Foes to friends: Mogadishu-Nairobi relations
It was less than three years ago that Kenya and Somalia appeared to be inadvertently hurtling towards armed conflict. Relations between Mogadishu and Nairobi had plummeted following the inauguration of former Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo in 2017, particularly over his repeated attempts to undermine Jubaland President and Kenyan ally Ahmed Mohamed Islam 'Madoobe.' Kenyan diplomats were expelled from the Somali capital in 2020, and by mid-2021, tensions were dangerously mounting over disputed maritime territory in the oil-rich Indian Ocean. Thankfully, violence was avoided between the neighbouring states, though relations remained brittle during Farmaajo's tenure.
New administrations in both capitals offered the opportunity for a welcome reset in 2022, and ties have steadily improved since. Kenya Airways has resumed offering direct flights from Nairobi to Mogadishu, and Somalia's lucrative khat trade has been opened up again to Kenyan producers, having been entirely shut out by Farmaajo's family ties to the Ethiopian khat market. With Kenya and Somalia closely economically integrated, the downturn in diplomatic relations had proven corrosive for many thousands of Somalis working in Kenya and vice-versa. Nairobi's ongoing construction boom in some of its wealthier neighbourhoods, like Parklands, is nearly entirely underwritten by Somali capital, while expatriate Kenyans are employed in a litany of professions from Bosaaso to Kismaayo. And Somalia's ascension to the regional East Africa Community (EAC) in 2023 may yet drive greater economic integration, which has already proven remarkably profitable for both states.
In recent months, amid the public souring of relations between Mogadishu and Addis, Villa Somalia has launched a minor charm offensive on its western neighbour. In early May, Somalia's Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre travelled to Nairobi to sign a raft of agreements, ranging from security cooperation to health capacity building. It was Barre's first official visit to Kenya, and was sandwiched by several separate trips to Nairobi by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Most recently, Hassan Sheikh travelled to the Kenyan capital for the African Development Bank annual meeting last week. During his visit, the Somali president also found time to venture to a mall in Eastleigh, colloquially known as 'Little Somalia' and home to over 250,000 Somalis.
Conspicuously absent from the agreements signed in early May was a talk of reopening the Kenyan-Somali international border, however. Despite bilateral discussions in early 2023 about its possible reopening, these were quickly shelved following a spate of attacks by Al-Shabaab in Kenya's Northern Counties. Nairobi's security services remain concerned about the security implications of reopening the border that has been shut since 2011—even with Somalia's ascension to the EAC, which is supposed to allow Somali nationals visa-free travel to all member states.
While Kenyan President William Ruto and his Somali counterpart have met a number of times in recent weeks, Nairobi is continuing to tread a careful diplomatic line between Mogadishu and Addis. Kenya has been careful not to antagonise either party and has so far successfully avoided being publicly dragged into the still-acrimonious dispute. It has also attempted to soothe tensions between Addis and Mogadishu, reportedly seeking to organise a meeting between Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Nairobi in late February, when both leaders were in town.
Somalia's National Security Advisor (NSA) Hussein Moalim's latest comments may complicate the current detente between Nairobi and Mogadishu somewhat. Last week, Moalim confirmed rumours that Villa Somalia would seek to expel thousands of Ethiopian troops by December 2024's end due to the MoU with Somaliland. It is unclear if Moalim's comments caught Nairobi unawares. Kenya has not yet publicly commented on the NSA's announcement and is unlikely to contradict its sensitive ally, but is hardly likely to be supportive of the withdrawal of the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) securing South West State, and Jubaland to a lesser extent. While Kenyan and Ethiopian units have a history of bickering and jostling over turf in South-Central Somalia, the strategic Addis-Nairobi relations have meant the two can overcome localised tensions and project a more unified security and military stabilisation posture.
Moreover, Kenyan President William Ruto has repeatedly voiced his support for the continuation of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). In a speech during his recent state visit to the US, President Ruto called the ATMIS draw-down timelines "calendar-based, not conditions-based" and warned that Al-Shabaab would step into any security vacuum left by the withdrawing forces. The Kenyan president's comments are entirely correct-- the looming ATMIS withdrawal poses an enormous threat to Somalia's security, as well as Kenya's and Ethiopia's.
And this threat will only be compounded by the withdrawal of thousands of non-ATMIS, ENDF troops. Sacrificing Somalia's security for dubious arguments and indignation over "sovereignty, territory, and territorial integrity" would be a grave mistake. Consequently, Nairobi's steadying influence within Mogadishu could be well-placed to guide Villa Somalia towards steadier ground. The future of ATMIS, and whatever comes next, remains in the wind, but sober, regional coordination is critical to protecting the Horn's security-- not bombshell security announcements that destabilise Somalia's internal and external politics.
By the Somali Wire Team
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I stand before you today with profound respect and appreciation for the sacrifices the sons and daughters of your countries have made in the AMISOM/ATMIS/AUSSOM missions to help their African brothers and sisters in Somalia fight the scourge of Al-Shabaab, open and maintain critical trade routes, and help in the state-building process of Somalia.
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