Friday's Attack at Lido Beach
Every weekend, predominantly young Somalis gather at the Lido Beach in Mogadishu at the various restaurants and hotels dotted along the seafront. Some chew khat or enjoy a 'cocktail,' the Somali term for a fruit smoothie, hanging out with friends or colleagues along the scenic beachfront. However, on Friday, their usual gathering spot turned into a bloody scene as Al-Shabaab unleashed yet another deadly attack, leaving dozens killed and over a hundred injured. Late that evening, videos on social media began circulating of bodies lying prone in the sand and of injured civilians being carted to hospitals in wheelbarrows.
A suicide bomber detonated their explosives amongst a crowd outside the Beach View Hotel before four armed gunmen stormed the building. Until the early morning, seemingly unprepared security forces clashed with the Al-Shabaab fighters, just as was the case during the SYL Hotel attack during Ramadan earlier this year. However, unlike the SYL Hotel attack that saw only a handful of people killed, the latest death toll from Friday stands at over 30, with dozens more injured, and the count is expected to rise further. It was another grim display of the extremist's continued potency in Mogadishu and willingness to deploy 'takfir,' the idea that someone is no longer a believer, to justify the unnecessary deaths of Muslim civilians.
Friday night's attack was not the first on Lido Beach by Al-Shabaab. In June 2023, 9 people were killed by Al-Shabaab fighters at the popular Pearl restaurant on the beachfront, three of whom were soldiers, and in April 2022, at least 6 were killed at the newly-opened Pescatore Seafood Restaraunt. There were also attacks in 2020 and 2016 by the extremists, with several civilians also killed on these occasions. Consequently, Lido Beach was not an unexpected location for an attack- far from it- yet security protocols were still found to be woefully inadequate. Repeat promises of new checkpoints and the purging of corrupt military officers have not prevented hundreds of young Somalis' lives from being irrevocably changed. Over the weekend, Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre announced that officers in charge of the beach's security had been arrested, but their identities were not disclosed.
The attack's timing is conspicuous– coming amid increased speculation that long-discussed 'peace' talks between Mogadishu and Al-Shabaab were imminent and during the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) draw-down. A mass casualty event of this type in the capital has not been seen for several months, though there have been clear signs of a ramping up of Al-Shabaab's activities within Mogadishu since the New Year. The shooting at General Gordon that left Emirati military officers dead in February, the SYL Hotel attack, the thwarted jailbreak at Mogadishu Central Prison, and the bombing of a cafe during the Euro 2024 Final last month have all pointed to an increasingly assertive presence. Despite this, it appears that there has been no concrete plan for improving Mogadishu's security amid the withdrawal of thousands of ATMIS troops.
Al-Shabaab appears to be signalling that it is ready to increase its number of mass casualty attacks in Mogadishu or that it is now time to come to the table with Villa Somalia and, by extension, formally govern. Internally, in recent months, Al-Shabaab has been undergoing a process of military and political consolidation rather than capturing more territory in South-Central. Though the internal machinations of the militant group are difficult to ascertain, it does appear that they are preparing for a type of more formal governance in Somalia. Externally, through attacks such as Friday's, the militants are straddling between showing their true colours as a violent extremist organisation that holds little regard for civilian life and attempting to position itself as a 'legitimate' political actor with genuine demands. These kinds of attacks are hardly likely to endear the militants to the general public or the wearied international community-- and are not intended to do so. But it could lend to the growing resignation amongst some internationals that the federal government cannot protect Mogadishu, and, subsequently, negotiations are the only solution to the decades-long conflict.
Twice-delayed, the African Union Peace and Security Council is finally expected to meet and ratify the new post-ATMIS guard force of just under 12,000 personnel-- despite funding concerns and the future of Ethiopia's troop deployment still in doubt. What was made abundantly clear this weekend, alongside several other reports of significant clashes between security forces and Al-Shabaab, is that even with the current ATMIS troop level, the government is unable to secure Mogadishu, let alone further afield. There remains little appetite for ramping troop numbers back up again, if that is even feasible in the short term, with the numerous Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) having been drawn down.
The government's continued insistence on the so-called 'Mogadishu Rising' narrative appears tragically absurd in the light of attacks like the one at Lido Beach. The complex attack painfully underscored that Al-Shabaab remains undiminished and, consequently, that any 'peace' negotiations that may take place will not arise from a position of the government's strength but rather the opposite.
by the Somali Wire Team
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