Issue No. 680

Al-Shabaab and a monopoly of violence

In recent months, there has been a discernible, growing fatigue and frustration among those working on Somalia. Across several capitals, an increasing number of diplomats and donors have begun to speculate whether the capture of the country by Al-Shabaab might not be such a bad thing after all. The argument runs that communities would be taxed just once, the perennial infighting and corruption of Mogadishu's elite would ease, and a degree of stability would return to the country. The final point is oft-repeated– that Al-Shabaab, unlike the federal government, would be able to exert a Weberian 'monopoly on violence' and put an end to the lost decades of internecine armed conflict.

This logic is flawed, however, and dangerously so. The belief that Al-Shabaab would hold a monopoly on violence in Somalia akin to the Taliban in Afghanistan is gravely mistaken for several reasons. First and most important are the fractured clan dynamics of Somalia, which continue to define the contours of the country's politics despite the various attempts to supersede these loyalties. If Al-Shabaab does come to rule Mogadishu on a 'legitimate' basis, it is unlikely to come in the guise of the massed Taliban forces which rolled across Afghanistan but through a secretive takeover under the shadow of Qatar-brokered peace negotiations.

Yet any political dispensation that sidelines key figures like Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni and Jubaland President Ahmed Madoobe will inevitably lead to resistance from the Darood-majority Federal Member States of Puntland and Jubaland. The prospect of submitting to an extremist, primarily Hawiye Islamist government in Mogadishu is not something they will accept or consider. After all, incumbent Jubaland President Ahmed Islam 'Madoobe' and the largely Ogadeni fighters that comprised his Islamist militia, Ras Kamboni, spent years battling Al-Shabaab for control of Kismaayo. Since 2012, Madoobe has established firm control over the regional capital and is sure to resist any attempts to wrest control of his fiefdom. Many of the former Ras Kamboni militia that have been absorbed into the state-level Darawiish forces would further face certain retribution if Al-Shabaab were to reclaim authority over Kismaayo.

With Puntland President Deni deeply opposed to the current occupants of Villa Somalia, the oldest and most stable region of Somalia would also seek to resist any attempt by an Al-Shabaab-controlled administration to assert control. Al-Shabaab’s profound hostility to the current federal system means that the retention of an autonomous status quo would not be an option. Consequently, rather than ushering in a new period of Islamist-ensured peace, we could instead witness renewed and fresh violence between clans and groups in an area that has enjoyed relative peace in recent years.

Even if much of Hirshabelle and Galmudug would probably be unable to resist the institutionalisation of Al-Shabaab in the capital, many Hawaadle, including figures such as Ali Osman Jeyte, would likely resist. These militias could likely count on support from Ethiopia, aware that they would not have a political future and face retribution from an Al-Shabaab intent on suppressing future uprisings similar to mid-2022.

Moreover, areas encompassing Baidoa, Huddur, Beledweyne, and Luuq– at a minimum– are all likely to remain in the Ethiopian sphere of influence. Several thousand Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) soldiers continue to guard against the penetration of Al-Shabaab into Ethiopia and across southern Somalia. Considering that these forces have remained in place in the face of ostensible opposition to their presence by Mogadishu in 2024, they would not likely withdraw at the behest of an Al-Shabaab-controlled government. Kenya could also respond by seeking to secure its borders, retaining Kenya Defence Force soldiers within Somalia's territory, or reinforcing its military aid to Madoobe's forces.

There is little substance to the argument that Al-Shabaab may ameliorate its extreme attitudes once in power. Despite talk of differences between the Taliban of the 1990s and the present day, since the Taliban re-took power nearly three years ago, girls’ education has been rolled back, and public executions have resumed. The idea that Al-Shabaab would become moderate and conciliatory in power is fanciful. It has not been open to concessions since its emergence nearly 20 years ago and would be negotiating the future political dispensation from a position of strength. Once it comes into power, it will have further access to the juridical instruments of influence with which it can pursue its extremist agenda, not just in Somalia but possibly across the Horn and beyond. An al-Qaeda branch taking power would be sure to inspire other extremist groups and establish Somalia as a haven for jihadists, as Sudan was in the 1990s.

Returning to the current moment, last week saw yet another chaotic piece of political sequencing under the guise of Somalia's much-heralded 'sovereignty.' Villa Somalia initially publicly requested the replacement of the UN Political Office with a standard Country Team towards the end of 2024 before subsequently backpedalling and instead requesting a 'committee' to review the oversight of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). It is clear that Villa Somalia wants a UN presence that does not scrutinise its flawed constitutional process and dysfunctional federal system, nor the growing likelihood of a collapse of the country's security architecture amid the African Union force draw-down.

The latest failure to consult, part of a recurring pattern, adds to the growing unease amongst much of the international community concerned about the current trajectory of Somalia. Yet, out of fatigue and exasperation, all should be careful not to view the ascent of Al-Shabaab as some kind of panacea. In reality, it would merely lead to another form of a rump government out of Mogadishu, where much of the peripheries have violently broken away. 

By the Somali Wire team