Security 'magical thinking' and anti-Ethiopianism
On 31 May, Somalia's National Security Advisor (NSA) Hussein Sheikh Ali participated in a widely viewed online conversation. Organised by the pro-Mogadishu media outlet 'Goobjoog,' the conversation highlighted the progress made in security since the Hassan Sheikh administration came to power in May 2022. Over 10,000 people listened to the NSA, who presented an optimistic vision far from the security reality in Somalia today.
The NSA claimed that the Federal Government of Somalia's (FGS) "multi-pronged" security approach was bearing fruit and that the planning for a smooth transition from the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia was proceeding well. Statistics were reeled off about the number of villages and towns reclaimed by the Somali National Army (SNA) in Hiiraan and Galmudug, the quantity of security-related bills passed by parliament, the assets and accounts of Al-Shabaab frozen, and the surrender of senior militant commanders. "We achieved a level of progress we did not attain in decades," he told the audience.
Hussein Sheikh Ali further claimed that the "comprehensive" government strategy was framed around 6 central pillars-- military, finance, ideology, propaganda, urban security, and stabilisation. He said 18,000 soldiers have been trained and equipped in preparation for assuming security responsibilities from ATMIS. Other achievements were also noted, citing the establishment of the Tubsan National Center for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (TNC-PCVE) as a landmark in the "ideological war" against Al-Shabaab. The NSA asserted, without evidence, that the federal government had diminished the capacity of militant groups to coerce rents from businesses in Mogadishu. The NSA also dismissed growing fears of an Afghanistan-type state collapse and the potential of an Al-Shabaab takeover. Dismissing the extremist group that controls much of southern Somalia as a mere "nuisance," Hussein Sheikh Ali called the comparison between the two countries "unfair."
Towards the end of the optimistic interview, the NSA dropped a bombshell-- that Ethiopia would not be allowed to play any role in a future post-ATMIS security arrangement, and that all Ethiopian troops must withdraw from Somalia by the end of December 2024. Hussein Sheikh Ali called Ethiopia a hostile state actively engaged in dismembering Somalia and, therefore, could not be allowed to contribute to any future multinational mission. Posting on X a day later, Hussein reaffirmed that Mogadishu's stance on the Ethiopian army's role in any post-ATMIS mission is "unequivocal" and that as "long as Ethiopia persists in violating our sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, we cannot and will not consider it an ally in advancing peace and security in the region."
Months of stop-start planning for the post-ATMIS mission has been scattergun and opaque. But in December 2023, Mogadishu appealed for a multinational guard force comprised of around 10,000 troops to provide security for vital infrastructure and key urban areas. The federal government has subsequently approached each ATMIS troop-contributing country to cut bilateral security deals, with Uganda, Burundi, and Djibouti agreeing on a role in the new future arrangement. Kenya, however, had yet to clarify its position. Though Ethiopia had expressed interest in continuing its mass deployment of forces and support for the Federal Member States, the worsening relations with Mogadishu following the bombshell Memorandum of Understanding between Addis and Somaliland on 1 January had generated significant uncertainty.
No matter the insistence of senior federal officials, Ethiopian forces remain essential to the security and stability of regional states. Its military has the longest combat experience in Somalia and is generally the most feared by Al-Shabaab. In particular, South West State remains entirely reliant on the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF), with the regional capital of Baidoa likely to collapse in a matter of hours if Ethiopian troops withdraw. Moreover, Jubaland, Hiiraan, and Galmudug all rely on an Ethiopian military presence to keep Al-Shabaab in check. Thousands of non-ATMIS ENDF are further positioned across much of south-central Somalia and remain critical for both countries' security, with Addis keen to retain its buffer zone and prevent cross-border infiltration of Al-Shabaab. Hussein Sheikh Ali's sudden announcement has now dramatically raised the political temperature and increased security anxieties in Somalia's periphery. In South West State, the security minister termed the NSA's comments "misinformation," while a large-scale rally is now planned in Baidoa to protest the decision.
International pressure also appears to be mounting on Mogadishu over the proposed Ethiopian withdrawal. A call between Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken on Saturday, 1 June, in which post-ATMIS issues were discussed, has been widely interpreted to have been triggered by the anti-Ethiopian comments from the NSA. Washington is likely worried about the possible adverse implications of an Ethiopian exit in just 6 months.
In theory, Somalia could replace Ethiopia with any other willing ally. Eritrean, Egyptian, and Rwandan troops have all been touted as possible replacements for the ENDF, but any substitutes would be catastrophic for both Somalia's internal stability and bilateral relations with Ethiopia. It would transform Ethiopia's mildly antagonistic relations with the Hassan Sheikh administration into grave and active destabilisation. And while Mogadishu has sought a close political and military partnership with Ankara, Turkey is far more interested in playing a maritime policing role and operating drones in Somalia than actively deploying its own soldiers. It is highly unlikely Ankara will be willing to have boots on the ground in one of the most deadly asymmetric warzones on the planet to replace ENDF troops.
Villa Somalia is clearly seeking to capitalise on the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding to 'maximise anger', inflame local sentiments and arm-twist the international community, but few Somalis are buying into this narrative. Mogadishu's political elite is out of touch with the reality in the wider Somali periphery. There, Ethiopia is viewed not as an existential enemy but as a dependable ally. South West State, Jubaland, Puntland, and Somaliland all have mutually beneficial security arrangements with Ethiopia and will resist pressure to adopt Mogadishu's hostile posture. As we will see in the coming days, this unfortunate misreading of popular sentiment will only add to the country's fractured politics and foment more instability.
By the Somali Wire Team
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