Robbing the Future: Corruption in the FGS
Hal booli ah, nirig xalaal ah ma dhasho
('A stolen camel cannot give birth to legitimate offspring')
The pervasiveness of corruption across Somalia means that many can perceive it as a frustrating, if inevitable, feature of life. While incoming governments, spawned from a highly corrupt parliamentary process, promise to tackle the scourge, they soon return to form. With debts to be repaid and kickbacks promised, every successive federal government has been beholden to its patrons and clans. The incumbent government is perhaps the most culpable yet.
President Hassan Sheikh's first term (2012-2017) was marred by widespread nepotism and corruption. While his return to Villa Somalia in May 2022 was a welcome relief following the calamitous years of Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, the cronyism of his first term lingered in the air. Still, in those first hopeful months of the administration amid the Ma'awiisley uprising in central Somalia, the federal government sought to portray that it had turned a new leaf. Several senior government officials were arrested or fled Somalia following corruption investigations by the Auditor General. These investigations, however, were highly politicised-- directed at individuals eyeing political positions or used to displace officials from their roles, allowing the current administration to install their favoured candidates.
Two years later, the graft has taken on a life of its own. Funds are currently being misappropriated through various schemes, ranging from travel reimbursements on non-existent trips to dodgy procurement strategies. Senior government officials are hijacking international projects to hire associates and service their clan's patron-client networks. Elsewhere, the federal government is working with property developers to sell off swathes of public land. In Mogadishu, several displaced and low-income communities living rent-free on public land have been removed ahead of land being sold off. Even tax collection has been privatised-- with a local company with ties to the administration's leadership now responsible for its limited collection. And these schemes further compound the poverty facing the overwhelming majority of the country, with crucial development funds not circulating among the public. In essence, only a handful of government officials and their associated business individuals are exchanging the immense flow of international capital between themselves.
Few ministries have been left untouched by the renewed palm greasing, but how it has taken root within Somalia's security architecture is particularly concerning. The Ministry of Internal Security and Defence Ministry are both reported as hot-beds of corruption. Defence Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur 'Jama' has become known as 'Mr 25%' for his fondness of taking a quarter-cut of any contract that lands upon his desk. Projects hiring advisory roles or procuring equipment have been particularly targeted. A popular phrase among Mogadishu's senior officials has become-- "If they refuse to hire the person I want, I will suspend the project."
Capital flight from Somalia is nothing new, but the scale of the corruption dwarfs that of the previous governments. For the first time, Somalia's federal budget has exceeded USD 1 billion, widely celebrated by Villa Somalia and federal officials. However, most of this still stems from grants and loans from the international community rather than from the limited tax base of essentially just Mogadishu. Money intended for national development is being used to buy and build apartment blocks in Nairobi, Turkey, and Dubai, while it is common to see government officials wearing Rolex watches or Armani suits. Funds are being funnelled into shell companies that are contracted out for projects by international donors and institutions-- including the World Bank. Other ministers and director generals have reached agreements with businesses to receive kickbacks. Rather than a government posting considered public service, officials too often regard it as a route to enriching themselves, friends, and families. It's common for newly appointed and outgoing appointees to face a particular question-- 'Maxaad ka qabsatay?' ('What did you get?')
The corruption also extends to the very top-- with the senior federal leadership believed to stand to personally benefit from Somalia's sale of its natural maritime resources to Turkey. With significant oil reserves estimated to reside off Somalia's shores, immense sums stand to be made if they can extract the much-coveted 'black gold.' Notably, the bill that contained the Somalia-Turkey maritime defence pact was rushed through parliament earlier this year-- several lawmakers admitted to not having read it before they voted in favour.
In Mogadishu, ministers and director-generals are too often working to enrich themselves rather than tackling the hard work of governance, capacity-building, and reform. And with nearly every process being manipulated for political advantage or financial gain, it is hard not to regard this material corruption as moral corruption as well. Particularly concerning is how the federal government has sought to suppress critical voices. Just on Monday, Ali Salaad, a former election campaigner for Hassan Sheikh and independent journalist, was arrested by police after accusing government officials of profiting from the sale of khat to armed forces.
Government corruption continues to pose an existential threat to Somalia. Why would a soldier in the Somali National Army lay down his life against Al-Shabaab when he is paid a pittance, rarely on time, and sees his commanding officers reaping immense profits? Moreover, the wholesale corruption and gaping inequality in Somalia breeds the violent extremism that thrives on disenfranchisement and disenchantment. The disconnect between Mogadishu and the people it claims to represent is only growing. Despite the occasional prosecution of a corrupt official and protestations that cronyism is being purged from the country, it is worse today than ever before-- while the problems facing the country are ever more challenging.
by the Somali Wire Team
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