Demystifying the Ma'awiisley: Part II
Today's editorial in The Somali Wire is written by Sara Petrovski. It is the second of a three-part series by the author that shall be published every Friday on the Ma'awiisley and their future in Somalia.
The current lack of future planning for the Ma'awiisley should be of immense concern to all interested in Somalia's stability. After arming thousands of young men and promising them sustained support during and after the offensive against Al-Shabaab, the federal government still has no serious plan or prospect for the future of these forces. And with the extremist group having seized the military upper hand and showing no sign of relinquishing it, Ma'awiisley should certainly not be discarded just yet.
The major issue facing the Ma'awiisley at this current juncture is that Al-Shabaab is on the advance across central Somalia. In large part, this is due to the extremist group's senior leadership having learnt from the chastening defeats it suffered in mid-2022 at the hands of the Ma'awiisley. While it has continued its policy of violent retribution against notable Ma'awiisley-affiliated individuals, it has also sought to prise marginalised clans from any tentative alliances with Mogadishu. Consequently, many of the villages that rose up against Al-Shabaab have since returned to their control. Other communities have faced renewed pressure from the extremist group in the form of taxation, targeting killings of clan elders, and the stoking of inter-clan tensions once again. Most significant in recent weeks have been the deadly clashes between Hawaadle and Abgal militia along the Hiiraan-Middle Shabelle border, which several politicians have accused Al-Shabaab of inciting.
While much of the Ma'awiisley have proven themselves as capable and often conscientious fighters when directed at Al-Shabaab, there are legitimate and serious questions about their conduct when operations pause. And in the longer term, the irregular status of the Ma'awiisley may well pose a greater threat to already feeble state institutions and resources. With that, some have speculated that arming and empowering the Ma'awiisley could inadvertently speed a return to the warlord years of the 1990s and 2000s in Somalia.
By their nature, clan militias routinely seek to take control of resources that should be under state control, often taking the form of natural resources, be it arable land or a water source. The absence of federal and regional governments across much of rural Somalia offers political and economic space for these militias to assert their authority. In and of itself, this can cause problems between competing clans over dwindling resources during periods of episodic drought and flooding in Somalia. With the country's climate becoming ever more hostile and the capacity for pastoralism dwindling, the Ma'awiisley fighters currently positioned against Al-Shabaab could be readily dragged by their communities into increasing inter-clan grievances if they are not regularised and professionalised.
However, simply integrating Ma'awiisley into the security architecture would not be enough to solve this problem, as this is not a unique issue to the Ma'awiisley-- regular Somali National Army (SNA) units are also often pulled into clan violence. Indeed, the only units with the SNA to avoid this are the highly trained, mixed-clan Danab units. Tackling this perennial issue can only come through concerted and immediate efforts to address both clan grievances, and tackling a number of political factors that are driving inter-clan tensions. Moreover, there is a pressing need to provide clans with the opportunity and space to peacefully negotiate their political arrangements In order to reduce the likelihood of Ma'awisley engaging in inter-clan violence.
Certain Ma'awiisley faction's ambitions have also extended beyond local resources' control to a broader political agenda. Most notable was the declaration of 'Hiiraan State' by former Hiiraan Governor Ali Osman Jeyte in June 2023 following his dismissal by Hirshabelle President Ali Hussein Guudlawe. While Jeyte's appointment as federal coordinator of the Ma'awiisley in September 2023 was dependent on the temporary sidelining of his political ambitions, Hiiraan-Hirshabelle tensions have rumbled on. Earlier in 2024, rival Hawaadle forces loyal to Guudlawe and Jeyte clashed in Beledweyne over influence in the city. While the federal government has sought to delay the question of Jeyte's support for a Hiiraan State, they cannot manage these tensions forever– particularly with Villa Somalia seemingly unwilling or unable to provide Jeyte's forces sufficient support.
This leads back to the broader problem that is going to continue to bite in the coming months– the continued lack of sufficient logistical and financial support for the Ma'awiisley. If the Ma'awiisley are not integrated or compensated fully for their fighting or any injuries they may sustain, fighters could become increasingly predatory towards civilians of other clans. For instance, those from Galje'el and Baadi'ade communities have voiced particular concerns about a possible influx of Hawaadle fighters to Beledweyne post-offensive. The delicate and contested clan make-up of the city that often erupts into violence could be tilted decisively by returning large numbers of young, armed Hawaadle with few prospects.
Hawaadle leadership are aware of this risk, but they are left with few options to solve the problem. If the Ma'awiisley are stranded on the frontlines without adequate food and ammunition, they risk being overrun by Al-Shabaab. But if they return to cities such as Beledweyne, many would inevitably be forced to search for a means of survival and subsequently pose a significant risk to the civilian population. Young armed men with weapons returning from the battlefield after having been almost abandoned on the frontlines is clearly no recipe for success. Here, the risk to civilians is not emerging from simply long-standing inter-clan conflicts but rather a matter of survival for the Ma'awiisley fighters.
More urgent and inventive responses to the question of the Ma'awiisley's future are needed to sustain these fighting forces. We are at an inflexion point for these forces and whether the shrinking successes of the previous offensives can be sustained in the coming months. In the third part of this series, we will subsequently explore the possible routes and avenues for the future of the Ma'awiisley, including incorporation into the Somali National Army or Darawiish.
Sara Petrovski is a researcher and independent consultant on the East and Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes, with a special focus on Somalia and DR Congo, leading a series of research projects on protection of civilians, armed groups, security sector reform, migration and conflict analysis.
Contact her: sara.petrovski84@gmail.com
https://rs.linkedin.com/in/sara-petrovski-48251683
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