Foes to friends: Mogadishu-Nairobi relations
It was less than three years ago that Kenya and Somalia appeared to be inadvertently hurtling towards armed conflict. Relations between Mogadishu and Nairobi had plummeted following the inauguration of former Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo in 2017, particularly over his repeated attempts to undermine Jubaland President and Kenyan ally Ahmed Mohamed Islam 'Madoobe.' Kenyan diplomats were expelled from the Somali capital in 2020, and by mid-2021, tensions were dangerously mounting over disputed maritime territory in the oil-rich Indian Ocean. Thankfully, violence was avoided between the neighbouring states, though relations remained brittle during Farmaajo's tenure.
New administrations in both capitals offered the opportunity for a welcome reset in 2022, and ties have steadily improved since. Kenya Airways has resumed offering direct flights from Nairobi to Mogadishu, and Somalia's lucrative khat trade has been opened up again to Kenyan producers, having been entirely shut out by Farmaajo's family ties to the Ethiopian khat market. With Kenya and Somalia closely economically integrated, the downturn in diplomatic relations had proven corrosive for many thousands of Somalis working in Kenya and vice-versa. Nairobi's ongoing construction boom in some of its wealthier neighbourhoods, like Parklands, is nearly entirely underwritten by Somali capital, while expatriate Kenyans are employed in a litany of professions from Bosaaso to Kismaayo. And Somalia's ascension to the regional East Africa Community (EAC) in 2023 may yet drive greater economic integration, which has already proven remarkably profitable for both states.
In recent months, amid the public souring of relations between Mogadishu and Addis, Villa Somalia has launched a minor charm offensive on its western neighbour. In early May, Somalia's Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre travelled to Nairobi to sign a raft of agreements, ranging from security cooperation to health capacity building. It was Barre's first official visit to Kenya, and was sandwiched by several separate trips to Nairobi by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Most recently, Hassan Sheikh travelled to the Kenyan capital for the African Development Bank annual meeting last week. During his visit, the Somali president also found time to venture to a mall in Eastleigh, colloquially known as 'Little Somalia' and home to over 250,000 Somalis.
Conspicuously absent from the agreements signed in early May was a talk of reopening the Kenyan-Somali international border, however. Despite bilateral discussions in early 2023 about its possible reopening, these were quickly shelved following a spate of attacks by Al-Shabaab in Kenya's Northern Counties. Nairobi's security services remain concerned about the security implications of reopening the border that has been shut since 2011—even with Somalia's ascension to the EAC, which is supposed to allow Somali nationals visa-free travel to all member states.
While Kenyan President William Ruto and his Somali counterpart have met a number of times in recent weeks, Nairobi is continuing to tread a careful diplomatic line between Mogadishu and Addis. Kenya has been careful not to antagonise either party and has so far successfully avoided being publicly dragged into the still-acrimonious dispute. It has also attempted to soothe tensions between Addis and Mogadishu, reportedly seeking to organise a meeting between Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Nairobi in late February, when both leaders were in town.
Somalia's National Security Advisor (NSA) Hussein Moalim's latest comments may complicate the current detente between Nairobi and Mogadishu somewhat. Last week, Moalim confirmed rumours that Villa Somalia would seek to expel thousands of Ethiopian troops by December 2024's end due to the MoU with Somaliland. It is unclear if Moalim's comments caught Nairobi unawares. Kenya has not yet publicly commented on the NSA's announcement and is unlikely to contradict its sensitive ally, but is hardly likely to be supportive of the withdrawal of the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) securing South West State, and Jubaland to a lesser extent. While Kenyan and Ethiopian units have a history of bickering and jostling over turf in South-Central Somalia, the strategic Addis-Nairobi relations have meant the two can overcome localised tensions and project a more unified security and military stabilisation posture.
Moreover, Kenyan President William Ruto has repeatedly voiced his support for the continuation of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). In a speech during his recent state visit to the US, President Ruto called the ATMIS draw-down timelines "calendar-based, not conditions-based" and warned that Al-Shabaab would step into any security vacuum left by the withdrawing forces. The Kenyan president's comments are entirely correct-- the looming ATMIS withdrawal poses an enormous threat to Somalia's security, as well as Kenya's and Ethiopia's.
And this threat will only be compounded by the withdrawal of thousands of non-ATMIS, ENDF troops. Sacrificing Somalia's security for dubious arguments and indignation over "sovereignty, territory, and territorial integrity" would be a grave mistake. Consequently, Nairobi's steadying influence within Mogadishu could be well-placed to guide Villa Somalia towards steadier ground. The future of ATMIS, and whatever comes next, remains in the wind, but sober, regional coordination is critical to protecting the Horn's security-- not bombshell security announcements that destabilise Somalia's internal and external politics.
By the Somali Wire Team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.