Does anyone actually want OPOV elections?
In May, federal and regional leaders, barring Puntland President Said Deni, assembled in Mogadishu for a meeting of the National Consultative Council (NCC). What emerged from the NCC was a tentative agreement to harmonise federal and regional polls in 2026 under a one-person, one-vote (OPOV) system to be overseen by a federal committee. Yet, less than three months later, the Jubaland and South West State presidents are already breaking from the pact to hold dubious traditional 'elections' in a bid to stay in power. And, for the moment, the federal government is keeping quiet.
The 'gaming' of Federal Member State (FMS) polls in Somalia is nothing new– these votes have little to do with genuine political alternation or freedom of choice but rather are carefully choreographed events intended to legitimise elite pacts. The timing is conspicuous-- neither South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen nor his Jubaland counterpart Ahmed Islam 'Madoobe' want federally-controlled OPOV elections that could unseat them in two years' time. Consequently, after weeks of speculation, they have both moved toward holding traditional elections that are 'legitimate' enough to be accepted by fellow elites and constituents while endorsing de facto term extensions.
Laftagareen is now expected to form a temporary electoral committee by 15 July at the latest, while a vote will take place by September 2024. And last week, as widely predicted, Madoobe directed his regional parliament to amend Jubaland's constitution to allow Somalia's longest-serving leader to run again and extend the presidential term from four to five years. It is not yet clear when the FMS president will hold elections, but Madoobe's term too has already expired, having last held elections in August 2019.
So far, the federal government has not commented on the apparent disregard for May's NCC agreement. While Villa Somalia has agitated for OPOV polls, it nevertheless has a similar rationale to Madoobe and Laftagareen– wanting to hold elections when it knows its favoured candidates can win. At this juncture, it appears that Villa Somalia is currently weighing up if Laftagareen is that candidate and whether it can still co-opt the South West president to support its constitutional agenda. A newer factor likely playing into their calculations is the growing plot by federal South West lawmakers to impeach Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre, with the blessing of Laftagareen, since the reopening of parliament last weekend.
If Villa Somalia decides not to continue dealing with the Laftagareen, it could well seek to delay the elections until such a time, place, and modality that its favoured candidate will win. Or, as some have suggested, the federal government may decide to hold parallel polls in Baraawe and refuse to recognise Laftagareen's all-but-certain victory. The government's favoured candidate to replace Laftagareen is believed to be Defence Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur 'Jama.'. But with Laftagareen maintaining a firm hold on Baidoa and, crucially, the city's airport, Villa Somalia will not want to sever relations with another Federal Member State leader unless it is sure that it can win.
So, in essence, we are currently playing a waiting game while federal and regional leaders seek to manipulate the elections at the FMS level in their favour in a way that still appears legitimate enough to prevent violence from erupting. And in a country that has faced decades of incessant violence, what do 'free and fair' polls actually entail? In a mature and robust democracy, free and fair elections would be fairly respectable, with most of the electorate able to participate and accept the majority of outcomes. But in Somalia, where most are understandably concerned about violence breaking out, it is an integral part of the body politic for the elite to make dubious pacts and to stoke violence if those choices aren't respected. Politicians such as former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo are the masters of inciting violence to 'game' polls to force term extensions and undermine his opponents.
In Somali politics, there is a thin line between legitimacy and chaos, particularly when it comes to elections. All Somalis understand that the current federal and regional elections are essentially bought and sold with patronage and promises, but they nevertheless will routinely imbue the victor with a critical mandate-- if the vote is 'legitimate' enough. This is why, even though they surely would love to, Laftagareen and Madoobe cannot simply wave their hands and grant themselves another term in office. Crossing the amorphous, changeable line risks turning febrile politics into violence. And some politicians are better at reading the mood than others, able to pull back from the edge at critical moments.
While all these leaders will inevitably pay lip service to the possibility of free and fair polls in Somalia, we should ask ourselves, do any of these elite actually want OPOV? And how good is 'good enough' to prevent violence between, say, the Leysan and Laftagareen erupting? Only time will tell, but the brief truce established at the NCC appears to be dying a death of a thousand cuts.
The Somali Wire Team
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