Al-Shabaab's Shadow 'War on Football'
Yesterday evening, Al-Shabaab detonated a car bomb parked next to a popular cafe in Mogadishu, killing 5 people and wounding over 20 more. At the time of the blast, football fans had gathered at the Top Coffee Restaurant in the capital's centre to watch England play Spain in the Euro 2024 Finals on a large flat-screen TV. It is probable that most attendees would have paid a small sum to watch the match that ended in a 2-1 victory to Spain.
While another grim reminder of the continued potency of the extremist group, the deadly attack also underscored Al-Shabaab's long-running campaign to rid Somalia of football. In its propaganda distributed by its Al-Kataib Media Foundation, Al-Shabaab has depicted the world's most popular game as a social scourge as well as a form of Western enslavement and debauchery to mislead Muslim youth. Jihadist clerics will invoke the theological principle of 'lawh' -- any frivolous pursuit that makes people forget Allah-- to ban football, a restrictive interpretation favoured by nearly all Salafists. But what makes Al-Shabaab different is its repeated wielding of violence to stop the watching of football.
Last night's attack was not the first by the extremist group on football spectators, having previously conducted bombings on stadiums themselves. In April 2018, Al-Shabaab detonated a remote-controlled landmine at a football stadium in Baraawe in Lower Shabelle, killing 5 people and injuring 10 more. Meanwhile, across Al-Shabaab-controlled territory, the content of already-limited satellite TV is severely restricted. Restaurants and public outlets can show Al-Jazeera Arabic and Al-Jazeera English.
Traditional Sunni Islamic scholarship and consensus deem the notion of football as 'lahw' as misguided. In fact, most call spectator football 'mustahab' – an intrinsically harmless social pursuit that may be socially and psychologically beneficial. Football has become increasingly popular across the Muslim world. It has been particularly encouraged by the Gulf capitals that have poured USD billions into their country’s football development and famous teams such as Manchester City, despite accusations of 'sports-washing' their human rights records.
Al-Shabaab's shadow war on football is part of its broader counter-cultural campaign to resist what it deems as a decadent foreign influence. In the past, the extremist group has banned pop music channels, Bollywood dramas and Mexican soaps – three influential foreign TV exports to Somalia. While Egyptian channels showing historical dramas are tolerated, those showing romantic films are not.
Still, Al-Shabaab is unable to police TV content wholly without control of satellite reception and distribution. Public viewing of satellite television remains prevalent across much of Somalia, with most families unable to afford a TV set and satellite subscription for their homes. While cafes draw customers to buy their goods by airing satellite TV, other Somalis have established ingenious methods to circumvent hefty subscriptions. They clone signals and distribute them 'illegally' over a vast local network – thus cutting the cost per family and spreading digital and satellite TV content to the poor. Radio still remains the most popular form of media in Somalia by some distance, however, and many would have listened to the game huddled around a portable radio last night.
The Federal Government of Somalia is engaged in its own modest counter-cultural campaign. In recent years, a number of youth centres have been established in Mogadishu to provide youth with 'healthy' recreation. Boy’s only youth clubs have been set up to teach dominoes, chess, card games, and pool. Senior government officials, including President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, PM Hamza Barre, and former intelligence chief Mahad Salad, have all toured some of these new centres and met with youths. For young boys caught up in violent extremism, football and other sports can offer a critical expressive outlet and a potent form of de-radicalisation as they transition back into normal life. Playing professional football has also provided financial rewards for young men who might otherwise face a life of impoverishment or extremism.
Al-Shabaab's extremism and its attachment to a benighted form of theology make for a grim prospect for youth under their watch. In a country where 70% of people are under 30 and who grew up in an age where England's Premier League has become an almost universal language, the prospect of a life without 'the beautiful game' is pretty depressing. Last night's attack on those simply watching a football match taking place in Berlin, thousands of miles away, further speaks to the worst instincts of the jihadists.
While some wrongly believe that negotiations with Al-Shabaab would foster a new era of peace in Somalia, the cultural imposition of a potential takeover has barely been addressed. Sports, art, film, theatre, dance, and music are all certain to face severe restrictions from Al-Shabaab, and with it, the tapestry of Somali life becomes a little greyer. While Mogadishu today is nothing like it was in the 1950s, liberally filled with music and bars on the capital's Lido Beach, it would nevertheless face a further reduction in self-expression and enjoyment if Al-Shabaab has its way. In this light, it is little wonder that many Somali youth are considering fleeing if the extremists can seize power.
The Somali Wire Team
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