Issue No. 715

Published 07 Aug 2024

Unpacking Al-Shabaab's PBIED Strategy

Published on 07 Aug 2024 13:43 min

Unpacking Al-Shabaab's PBIED Strategy

Last Friday, a jihadist detonated his suicide vest amongst a crowd of young Somalis on Mogadishu's Lido Beach, killing over 40 people and injuring hundreds more. The suicide bombing, followed by a storming of the Beach View Hotel by several armed militants, was the largest mass-casualty event in Mogadishu for many months. The attack has drawn condemnation of a continued lack of comprehensive security plans for the capital, with the usual recriminations circling about insider support and complacency. The suicide bomber's ability to navigate to Lido Beach has further highlighted why Al-Shabaab often turn to person-borne improvised explosive devices (PBIEDs).
 
Within Al-Shabaab, the unit responsible for the creation of and deployment of these IEDs is known as the 'Mutafaajiraad'– a sub-division of the much-feared secret service, the 'Amniyaat.' Since their formation in the early 2010s as a specialist bomb-making unit, the Mutafaajiraad have honed their in-house skills to produce an immense number of IEDs every year. Explosive materiel salvaged from Somali National Army weapons and raided bases often comprise the explosive elements of these IEDs, with shrapnel and chemical precursors sourced from markets in Mogadishu. Once sourced, the PBIEDs are typically assembled in one of Al-Shabaab's many anonymous garages dotted across the country. It is highly possible that the suicide vest worn last Friday was built in Mogadishu, but an Amniyaat operative could have smuggled it into the city.
 
Unlike PBIEDs, vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) are nearly always prepared close to their intended target in Mogadishu due to the complexities of smuggling a rigged vehicle through numerous checkpoints. Al-Shabaab's suicide bombers can more easily blend into a crowd before detonating near their intended target-- be it a tea shop, hotel, or senior official. A bomber can also often evade the mandatory concentric checkpoints on roads around Halane and Villa Somalia or mingle with pedestrians to provide cover. Mandatory searches on vehicles can further trigger premature detonations.
 
The targets of PBIEDs also typically differ from VBIEDs or suicide VBIEDs– with the latter being more often deployed on the battlefield. Al-Shabaab routinely uses VBIEDs when attacking Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in the bush to initiate a night or early morning raid-- disorientating and blowing open defences before fighters are poured in. Meanwhile, as we saw last Friday, PBIEDs are often wielded in large crowds or restaurants frequented by government officials and soldiers. These attacks typically take place in the early afternoon, targeting khat-chewing soldiers relaxing in the capital's numerous tea shops. For instance, in September 2023, an Al-Shabaab suicide bomber targeted the Bar Bulsho tea shop in Mogadishu, killing over 7 people. The PBIEDs that target senior government officials have a lower success rate than these poorly-guarded tea shops.
 
Al-Shabaab's suicide bombers, either personal or vehicle-borne, are nearly always male, with the notable exception of the blind woman who killed Mogadishu's mayor and 6 others in July 2019. That does not mean that women are not intimately involved in the bomb-making process-- they often play key roles in transporting and storing explosives-- but that they typically are not invited to join the 'Liwaa al-Istihhaad' (Martyrdom Brigade). Yet, as the 2019 bombing emphasised, the extremist group has shown few qualms about deploying people with disabilities as suicide bombers, even if it is infrequent. One of the last attacks to be carried out by a disabled extremist was the May 2022 VBIED attack against a Burundian FOB in Qoryooley that killed several soldiers.
 
It has been reported that Al-Shabaab is considering deploying greater numbers of disabled extremists as suicide bombers in the coming months. Due to nearly two decades of insurgency, hundreds of fighters have been left with life-changing injuries and disabilities, with many rendered immobile and of no use to the extremist group. The costs of supporting these former fighters and their families are extracting a high financial price for Al-Shabaab, and it appears that the jihadists are considering weaponising them once again partly to ameliorate these costs.
 
The plans were discussed by senior Al-Shabaab leaders in mid-May in the Bay region at the behest of Mahad Karate– a former head of the Amniyaat and senior commander. The immobile extremists would presumably not be expected to deploy suicide vests but rather vehicles loaded with munitions. If the plan moves forward, it is believed that selected bombers would be chosen from the estimated several hundred disabled extremists before further training and indoctrination in Bay and Bakool.
 
Though Mogadishu has seen an increasing number of suicide attacks in 2024, other major cities in Somalia have experienced relative downturns. Attacks in Beledweyne, a site of numerous mass-casualty suicide bombings, have eased in recent months. The last significant VBIED episode occurred in September 2023 at a security checkpoint, killing at least 18 people and wounding dozens more. The reasons for the relative downturn in attacks in urban centres in Somalia are hard to gauge, but it should not be taken as a sign that they lack the capacity to conduct these attacks. Instead, targeting Mogadishu and particularly sites like the SYL Hotel located a stone's throw from Villa Somalia and the infiltrator General Gordon military base attack are used to emphasise the penetration of the extremists across the country.
 
The Beach View attack brutally reiterated both Al-Shabaab's continued ability to build and deploy PBIEDs and the government's inability to secure Mogadishu. Interdicting and preventing PBIED attacks is certainly more complex than VBIED detonations, but that does not mean it is impossible. One way to begin securing the capital would be to properly map out the litany of government security forces in Mogadishu and establish them under a single chain of command. This work needs to begin immediately, particularly considering the reports that Al-Shabaab may now be considering deploying its disabled veterans as suicide bombers. If this proves to be the case, the 2019 and 2022 disabled attacks may become far closer to the norm, not the exception.

by the Somali Wire Team

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