Issue No. 684

From jihadi to statesman-- Jubaland President Ahmed 'Madoobe'

At last week's National Consultative Council (NCC) meeting in Mogadishu, one man in particular stood out in the distributed photographs– Jubaland President Ahmed Mohamed Islam 'Madoobe.' Wearing an Islamic kofiya hat and unsuited, unlike his federal and regional counterparts, the influential Federal Member State (FMS) leader has established himself as one of Somalia's elder statesmen. Madoobe has served as the de facto ruler and latterly regional President of Jubaland since 2012, when his Islamist Ras Kamboni militia, backed by the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), re-took the southern city of Kismaayo from Al-Shabaab. The deep sea port city has flourished since then, while Madoobe has firmly established himself as the godfather of the rump Jubaland administration.

In many ways, the story of Madoobe mirrors the history of modern Somalia. Born to a conservative family in independent Somalia over 70 years ago, his father was a sheikh, while his sister later married Hassan Abdullah Hersi, also known as Hassan Turki, one of the founders of the Somali jihadist movement. Turki and Madoobe would eventually join the first major armed religious group in modern Somalia, al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI). Two further Islamist armed movements emerged from AIAI, Hizbul Islam and Ras Kamboni, in which Madoobe also played central roles.

In the 2000s, Madoobe became a notable leader in the Islamic Courts Union, serving as governor of Jubaland before the Court's overthrow by the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia. Badly injured by a hail of bullets from an American AC-130 in early 2007 near the Kenyan border, he was rescued by the Ethiopian army and received life-saving medical treatment. Madoobe's lengthy recuperation in Ethiopia would prove to be his Damascene conversion, and he remained fiercely loyal to Addis in the years following. But it was only after a series of Nairobi's failed initiatives to dislodge Al-Shabaab from southern Somalia that Kenya and Ethiopia collaborated to support Madoobe's Ras Kamboni forces in Jubaland against the extremist group.

Today, Madoobe is a reformed figure– and remains one of the central bulwarks against Al-Shabaab in the country, even if most of his FMS remains in the clutches of the extremist group. Most of Middle and Lower Juba is still controlled by Al-Shabaab, and Jubaland has the dubious honour of hosting Jilib, the de facto capital of the militants. Still, many of the battle-hardened Ras Kamboni forces have since been incorporated into Jubaland's Daraawiish. Further backed by Kenya, this incorporation has provided him with a cadre of loyal military forces that neither his Galmudug nor Hirshabelle counterparts in the NCC enjoy. In this regard, Madoobe has further been reticent about arming non-Ogadeni clan militias in Jubaland in case he faces the pressures that Hirshabelle President Guudlawe experiences from Ali Osman 'Jeyte'-- the federal Ma'awiisley co-ordinator and Hawaadle militia commander.

Kenya remains particularly important for Madoobe's grip on Jubaland. The KDF maintains a significant presence in the regional capital under the African Union Transition Mission In Somalia (ATMIS), as well as on the Jubaland coast. Moreover, Nairobi further provides monetary and military support to Madoobe's forces, still seeking to secure the porous Kenyan border with Somalia to resist Al-Shabaab's penetration of Mandera, Lamu, Wajir, and Garissa. And in turn, Madoobe has not swayed from his opposition to Al-Shabaab.

Currently, Madoobe enjoys far better relations with the incumbent President of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, than he did with his predecessor, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo. With the former president hailing from the Marehan, an influential sub-clan of the Darood that inhabits much of the Gedo region, the former president was able to exercise a particularly destabilising influence as he sought to remove Madoobe from office in August 2019. Having failed to do so and nearly triggering open conflict between Ethiopian and Kenyan forces at Kismaayo's airport, Farmaajo instead directed the violent overthrowing of the Madoobe-allied Gedo administration. Al-Shabaab took ready advantage of the instability, expanding further across the FMS.

Though the possibility of a violent removal of Madoobe directed from Villa Somalia has thankfully dwindled, the future of the Jubaland administration has been increasingly called into question. It is widely believed that the Jubaland president is currently orchestrating the amendment of the FMS constitution to allow him to serve a third consecutive term, further extending his rule over Kismaayo and its environs. However, there remains no clear successor to the throne, with Madoobe having made sure to dampen any prospective opposition. This lack of a clear succession plan has raised concerns about Jubaland's future, particularly with the elder statesman not in the best of health. Though he is just in his early 70s and remains a competent political operator, Madoobe increasingly shuttles back and forth from Dubai for medical treatment and spends less time on the mundane question of Jubaland's institution-building.

Rumours that Villa Somalia might seek to replace Madoobe with Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre have quietened, in no small part because of the immense complexity of such an endeavour and the influence of Nairobi. Notably, both Barre and Madoobe hail from the same Ogadeni sub-sub clan, the Mohamed Zubeyr, which holds political influence in both Kenya and Ethiopia. But Nairobi may baulk at any future plan to replace Madoobe with Barre, who is viewed as an Islamist reactionary by many, a reputation not helped by incidents such as his refusal to shake the hand of UN Special Envoy Catriona Laing in 2023. And with Kenyan Defence Minister Aden Duale, also Ogadeni, a close ally of Madoobe, there is no likelihood of Madoobe being coerced into retirement in the near future.

At the NCC meeting last week, Madoobe appeared to offer his support for Villa Somalia's 'one-person, one-vote' system in exchange for a further two-and-a-half-year term extension until 2026 – allowing federal and regional presidential polls to be synchronised. While Madoobe appears to have agreed to the NCC communique, in essence, he now has a choice between a de facto term extension culminating in elections under federal auspices or moving forward with the traditional process that will ensure all but certain re-election, and a further 5 years at the helm. Either way, it is clear that the Jubaland president is going nowhere in a hurry.
 
By the Somali Wire team