Somalia's Accountability Crisis
Somalia's federal government has a scrutiny problem– it doesn't like it. Be it lawmakers, journalists, or the international community, the incumbent government has repeatedly sought to quash the examination of its policies and actions, either through inducement or suppression. The Hassan Sheikh administration is hardly the first government, Somali or otherwise, to seek to limit prying eyes, but its targeting of the media in recent months has drawn particular alarm.
The latest journalist to be controversially jailed is Alinur Salaad for his reporting on Somali National Army soldiers' use of khat on the battlefield. He was denied fundamental rights-- being charged without a lawyer present at a courthouse in Banaadir before being detained for 5 days and released on 27 July. Salaad is far from the only one arrested or intimidated in recent months. Others, such as Said Abdullahi Kulmiye and Abdulkadir Isse, have faced pressure over their critical reporting on corrupt police and government officials. The renewed intimidation has elicited concerns about a return to media freedom during President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's first term, which saw the passage of the draconian media bill that slashed the protection of reporters. Ongoing discussions about new legislation that would impose additional restrictions on the media have elicited alarm from domestic and foreign press associations alike, including the National Union of Somali Journalists. US Ambassador to Somalia Richard H. Riley has urged the federal government to listen to their concerns.
The lack of effective scrutiny, despite the best efforts of independent journalists in a dangerous, unpredictable environment, has profound implications for the quality of governance Somalis can expect. The federal government's much-vaunted military operations are one example, with the reality on the battlefield so devoid of the daily press statements of Al-Shabaab fighters killed and villages re-taken. If you were to merely read the press statements published by SONNA or the Information Ministry, you would be led to believe that the military offensive against the extremists is going swimmingly. But it is not– and the government's repeated denials of the reality has hindered the attempts to restart operations and bring critical communities back into the offensive. While this is typical in wartime, with no government likely to openly admit to morale-damaging defeats, the dynamic is particularly extreme in Somalia.
The media is not the only checks and balances sought to be co-opted by the incumbents in Villa Somalia and their predecessors. The federal parliament, in particular, has long been an infamous hotbed of corruption and vested interests that routinely fails to achieve a quorum, let alone seriously debate and scrutinise legislation as their mandate demands. This year has seen an alarming rise in bills being pushed through with barely a glance– including the substantial Turkey-Somalia maritime security and economy deal. The agreement is likely to have profound implications for the country, but the public remains in the dark- with information only being eked out when the federal government decides to clear a cemetery in Mogadishu to make way for a naval base or such.
Another example is the recently concluded Somali Diaspora Conference that was hosted in Doha and attended by the PM and Foreign Minister. It has been widely speculated that the federal officials present would use the opportunity to open a form of dialogue with Al-Shabaab with the support of senior Qatari officials. While publicly denied by Villa Somalia, it is understood that there are influential individuals within the administration who are pushing for a negotiated settlement with the extremists. Though peace talks routinely occur behind closed doors, any attempt to conduct them without laying the requisite groundwork will inevitably doom them to disaster even if they 'succeed' in bringing the extremists into government.
The Turkey-Somalia pact and Somali Diaspora Conference rumours both speak to the country's broader political settlement, where decisions are made behind closed doors without the prying eyes of the international community or the public. One might compare Somalia's politics to an iceberg, where the stories reported in the news only signal the reality beneath. The undercurrents of clan and community that do not appear readily on the surface are instrumental in shaping all aspects of politics but are typically not well understood by non-Somalis. This does not excuse, however, the silence of the international community when it comes to comments like PM Hamza Abdi Barre's that Jews were the "children of pigs and monkeys" in the aftermath of the 7 October attacks and Israel's invasion of Gaza.
When it comes to other pressing matters, there has been an apparent unwillingness to hold politicians and others publicly accountable from the fatigued international community siloed in Aden Adde. The federal government has been able to act egregiously on media freedom and women's rights, topics that should matter to the traditional international community, in large part because many of their primary donors allow them to do so. The damp squib of a response to the abrogation of Chapters 1-4 of the Provisional Constitution was particularly telling-- this is a process that millions of USD have been invested into, but diplomatic missions acquiesced nonetheless. The federal government is now laying the political groundwork for Chapters 5-9, with the full expectation that much of the international community will consent to whatever version emerges.
Scrutiny works both ways- for a government to be scrutinised, there must be those willing to hold it accountable. Independent journalists like Alinur Salaad cannot bear the burden alone, with parliamentarians and the international community both shirking their duty. Backing a thin-skinned government that quickly resorts to intimidation is surely unsustainable in the long run. Any robust and vibrant democracy depends on the quality of its media and opposition to keep the central government on an even keel. Journalists need greater support in Somalia to bring the country's politics decided in the dark to the light, not more intimidation under the guise of legislation.
by the Somali Wire Team
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