Egyptians for Ethiopians in AUSSOM
Exit stage left the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and enter stage right the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Last week, after successive delays, the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) met to agree on the structure of the new peacekeeping mission. As widely anticipated, just under 12,000 personnel were approved, including a smaller civilian and policing component, to prevent a security vacuum from emerging following the ATMIS draw-down that will now be paused. Significant questions remain, however, particularly surrounding the proposed introduction of Egyptian troops into the AU mission, whether less than 12,000 personnel will be sufficient to maintain territory against a strengthened Al-Shabaab, and who will fund AUSSOM.
The AUPSC has welcomed Egypt's offer to deploy troops to Somalia for the first time in the 17-year AU deployment. Through bilateral security deals, Djibouti, Burundi, and Uganda have already pledged troops to the mission. Kenya will also likely continue its deployment in Jubaland, where it will enjoy a close relationship with the regional administration. Rather than entirely withdrawing, the ATMIS draw-down is expected to be frozen in September, and troops will be rotated out or transferred into their new locales if applicable. The approved Concept of Operations (CONOPS) stipulates that the mission will run until the end of 2029, with security responsibilities again being transferred to Somalia's security forces. In the meantime, AUSSOM troops are mandated to support offensive operations, protect civilians, and facilitate humanitarian access, among other tasks. In reality, it will likely be up to the respective troop-contributing countries to decide how far their forces will be exposed to risk. Funding remains a concern, though, with the EU's budget already approved for the coming months. It has been reported that Qatar and Turkey may step in to provide some financial support but are unlikely to cover the hefty price tag fully.
While it is unclear how many Egyptian soldiers will be deployed, it marks a considerable deepening of the Cairo-Mogadishu relationship, with the former having seized upon the deteriorated relations between Ethiopia and Somalia in 2024. Senior Egyptian officials have taken repeat opportunities to reaffirm Cairo's support for Somalia's "sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity" and chastise Ethiopian 'aggression.' In January, it withdrew from another round of talks over the use of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which Egypt perceives as a threat to its existence due to its use of the Nile waters. Direct flights from Cairo to Mogadishu have been launched, and Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has travelled to Egypt to cement the new bilateral defence pact.
It is not the case of replacing 'like-for-like,' however. Much of the lengthy Ethiopian border with Somalia is hostile terrain and awash with Al-Shabaab, particularly on its south-eastern side. The difficulties of deploying troops to these areas are immense, as witnessed by the use of hundreds of Ethiopian troops to extract 500 of their comrades earlier this year. New gaps are expected to spring up with the ATMIS to AUSSOM transition with the reduction of sectors from five to four, particularly in Lower and Middle Shabelle. In South West State, where Ethiopian troops play a particularly crucial role in securing, the years-long relationships with communities like the Leysan and with the regional administration cannot be easily replicated by the Egyptians or other troop-contributing countries.
The timing of President Hassan Sheikh's visit to Cairo this week amid the two-day indirect Somalia-Ethiopia talks in Ankara was also conspicuous. Mixed messages continue to emerge about the Ankara talks, with some positive noises emerging from the Somali camp, including State Foreign Minister Ali Omar, who said that "positive strides" had been made in "overcoming the challenges stemming from the illegal Ethiopian MoU." Others, however, have insisted that Addis remains committed to achieving sea access and is unlikely to withdraw from the agreement without significant inducements offered by Somalia and Turkey. The sidelining of Somaliland is generating significant alarm in Hargeisa, with President Muse Bihi questioning Turkey's neutrality in recent days. Ethiopian and Somali officials are expected to meet again in early September.
While the AUSSOM force is, of course, a critical component of limiting the gains of an encroaching Al-Shabaab, it is not the most important. There is no clearer evidence that Somalia's security forces remain woefully unable to secure the country that the AU has felt compelled to extend ATMIS by another name. The Somali National Army remains beset by ineffective leadership and command-and-control, logistical problems, and corruption. And with coordinated and comprehensive military operations still nowhere on the horizon and Al-Shabaab consolidating its influence, the move from ATMIS to AUSSOM could generate further churn that the country can ill afford.
Security sector reform is essential, but this requires significant political capital that the federal government is burning through to pursue its dubious electoral agenda. Rather than negotiating the necessary political and clan support for securing the country and investing in the federated security architecture, the federal government's attention is trained on the MoU and electoral reform. Seeking to replace Ethiopian troops with Egyptian is further evidence that politics, not security, currently comes first for the federal government.
By the Somali Wire team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
With all eyes trained on the Strait of Hormuz blockades and their geopolitical convulsions, discussions and concerns, too, have risen about the perils of other globalised chokepoints, not least the Bab al-Mandab. The threats to the stability of the Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea may not arise principally from the escalatory logic that the US, Iran, and Israel have been locked in, but the threats posed from collapse and contested sovereignty offer little relief. Off Somalia's northern coastline in particular, it is transnational criminal networks — expressed in smuggling, piracy, and, less visibly but no less consequentially, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing — that define the character of offshore insecurity. It is this last phenomenon that provides the foundation on which much of Somalia's maritime disorder is built, and which remains the most consistently neglected.
In the past months, a number of unsettling images and videos have emerged from the Russian frontlines in the Ukraine war. Within the horrors of the grinding "kill zone," where kamikaze drones strafe the sky for any signs of movement, yet another concerning dimension has emerged—the use of African recruits by Moscow in the conflict, often under false pretences. Particularly drawn from Kenya, many reportedly believed they were signing contracts to work as drivers or security guards, only to be shipped to the front lines upon arrival. Such activities are illustrative of several issues, including Russia's relationship with countries in the Horn of Africa, one shaped more by opportunistic realpolitik than genuine partnership.
Villa Somalia's triumph in Baidoa may yet turn to ashes. Since the ousting of wary friend-turned-foe, Abdiaziz Laftagareen, in late March, the federal government has ploughed ahead with preparations for state- and district-level elections in South West. Nominally scheduled for next week, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has chosen to reward his stalwart parliamentary ally, Aden Madoobe from the Rahanweyne/Hadaamo, with the regional presidency after some vacillation, naming him the sole Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) candidate
Another showdown over Tigray's political architecture is unfolding, with the future of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) once again at stake. For much of this year, fears of renewed war have loomed over Ethiopia's northernmost region, with the federal government mobilising substantial forces to the edges of Tigray.
In Act III, Scene I of William Shakespeare's tragedy Coriolanus, the tribune Sicinius addresses the gathered representatives and, rejecting the disdain the titular character displays towards plebeians, defends them, stating, "What is the city but the people?" Capturing the struggle between the elite and the masses of ancient Rome, the line has remained politically resonant for centuries--emphasising that a city, democracy, and state rely on the people, not just their leader. Or perhaps, not just its buildings. It is a lesson missed by Villa Somalia, though, with the twilight weeks of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's term in office — at least, constitutionally — dominated by the government's twin campaigns in the capital: land clearances and the militarisation of Mogadishu.
On Tuesday, 14 April, the four-year term of Somalia's federal parliament ended, or rather, it didn't. Villa Somalia's (un)constitutional coup of a year-long term extension for the parliament and president in March remains in effect, leaving the institution in a kind of lingering zombie statehood. It is perhaps a fitting denouement for the 11th parliament, whose degeneration has been so thorough that its formal expiration means little in practice.
Yesterday, 15 April, marked three years of brutal, grinding warfare between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Wholly neglected by a fading international community, many grim landmarks have been passed; another genocide in Darfur, the weaponisation of rape and starvation, another famine, or the desecration of Khartoum, El Fasher, and other major cities. And with no ceasefire or settlement in sight, the war has continued to swell, drawing in each neighbouring African country as tussling Middle Eastern powers grapple for the upper hand-- leaving Sudan in tatters.
As global energy markets reel from the partial shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz and war insurance premiums skyrocket by nearly 4,000%, an unlikely maritime security provider is emerging as a critical stabiliser in one of the world's most vital shipping corridors. The Somaliland Coast Guard, operating from the port city of Berbera, has quietly begun providing maritime escort services, seeking to reduce shipping insurance costs—and consequently, the price of commodities and energy for consumers across the Horn of Africa and beyond.
Most nights in a number of dimly lit bars in Addis Ababa, one can hear a vibraphone hum over a syncopated bassline. The sprightly rhythm is unmistakably jazz, but the scales are Ethiopian; pentatonic, looping and melodic. Five decades after its pioneering by visionary musician Mulatu Astatke, Ethio-jazz remains in full swing, with its renaissance from the late 1990s persevering despite tough political and cultural conditions.