Puntland goes to the polls (again)
A study of nearly 2,000 households in Puntland in October 2023 revealed that children under 15 make up 53% of the population, 15-64 make up 44%, and over 65 just 3%. Given that the last direct, multi-party election in Puntland was in 1969, most in the northern Federal Member State (FMS) have had no experience of direct democracy-- until 25 May 2023. Last year, amid deadly political disputes between the Puntland administration and political opposition, one-person, one-vote (OPOV) district council elections were held in 34 out of 37 districts. Voting in three districts in the opposition stronghold of the Nugaal region, including Garowe, was delayed due to security concerns. On Tuesday, 23 July, the remaining votes were peacefully held in a far more stable political environment.
According to the Puntland Electoral Commission (PEC), over 64,000 people were registered as voters in 80 polling stations in the three districts. Still, despite well over a year of preparation, the expected turnout was around half that number to elect local government representatives in 81 seats. Four hundred and thirty-one candidates contested these seats, with the majority being men, 332 to 99 women.
The PEC's preliminary results have revealed a tight contest, with 8 political associations picking up seats in the districts. The ruling Kaah party came out top in Garowe, Dangorayo, and Godobjiiraan, winning 12, 9, and 7 seats, respectively. In Garowe, Horseed won 6 seats and picked up another 5 seats in Dangorayo. The other associations that won seats were Ifiye, Runcad, Shaqaalaha, Mustaqbal, Mideeye, and Sincard. The number of associations winning votes in Puntland reflects a far more vibrant democratic culture than Somalia is often credited with.
The polls held last May were imperfect, with civil society and opposition groups alleging instances of voter fraud, intimidation, and breaches of the regional constitution. However, they still marked an important step forward in Puntland's democratic journey, and for the first time in decades, groups that typically did not have a say in Somalia's politics, including women and youth, were directly elected to positions of authority. Despite Kaah winning the most votes in all three districts on Tuesday, coalitions will need to be formed in each to elect mayors. Coalition-forming in several Puntland districts proved contentious last year, with councils failing to make inroads and actually begin governing for multiple weeks.
Today, Puntland's politics are far calmer than last May. On 8 January, after months of disputes between President Said Abdullahi Deni's administration, the regional parliament, and the opposition, a traditional vote secured the incumbent president a second 5-year term. While it was widely expected to be a close race, it was a comfortable victory for Deni, who won 45 out of 66 MPs' votes. His nearest rival, Guled Salah Barre, secured 21.
Despite the contentious buildup to the traditional vote, Deni was swiftly accepted as Puntland president with a renewed mandate. Critically, following his victory, Deni reached out to the Issa Mohamud sub-clan of the Majerteen, who are linked to the opposition Horseed association, to soothe the tensions that had arisen from his plan to impose a OPOV system for the regional presidential elections. Last year, Issa Mohamud militia, led by Jimaale Takar, took to the streets of Garowe several times, intermittently clashing with forces loyal to the Puntland president, including the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF). Horseed and others partly opposed the OPOV transition due to concerns it would contravene the informal presidency rotation between the three major sub-clans of the Majerteen, with Deni from the Osman Mohamud sub-clan. The agreement by Horseed, Mideeye, and other opposition groups to complete this week's polls with PEC in May significantly reduced the likelihood of disruption on Tuesday.
The Kaah's relative successes in Nugaal can be partly attributed to a rally-to-the-flag dynamic that emerged after Puntland publicly disengaged from Mogadishu in April 2024 following the controversial passage of heavily amended Chapters 1-4 of the Provisional Constitution. Many Puntlanders were already feeling disenfranchised by the Hawiye-dominated federal government, and the subsequent severing of ties between Puntland and Mogadishu has been welcomed in many quarters. Since then, the Deni administration has mainly taken a step back from the chaos of Mogadishu and the recriminations consuming the federal government. Still, the Puntland president may feel that he has to intervene with the imminent reopening of Chapters 5-9 of the Provisional Consitution and whether Villa Somalia seeks to amend Article 97– where executive power lies within the federal system.
Another boost to the administration was the UN's agreement to directly disburse development funds to Puntland following the visit of James Swan, the Acting Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to Somalia, to Garowe. The federal government has repeatedly been accused of controlling the funds and delaying assistance to the northern FMS.
Still, not everything is rosy in Puntland. The Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) is continuing to extort businesses and expand operations from the Bari mountains. Several private hospitals were forced to close due to extortion demands in the coastal city of Bosasso, and the hope that ISS leader Abdulqadir Mumin was killed in a US airstrike at the end of May has been dashed. The Puntland administration has also been wrestling with the surge in piracy since the beginning of the year, which is now down month-on-month.
Puntland's experience shows once again that political buy-in remains the most critical factor for successful elections in Somalia. Establishing support from Horseed and others allowed Tuesday's votes to pass off without any disturbance and allowed for 8 associations to have their candidates elected. Though district coalition-building may prove difficult, it also necessitates that multiple communities will influence decision-making in their districts on issues that affect them. And the images of Puntlanders, young and old, men and women, lining up to exercise their democratic rights were nothing if not inspiring. In one interview with local media, an 80-year-old man reminisced about the last time he cast his ballot several decades ago. Puntland now must build upon the successes of Tuesday to look towards an OPOV presidential system that works for all parties involved. Rolling back these democratic gains cannot be an option.
by the Somali Wire Team
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