is the city but the people?" Capturing the struggle between the elite and the masses of ancient Rome, the line has remained politically resonant for centuries--emphasising that a city, democracy, and state rely on the people, not just their leader. Or perhaps, not just its buildings. It is a lesson missed by Villa Somalia, though, with the twilight weeks of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's term in office — at least, constitutionally — dominated by the government's twin campaigns in the capital: land clearances and the militarisation of Mogadishu.