Clan-destine arms smuggling
On Monday, two trucks travelling from Ethiopia laden with weapons and ammunition were ambushed near Abudwaaq town in Galgaduud. A dozen people, including security personnel, were killed in the raid by Marehaan militia, with photos quickly circulating across Somali social media of triumphant clan members holding rifles aloft. While the federal government has repeatedly insisted that it will seek to reclaim the thousands of pistols, AK-variant rifles, and DsHK heavy machine guns, the chances of their return are dubious.
The hijacked weapons were seemingly clandestinely destined for one of Villa Somalia's political proxies in Galmudug, Libaan Ahmed Hassan 'Shuluq,' who is planning to contest the upcoming regional presidential election against the incumbent Ahmed Abdi Karie 'QoorQoor.' Through his federal connections, Shuluq has profited USD millions from overseeing the distribution of arms, fuel, and supplies to the allied clan militias battling Al-Shabaab in central Somalia. This week's frantic backpedalling from the federal government appears more intended to deflect intention from an irresponsible government act than to actually augment arms control. The incident is further proving particularly embarrassing for those federal officials who proudly celebrated the lifting of the remaining elements of the UN arms embargo on Somalia only months ago.
Moreover, the apparent ease with which the weapons were hijacked is another potent symbol of the Somali government's continued lack of a monopoly of force, as well as the immense proliferation of arms across South-Central Somalia. Not only is the country one of the most heavily armed in the world, but according to the 2023 Global Organised Crime Index, Somalia is also home to one of the most pervasive arms trafficking markets. Following the attack on the two trucks, the cost of an AK-47 in the Abudwaaq market plunged from USD 1,400 to just 400. In small dhows and speedboats from Yemen and Iran, weapons are shuttled across the Indian Ocean and Red Sea to the longest coastline on the African continent. Simultaneously, rogue Ethiopian generals have become increasing points of origin for weapons being smuggled into Somalia, as well as South Sudan and Sudan. It is not yet clear where precisely the ambushed trucks originated from in Ethiopia, but unsurprisingly, it has already been seized upon in the context of the deteriorated Addis-Mogadishu relations as a further example of Ethiopia seeking to destabilise Somalia.
Somalia's Minister of Internal Security Abdullahi Ismael 'Fartaag' and several officials have now travelled to the district to meet with Marehaan representatives and others to discuss the return of the weapons. They are unlikely to have any major success, considering that the federal government has repeatedly failed to intervene and protect civilians in the particularly bloody inter-clan clashes of recent weeks. Particularly ludicrous, though, was the announcement by a hurriedly assembled National Security Council yesterday that a "total ban" would be imposed upon the import and trade of weapons by non-state actors. With the federal government only controlling a fraction of Somalia, the notion that it can now somehow impose this ban is nonsensical.
While they may be able to recover some firearms, and that may be only possible through a promise of financial or military inducements, there were over 2,200 AK-47s in the trucks alone, and many will likely have already been dispersed through clan networks. Some have speculated that a significant quantity could end up in Al-Shabaab hands, and though some well could through the arms markets that dot the country, the Marehaan militias near Abudwaaq are more closely associated with the Sufi paramilitaries Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a, who have fought the extremists for years.
The capture of these weapons also begs a broader question about the feasibility of disarmament in Somalia. Nearly every household in the country possesses one weapon or another, and military supplies continue to flow into the country to arm the multitude of clan militias, as well as the violent extremists of the Islamic State in Somalia and Al-Shabaab. For many, an AK-47 is synonymous with self-defence– a firearm one can still easily pick up at Mogadishu's notorious Bakara market for several hundred USD. Again, there is little possibility that the federal government can suddenly end the weapons trade when it cannot do so even within the capital.
And at the heart of any future disarmament programme in Somalia lies the question of who is disarming whom? With every successive regional and federal government in Somalia having been tainted by the perception of serving particular political, religious, or clan interests, successive attempts to disarm militias and warlords have collapsed– often violently. Considering that the current occupants of Villa Somalia have been firmly associated with an ongoing 'Hawiye-fication' of the federal government, they, too, would surely struggle to disarm vast swathes of the country. And the import of high-end M-16 rifles for Shuluq and his militia amid persistent inter-clan fighting in Galmudug speaks to the continued malaise of wielding violence for political ends. It is little wonder that across social media, many Marehaan have been insistent that they will fiercely resist any attempt by the federal government to reclaim the weapons. This is surely not what UN officials envisaged after they lifted the final elements of the arms embargo on the federal government in December 2023.
The Somali Wire Team
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