Issue No. 685

Demystifying the Ma'awiisley: Part III

Today's editorial in The Somali Wire is written by Sara Petrovski. It is the last of a three-part series by the author that has been published every Friday on the Ma'awiisley and their future in Somalia.

There is no golden bullet or solution for the future of the Ma'awiisley. Nearly two years after the initial uprising in Hiiraan in 2022, there remain immense differences between Ma'awiisley forces in their respective military capacity, organisation, armament, and political ambitions. So, too, is there variation between what the Ma'awiisley aspire to in a scenario where the threat of Al-Shabaab to their families and communities is substantially reduced. Some have revealed a preference to return to civilian life. The majority, however, have expressed an interest in being integrated into Somalia's official national security architecture, a potentially attractive solution to their currently unregulated status.

As Al-Shabaab continues to advance, the space for an effective and sustainable solution to the question of the Ma'awiisley's future is becoming more pressing, while the palatable options are further diminishing. One thing is for certain, though, if the Ma'awiisley remains unsupported, cut adrift from the state security forces, and without effective chains of command and training, their capacity to respond to Al-Shabaab will be reduced, while the threat the Ma'awiisley represent to civilians will only grow.

In discussions on the possible future of the Ma'awiisley, various forms of 'disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration' (DDR) tend to be mooted. However, it's worth bearing in mind that in Somalia, not only has the country's DDR programme proven hugely controversial at various points, but the term typically refers to the process by which former Al-Shabaab fighters who have abandoned their jihadism are reintegrated into society. In the case of disarming and demobilising the Ma'awiisley, the process would represent a wholly new and different endeavour.

First, small arms have proliferated into every corner of Somalia, and with nearly every household armed for self-protection, disarming the Ma'awiisley would be particularly difficult. The very raison d'être of the Ma'awiisley is to protect their communities, so with Al-Shabaab continuing to advance across much of South-Central Somalia, they will certainly not countenance a DDR programme, which would only expose their communities to greater threat and likely revenge attacks from extremists. Subsequently, until such point as the security situation in Somalia radically alters for the better, the prospect of the Ma'awiisley being disarmed is not a tenable option. 
 
The only viable way forward may be to offer support to the Ma'awiisley. One option is to assist these forces as they are now, unintegrated, as 'holding' forces. Another would be to incorporate the Ma'awiisley into the SNA. Lastly, more creative options also exist, such as integrating the Ma'awiisley into the state-level Darawiish or local police forces.

Amid the growing fears of a possible implosion of the SNA within the next 12-18 months, supporting the Ma'awiisley as unintegrated forces would be one way to guard against this collapse, but it remains a thorny prospect for many foreign partners. To date, the Ma'awiisley have predominantly performed a 'holding' force role– clearing and protecting their communities from Al-Shabaab presence and have subsequently been left to do so without adequate support from more capable and better-equipped forces, such as the Danab special forces.

Despite their efforts, Al-Shabaab has steadily rolled back much of the territorial advances of the initial offensive in mid-2022. Without immediate support, the likelihood of Al-Shabaab overrunning the Ma'awiisley is growing, exposing local communities to the threat of greater retaliation. Further, if they remain insufficiently supported and without a degree of regularisation and training, the Ma'awiisley could come to pose a more significant threat to minority clans, engage in internecine fights, and aggravate political conflict. Ultimately, therefore, the Ma'awiisley should be supported, regulated, and trained– which necessitates integrating them into existing forces.

Subsequently, some have proposed that the Ma'awiisley be incorporated into the SNA, building on the historical processes that have formed the army to date. But there are minimal advantages to integrating the Ma'awiisley into the SNA, apart from the partial regularisation of pay and resources. The SNA remains beset by significant flaws, including its own inability to carry out major kinetic operations against Al-Shabaab, and, as we have seen in recent months, it has repeatedly struggled to hold onto liberated territory.

Incorporating the Ma'awiisley into the SNA would do nothing to dilute the deeply embedded issues within the army but instead potentially undermine the main successes of these ad hoc forces, whose main strength lies in their motivation and intimate knowledge of their communities and terrain. Absorbing them into the SNA and deploying them elsewhere in Somalia would neither solve the perennial instability of the army nor reduce the potential risks they represent for other clans, or the state. Therefore, if the Ma'awiisley are to be eventually integrated into the SNA, they should be confined to operations within their territory, and the force composition should further reflect the clan composition of a given area. 

However, the SNA is not the only force within which the Ma'awiisley could be incorporated. Another option would be to absorb the Ma'awiisley into the state-level paramilitary Darawiish or local police forces. Although the Darawiish is often overlooked, according to the country's National Security Architecture, these forces have a particular role in both protecting civilians and fighting Al-Shabaab. Considering this mandate perfectly fits into the Ma'awiisley role to date, this integration would best match their experience. The federal government previously proposed integrating a number of the Ma'awiisley into the Darawiish in Hirshabelle and Galmudug, but to date, no progress has been made on this plan.

The number of state-level police across Hirshabelle and Galmudug is meagre, and there remains a demand for an increased police presence in these Federal Member States. Incorporating some Ma'awiisley into the police could help provide a degree of security, while allowing them to oversee community policing rather than kinetic military operations certainly lowers the risk to both the fighters and civilians. However, it also does not align with the Ma'awiiisley's experience to date in fighting Al-Shabaab, and community policing would require a host of different skills and training.

Yet integrating them into state-level Darawiish or police forces would only partially solve the problems impacting the Ma'awiisley. As with all other armed forces in Somalia, regularisation does not necessarily remove the threat of inter-clan conflicts or reduce the possibility of their political misuse in the future. As with other forces, they should be properly vetted, fairly remunerated, well-trained, professionalised, and held accountable. Integrating them into the SNA or another force would not be a solution in and of itself, as they would be integrated into a corrosive framework.

The Ma'awiisley has made an immensely significant contribution to the fight against Al-Shabaab since mid-2022 when their communities rose up to throw off the yoke of the extremist group. While they remain idolised by many in their communities, the federal government has failed to harness their potential and secure their future. Maintaining the current status quo, whereby they are supported on an irregular basis as unintegrated forces, is not sustainable in the long term.
 
Subsequently, Mogadishu cannot afford to further delay compensating the Ma'awiisley and addressing their political and logistical requests. With Al-Shabaab certain to advance further into rural areas amid the anticipated withdrawal of African Union troops in the coming months, there is also a pressing need to invest resources into the presently stagnant reconciliation processes between clans. Otherwise, fragile territorial gains will crumble as inter-clan violence escalates under pressure from Al-Shabaab. The federal government should begin laying the immediate groundwork for a post-African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) security dynamic in Somalia, one in which the Ma'awiisley can play an important role within the state-level Darawiish- rather than abandon these fighters and their communities to a grim fate.