The Politics of 'Shiid' and 'Shixaad'
Most Fridays, Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) addresses a small gathering after evening prayers in Villa Somalia's mosque. State television and social media transform the sermons into a 'national' event, and the speech's topics frequently become viral on Somali social media. The occasions are used to project the image of a confident and wise leader, with HSM often pontificating on a number of subjects. Devout Somalis dislike the notion of government leaders using the Friday minbar (pulpit) to speak about 'earthly' affairs. It matters little that HSM is talking to his own staff in his own compound.
Last Friday, HSM gave a 22-minute speech in which he returned to his favourite subject of democratic elections and his determination to transition Somalia towards a one-person, one-vote (OPOV) electoral system. The president has repeatedly sought to cast himself as the federal leader who will finally realise the much-vaunted system in Somalia for the first time in decades, even as he has burnt political capital and goodwill pushing a deeply abrogated version. Just the day prior, the Council of Ministers approved a highly flawed and contradictory electoral bill that reintroduced the bizarre restriction of political parties to just two. During his Friday speech, however, he veered off course to attack the 'real' issue he seemingly wanted to address-- 'lazy' youngsters.
The attack was scathing, chastising youth who sit in hotel lobbies and complain about economic hardships (known as 'shiid' in Somali) while seeking to shake down politicians for handouts. Scrounging or parasitism ('shixaad') is the bane of many politicians in Africa and Somalia, who are expected to distribute largesse to their families and communities. Somali politicians have been known to sneak into their hotel rooms via the backdoor to avoid the shixaad crowds waiting for them at hotel entrances to plead their case.
What was bizarre was HSM's attempt to link all shixaad to laziness and, worse, to Al-Shabaab. He claimed those sitting in hotel lobbies seeking politicians' crumbs were actually rent collectors for the jihadists. These comments in particular have generated significant furore, with Somalis taking to social media to denounce the comments. Two well-established critics of the president, former President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Prime Minister Hassan Ali Kheire, also denounced HSM's speech.
The speech has triggered a number of contrasting commentaries. The economic situation in Somalia remains dire, particularly for youth, with a high rate of unemployment and inflation adding to the painful cost of living crisis. With few options, many in the capital turn to 'shixaad' to survive and support their families. Many youths have been sharing photos of bare bowls and stale bread to emphasise their poverty. Others criticised the opulence and ostentatious displays of wealth by Somalia's nouveau riche alongside the perception that corruption is worsening under the current federal administration. From this perspective, some argued that the president was out of touch with the harsh economic realities of life in Somalia.
Yesterday evening, Somali National Television posted another set of stats to attempt to claim that the country was becoming wealthier. Calling the jump "remarkable," it noted that Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth had risen from "2.7% in 2022 to 4.2% in 2023." Yet GDP numbers for Somalia are inherently suspect because of the challenges of gathering reliable data, and the federal government can hardly claim credit for the improvement considering that it controls so little territory and, therefore, has limited capacity to influence economic performance. Instead, the cited increase of 1.5% has been largely attributed to the emergence from a punishing multi-year drought, and, critically, the country's economic structure remains unchanged. Most Somalis work in agriculture, representing more than 65% of Somalia's GDP, rendering it highly vulnerable to increasing climatic shocks. And while debt relief, ascension to the regional East African Community bloc, and the largest-ever budget were achieved in 2023, the boons are overwhelmingly concentrated in Mogadishu's political and economic elite. Real GDP per capita averaged -0.8% between 2019 and 2023, meaning most today are poorer than 5 years ago.
In this light, HSM's recent speech demonstrated a lack of sensitivity to the millions caught in difficult circumstances and unable to make ends meet. For a president who lives in a compound in the Green Zone, unable to meet and greet the city's impoverished youngsters, the comments are hardly surprising. The notion that youth poverty is a choice and comes from an inability to explore existing opportunities in the private sector is demonstrably false. Within the public sector, too, there are few jobs readily available, with those on offer often awarded to those with limited merit and on nepotistic grounds.
Shixaad in traditional Somali culture is a shameful practice, with those perceived as scroungers and parasites shunned. On the flip side, the culture, with its proud entrepreneurial history, emphasises self-drive, industry, and self-reliance-- all aspects that Somali youth surely would love to emulate, given the opportunity. Instead, today's poor youths are products of a broken state and decades of protracted conflict, with shixaad just another form of survival-- and not one always driven by sloth.
By the Somali Wire team
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