Issue No. 686

The Facade of 'Mogadishu Rising'

On 15 May 2024, Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) marked two years since he began his second non-consecutive term as the country's premier. At the time, his return was greeted as a welcome relief following the turbulent years of his authoritarian-minded predecessor, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo. Under Farmaajo, Al-Shabaab's territory and influence expanded across the country, while Somalia's meagre democratic and state-building gains were rolled back. HSM was supposed to usher in an era of professionalism and competence in government as well as a clear-sighted agenda. Yet today, just two years into his second term, the initial lustre has long since faded, and Somalia seems worryingly adrift in the face of a host of critical political and security issues. To list just a few, the schedule and structure of federal and regional presidential elections, the future of the Provisional Constitution, and the nature of any post-African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) 'guard force.'

The rushed 'completion' of the Provisional Constitution is part of Mogadishu's broader attempts to frame itself as the entity responsible for forging a Somalia independent of international support. In interviews and speeches, federal officials routinely list off the completion of debt relief, the lifting of the arms embargo, and the ascension to the regional East African Community (EAC) in 2023 as evidence that the country is on the right track. In this light, the chaotically requested closure of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) earlier this month was meant to reinforce this narrative. But despite the 'Mogadishu Rising' portrayal, in reality, Villa Somalia remains overwhelmingly dependent on international monetary support and security aid-- much of which will be reduced in the coming months as ATMIS draws down. There is limited understanding of the economic consequences of this financial contraction, but they are likely to prove hugely damaging for the ecosystem of the Mogadishu elite.

The current turmoil and looming crises the federal government faces have not led it to lift its head out of the sand, and it seems set on pursuing a unilateral agenda, including controversially amending the Provisional Constitution. On 18 May, the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission (ICRIC), a body responsible for amending and ratifying the Provisional Constitution, announced that it had begun drafting Chapters 5-9 of Somalia's supreme document.

Within these chapters are further notable provisions, including sections on the judiciary and the delineation of federal-regional relationships. While the current ICRIC members had previously been praised for their professionalism, Villa Somalia has since hijacked the entire process. The revised chapters will likely follow a similar centralising approach to Chapters 1-4, which was pushed through parliament at the end of March 2024. Among the impending sections is Article 97, which awards the country's executive power to the Council of Ministers, including the Prime Minister. It is highly likely that HSM will seek to insert the presidency within this article and hand himself executive authority. And with the large-scale bribing of the federal parliament means that Villa Somalia will likely face little resistance from lawmakers in the coming weeks. But with Puntland still absent from the process, it remains profoundly compromised and unimplementable from several angles.

The uncertainty stemming from the unanswered questions surrounding the constitution and term extensions for the regional presidents is continuing to negatively impact Somalia's stability. Any renewed military offensive, as promised at the recent National Consultative Council meeting, will require the buy-in of the country's political opposition. However, without a comprehensive political settlement outlining a schedule for when regional presidential elections will occur, it is doubtful whether the regional opposition will support the operations-- if the military can even muster the forces in the first place. Much of the opposition is opposed to the idea of their clans fighting for regional presidents who have extended their terms again, and neither do they want Villa Somalia to take any credit for liberating Al-Shabaab-held areas.

The government's insistence that 'Phase II' of the military offensive against Al-Shabaab is imminent is hard to take seriously when a still-deteriorating security dynamic remains the most significant risk to Somalia. Since Al-Shabaab overran the offensive front at Osweyne in Galmudug in August 2023, the Somali National Army (SNA) has faced mass desertions and a collapse in morale. The concerns about a potential total disintegration of the SNA within the coming 12-18 months are well-founded.

Nearly every element of the military is currently facing one form of crisis or another, including the historically competent and politically immured US-trained Danab special forces that were caught up in a recent corruption scandal. With Abu Dhabi having suspended stipend support for 10,000 soldiers following the Al-Shabaab infiltrator attack in Mogadishu's General Gordon camp in February, the SNA brigades 23-27 have essentially dissolved. And with the third phase of the ATMIS draw-down scheduled to begin in the coming days, from where exactly the several thousand soldiers scheduled to be withdrawn will be pulled remains unclear. It has not even been announced which Forward Operating Bases will shutter or alternatively be transferred to the SNA or, indeed, whether the army actually has the current capacity to operate these bases. The plans for the post-ATMIS 'guard force' are also two months overdue and yet to be presented to the United Nations Security Council.

With two years left to run before the next federal elections, HSM is positioning his administration to be able to claim credit for having 'finalised' the Provisional Constitution and to have conducted the first one-person, one-vote elections in decades. On the face of it, these may appear noteworthy aspirations and essential for the country's development, and it would seem that many in the international community have accepted Villa Somalia's rhetoric at face value. But the facade of stability is cracking, including in Mogadishu, which is facing growing instability and a steady rise in politically motivated assassinations. Reality cannot be denied forever, and the federal government's refusal to publicly countenance these crises is only adding further fuel to the fire. The instability that has marked the last 12 months of HSM's administration may be a worrying portent of what the next two years may bring.

By the Somali Wire Team