Issue No. 706

Djibouti turns up the heat with Somaliland

At the end of June, with temperatures reaching over 40 degrees Celsius in Djibouti City, Somaliland's diplomatic building had its water and electricity severed. With no air-conditioning and Somaliland diplomats unable to work, the mission was soon closed. The responsible party, Djibouti's government, publicly cited unpaid bills of several thousand USD as the reason for shutting off the building's water and electricity, but this came amidst worsening tensions between Hargeisa and Djibouti.

Relations took a downturn on 1 January 2024 when Somaliland and Ethiopia announced their bombshell Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that would lease to the latter 20 km of coastline in exchange for sovereign recognition of Somaliland. The news followed a visit by Somaliland President Muse Bihi and Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to Djibouti to restart the dormant Hargeisa-Mogadishu dialogue, overseen by their Djiboutian counterpart Ismail Omar Guelleh. The Djiboutian President's and Mohamud's aggressive negotiating position, particularly surrounding Somaliland's loss of Laas Aanood in Sool to Dhulbahante SSC-Khaatumo militia, was received poorly by Bihi, who had anticipated that talks would resume from where they had left off in 2020. Agreeing to resume dialogue at a later date, the Somaliland President subsequently departed for Addis and signed the MoU.

For Guelleh, these actions were likely taken as a personal affront. Some have posited that Djibouti's opposition reflects the MoU's perceived existential economic threat to the country. While ties between Hargeisa and Addis have once again raised the possibility of Ethiopia diverting trade through the Port of Berbera, operated by the Ethiopia-allied, Emirati-owned DP World multinational, any diversion is unlikely to be significant. Moreover, the Ethiopian base on Somaliland's coast would be naval, not commercial. And critically, the current port infrastructure of Ethiopia in Djibouti is more developed than that of Somaliland or even Lamu in Kenya.

Despite public antagonism to the MoU, Guelleh has been more amenable to Ethiopia behind closed doors. On 24 June, Ethiopia's Foreign Minister Taye Atskeselassie travelled to Djibouti for the first time in his official capacity to meet with Guelleh. While the Djiboutian President reiterated his opposition, he also reportedly told the Ethiopian Foreign Minister that if Addis is committed to implementing the MoU, Djibouti would not oppose it. These comments arguably reflect that while Djibouti can afford to spike its relations with Somaliland, it remains closely economically integrated with Ethiopia.

Following the closure of the Somaliland mission in Djibouti, after weeks of intensifying rhetoric, on 2 July, Somaliland Information Minister Ali Hassan Mohamed joined those accusing Djibouti of hosting Awdal State Movement (ASM) rebels. The ASM are a small group of Gadabursi on either side of the Somaliland-Djibouti border, known to fluctuate in their political alliances. Having previously supported the deal with Addis, they are currently opposed to the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU because they believe the Gadabursi do not stand to benefit from its implementation. The ASM has also received vocal support from Mogadishu, particularly Somalia's new Foreign Minister Ahmed Fiqi, who met with ASM leaders in February in Mogadishu. Somaliland views the ASM as a significant threat to its integrity and unity, and has criticised Djibouti for hosting its leaders. Some have asserted that the Guelleh administration has also offered ASM rebels military training.

Another casualty of deteriorating Somaliland-Djibouti relations has been back-door SSC-Hargeisa talks. Through much of 2023, the administration in Djibouti was working behind the scenes on these talks, but, like the Mogadishu-Hargeisa talks, these have also been dashed. Djibouti has not denied that Abdulkader Ahmed Ali 'Firdhiye,' leader of SSC-Khaatumo, was welcomed to the presidential palace by Guelleh on 8 July. Firdhiye's welcome there is somewhat ironic, considering that the SSC angrily accused Djibouti of supporting Somaliland during armed clashes in Laas Aanood last year.

The invitation to Firdhiye to visit was a clear escalation by Djibouti, feeding the drum-beat of those speculating that war could soon be upon the two neighbours. While views differ on whether Laas Aanood could again erupt into violence in the coming months-- either between Somaliland and the SSC-K or between the SSC-K and Abdi Madoobe's Al-Shabaab faction-- the removal of Djibouti as a de-escalating factor should be of concern.

While Djibouti may be offering military training to militia from Awdal and Sool, this furore has overshadowed the notable withdrawal of Awdal's most prominent candidate, Professor Ahmed Ismail Samatar, from Somaliland's party elections scheduled for November 2024. The Hilaac party leader cited the monopolisation of Somaliland's political space by the Isaaq as the reason for his withdrawal, with Isaaq sub-clans dominating the three current parties– the ruling Kulmiye, UCID, and Waddani. Only these three parties will be allowed to compete for the presidency in November. With Awdal to the west and Sool to the east both mired in growing political crises of legitimacy, it is little wonder that Hargeisa has forcefully responded to Djibouti's recent actions.

The deterioration of Somaliland-Djibouti relations further reflects the ongoing Emirati-Saudi schism, which is proving so corrosive to the Horn of Africa. The former Gulf allies are essentially fighting a proxy war in the devastating Sudanese conflict, with paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) enjoying the patronage of the Emiratis, and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) maintaining close ties with the Saudis. Administrations across the Horn have essentially fallen into one camp or the other, with Eritrea and Egypt siding with Riyadh, and Ethiopia with Abu Dhabi. 

Djibouti has aligned itself with Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar, having previously seized control of DP World operations at the Doraleh Container Termina adjacent to the Port of Djibouti in 2018. In June 2024, Riyadh and Djibouti agreed on a 92-year contract for a duty-free logistics zone that would span 120,000 square miles. For Somaliland, Abu Dhabi remains a crucial ally and trading partner, while many have speculated that the Emiratis were involved in some way in the MoU.

This is not to say that either the Saudis or the Emiratis are intentionally stoking divisions between Djibouti and Somaliland, though they are surely not oblivious to them, but rather that nearly every diplomatic row in the Horn is now being refracted across the Gulf. The strategic importance of Somaliland and Djibouti may pale in comparison to that of Ethiopia and Sudan, but they nevertheless lie along the world's most important strategic waterway– the Red Sea. This passage is responsible for 12-15% of global trade and 20% of international container shipping, and both the Saudis and Emiratis are seeking to expand their maritime presence on this arterial strait.

In addition, Djibouti is facing growing pressure from Western countries that maintain a military presence there over its close ties with Beijing. China has increasingly positioned itself as a major power in Djibouti, to the alarm of the 6 Western nations with military bases there. The growing possibility of Somaliland's recognition by Ethiopia could also offer these countries another outlet to the Red Sea, surely another concern for Djibouti.

While there has been speculation of possible border or proxy violence in the area, it benefits neither Djibouti nor Somaliland to allow such rhetoric to further escalate. Permitting Mogadishu to continue to stoke their worsening relations only raises the possibility of further destabilisation in Awdal and Sool. Djibouti and Somaliland's similar reliance on Ethiopia means the stakes for the MoU are undoubtedly high, but it does not necessitate economic collapse for Djibouti and should not be regarded as existential. Regarding Awdal and Sool, it is clear that ahead of November's elections, Somaliland's major parties need to make the case for disaffected Dhulbahante and Gadabursi to remain a part of the polity. Sabre-rattling will not solve crises of legitimacy to Hargeisa's east and west. In the meantime, restoring water and electricity to Somaliland's mission in Djibouti would be a good first step in a positive way forward.

The Somali Wire Team