A Changing of the—International— Guard in Mogadishu
Within weeks, both the United States and the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) will have new leadership in Mogadishu. Finally confirmed by the US Senate, Richard Riley will soon arrive to assume the influential mantle of US Ambassador to Somalia, after an entire year of the post being left unfilled. Having previously served in various positions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and China, among others, Ambassador Riley will be able to draw on a range of useful experiences in navigating the complex political terrain of Somalia. James Swan, another seasoned American diplomat, has been temporarily re-appointed as Special Representative to the UN Secretary-General for Somalia, a position which he previously held from 2019-2022– a particularly tumultuous period. Ambassador Swan has deployed to Mogadishu amid an ongoing row over the future of UNSOM, which Villa Somalia has sought to close.
It is safe to say that international partners have high expectations for these two men as they step into their roles. The coming months are certain to herald immense political, security, and humanitarian challenges for Somalia, with African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) forces continuing to draw-down and the Somali National Army-led operations against Al-Shabaab remaining badly stalled. Despite the insistence of the federal government to the contrary, the country is actually becoming less, not more, peaceful and secure. Simultaneously, Villa Somalia appears set on pursuing its unilateral political agenda, coercing the Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission, the National Consultative Committee, and the federal parliament into approving and supporting dubious constitutional amendments. Consequently, Villa Somalia’s efforts to re-centralize power in Mogadishu and push ahead with a one-person, one-vote (OPOV) system for which the country is not yet prepared is propelling Somalia towards a situation of diminished political and social stability. All the while, dire droughts and floods are continuing to wreak havoc on much of the country.
Frustrations among Somalia’s international partners in Mogadishu and Nairobi, as well as their headquarters in their respective capitals, are understandably running high. Enormous quantities of policy support, humanitarian and development aid, and security assistance have been frittered away in the name of a still-fragile state-building project. With growing demands for funding and attention, some are increasingly taking the view that Somalia may be a lost cause. But there are still opportunities for creative, cooperative engagement that could help prevent a possible radical jihadist takeover or another state collapse.
Indeed, this is not the moment to withdraw from Somalia, but rather one to recalibrate and recommit to improving the situation together. It is not too late for the UN, European Union, US, European bilateral partners, and African stakeholders in Somalia—including Kenya, Ethiopia, and the Horn’s Intergovernmental Authority on Development to work together with the Somali people to support the security and political stability it so badly needs. Reflective, not reactionary, policies should be formed with a view to producing short-, medium- and long-term solutions for the country.
This would necessitate immediate backing for the SNA to prevent its possible implosion, likely in the form of a post-ATMIS force. It would also mean clearer security planning and reform, which has been so woefully lacking across successive Somali governments, to bring about a coordinated, transparent, and effective national security architecture. Potentially unpalatable decisions will also likely need to be countenanced, such as support for the regularisation and integration of the local Ma’awiisley forces into the national security architecture, with sufficient and appropriate oversight.
Moreover, there is a pressing need for robust and consistent messaging from within Halane, and from Nairobi and other partner capitals, to help restore some order to the destabilising political churn currently roiling Somalia. Further financial and technical support could well be needed to ensure that genuine constitutional consultations and dialogue can occur with Somalia’s public without coercion and inducements rather than a performative exercise with a few tokenistic meetings with handpicked civil society members. The country’s OPOV process should not be a top-down, elite-driven endeavour but a far more collective national effort. To this end, there must be an inclusive and transparent dialogue between Puntland and Mogadishu to return the northern Federal Member State to within the fold of the federation, as well as between Galmudug, Hirshabelle, South West State, and Jubaland.
This would mean coming together as democratic and rights-minded partners committed to ensuring that women can safely participate in Somali politics and society, that children are fed and well-educated, and that youth and minorities see their way towards sustainable livelihoods without succumbing to the lure of radical Islamist groups. The question has moved beyond a matter of maintaining liberal democratic values when faced with the reality of competing with direct bilateral security funding and economic development by wealthy and powerful Gulf states. For Doha and others, profit, authoritarian ‘stability’ and ideology come far ahead of any consideration for human rights and humanitarian conditions.
While Richard Riley and Jim Swan will undoubtedly be carrying the weight of great expectations on their shoulders in Mogadishu, the wider international community can and should step up with them to be steadfast, creative, inclusive, courageous, and ultimately effective in supporting the people of Somalia.
By the Somali Wire Team
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Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
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