Editing Women Out of Politics and Power
Last week, Somalia's federal government announced that a man would head up the former Ministry of Women and that it would amend the docket to the 'Ministry of Family and Human Rights.' Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre's sudden decision to appoint a former army general, Bashir Mohammed Jama 'Goobe,' to head up the new department has unsurprisingly proven controversial. The decision is highly unusual in Africa, where most governments can at least accept the symbolism of having a woman in charge of a ministry for women's affairs, even when they are not necessarily champions of gender rights and equality.
Even more contentious has been the decision to rename the former Ministry of Women and Human Rights. Substituting the word "Women" with "Family" is far from innocuous but rather an apparent ideologically-driven attempt to write Somali women out of political participation and leadership. The rewriting clearly implies that women's roles are limited to the family and do not deserve to have their own issues heard within Somalia. Barre may have felt that appointing a man to lead the Ministry of Women would have been too uncomfortable, but renaming the Ministry is arguably far worse.
Islamist social conservatives and Islamist right-wingers have long campaigned against what they perceive as a pernicious 'gender equality ideology' promoted by the West. The still-growing Salafist and Wahhabist influence in Somalia in recent years has further compounded the sentiment that women should only serve as 'carers' in society and that the gender rights movement undermines traditional family values.
The new Minister Goobe is a veteran army officer and bureaucrat with a vaunted career in government, notably serving as the Director-General of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) between 2013 and 2014, as well as heading up the country's prisons. Still, though he may be well-regarded and praised for competence in management, Goobe brings no particular interest or aptitude in advancing women's rights or human rights in general. Instead, his return to high-profile politics is more likely driven by future electoral calculations on the part of the federal government.
Last week, Goobe 'won' the 18th seat of the House of the People's Representatives in Dhusamareb, following the stepping down of his wife, Sahra Olad Abdi, from the seat and post as State Minister for Public Works. There is a key reason that Goobe has been suddenly elevated to both MP and Minister-- he hails from the minority Madhibaan clan, also known as 'Gabooye.' Though generally regarded as 'low caste,' in recent years, they have been allowed some form of representation. The federal government and Hamza are subsequently attempting to kill two birds with one stone-- neutering the women's agenda while seeming to empower a low-caste clan resented by the 'blue-blooded' clans. With a potentially bitter fight on the horizon over the amending of Chapters 5-9 of the Provisional Constitution in parliament, the federal government has been seeking to shore up its deteriorated support on a number of fronts in recent weeks.
Women groups, led by the Somali Gender Equality Movement (SGEM), are calling on the PM to rescind the decision. A parliamentary caucus of women is under pressure to draft a censure motion and appeal against the decision to rename the Ministry and appoint Goobe. And as the SGEM notes in its latest letter of complaint to the PM, the 75-member ministerial council now has one woman less, bringing the total number of women on the council to just 7.
The controversy is the latest in a line of dubious anti-women decisions by federal politicians. Earlier this year, the rewriting of Chapters 1-4 of the Provisional Constitution quietly dropped the 30% quota for women in parliament despite the protestations of female lawmakers. Though the quota itself was never met and a dubious inducement often wielded as a political tool, its removal was a clear signal of where Villa Somalia's priorities lie. The 'gaming' of the 2022 federal parliamentary polls was another particularly blatant example of politicians paying lip service to the notion of female representation. Former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo's Nabad Iyo Nolol coalition picked inexperienced female candidates to shut out women's rights champions in the 2022 federal parliamentary elections, with the quota used as a blunt instrument.
Infamously, the Sexual Offences Bill in 2018 was sidelined following a vitriolic backlash by conservative elements of Somali society, particularly Islamist preachers. The Sexual Intercourse Bill that was tabled two years later encapsulated many of the regressive attitudes that remain prevalent amongst parts of Somali society-- removing the age of consent, watering down the definition of rape, and legalising child marriage. Moreover, the now-defunct Ministry of Women's Affairs post became vacant after the former Minister, Khadija Mohammed Diriye, died of natural causes in December 2023. It has been vacant for 7 months, which is itself a testament to Hamza Barre's low priority assigned to the Ministry.
The enemies of gender equality are many, but the alliance between traditionalists and Islamists to use their political muscle to roll back gains in gender equality should be of immense concern. There is a tremendous need for a specific docket for women's issues in Somalia, with Female Genital Mutilation, sexual violence, and period poverty all rife across the country. Moreover, the ridiculousness of replacing the post with one concerning the family speaks to the conservative Islamist streak that runs through the incumbents in Villa Somalia. As the Sexual Intercourse Bill was eventually batted back following domestic and international pressure, this decision, too, should be met with strong opposition from Somalia's partners. Appointing a woman to lead the Ministry and reinserting 'Women' into the title is not even the bare minimum-- it is a travesty that this is where the debate still lies with federal politicians in Somalia.
by the Somali Wire Team
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