Web of Terror
In the digital age, as the battleground against extremism has shifted online, Al-Shabaab has established itself as a particularly notable force. Of the Al-Qaeda branches operating today, Al-Shabaab is by far the most technologically literate in both its production and dissemination of extremist material. Its infamous media arm, the Al-Kataib Media Foundation, is chiefly responsible for delivering an immense quantity and variety of media across several platforms daily to radicalise, proselytise, and intimidate different audiences. According to one estimate by Tech Against Terrorism, the militant group is responsible for 20-25% of all extremist content that appears online per week. This ranges from videos captured during attacks on Somali National Army (SNA) bases to diatribes against the perceived decadence of the West. Meanwhile, the occasional attempt to stifle extremist content by social media companies and Somalia's government has done little to halt the flow of material to date.
In its early years, between 2006 and 2011, Al-Shabaab often used traditional media interviews to express its intentions, facilitated by its strategic communications office, the Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen. But the increasing interception of journalists and military pressure on the extremist group, amid the rapid growth of social media, saw Al-Shabaab diversify and pivot towards producing content in-house for online audiences. The militant group subsequently created Facebook and Twitter accounts in May and December 2011, respectively. One of the more notable incidents of Al-Shabaab's early online presence was the Twitter live-streaming of the 2013 Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi that saw 67 Kenyans killed. Until the live-stream began, accompanied by language such as "Muhajideen," Kenyan police purportedly believed the attack to be an ongoing robbery.
Unlike the Islamic State, which has inspired numerous lone-wolf attacks in the West and beyond, Al-Shabaab's content is not typically geared towards driving ad hoc attacks. Instead, as social media has become ever more popular, Al-Shabaab has consciously worked to ensure that competing voices or ideological differences do not muddy its brand. Much like its on-the-ground operations, the extremist group maintains a highly regulated output that has established Al-Shabaab as an influential presence within the competing online galaxy of Islamic extremist groups.
Today, the Al-Kataib Media Foundation takes primary responsibility for producing a host of audio-visual content and coordinating propaganda. Much of this is subsequently distributed across affiliated websites such as Somalimemo and Calamada, which pose as legitimate news outlets. These sites often cover broader global issues and espouse Islamist rhetoric on a variety of topics, such as the ongoing Israeli devastation of the Gaza Strip. Within the Al-Kataib Media Foundation is also the Al-Kataib News Channel, which was formed in 2010 as a television channel that primarily displays videos and pictures from the battlefield.
A handful of 'opinion setters' are further central to keeping Al-Shabaab's propaganda on-message and consistent, with near-identical posts being spread across numerous sites on a daily basis. Al-Shabaab's trusted extremist influencers have established large followings on Telegram and Facebook and share a journalistic manner further designed to bolster their credibility. Any veneer quickly falls, however, when they are able to post minute-by-minute updates on significant attacks, often hours before Al-Shabaab-affiliated websites such as Somalimemo. These posts are then quickly amplified by dozens of sympathetic or aligned militant accounts, allowing the content to take on a life of its own on YouTube, Facebook or Telegram. By keeping its message consistent across several years, Al-Shabaab has further sought to present itself as a legitimate alternative to Villa Somalia and reinforce its grievances. Moreover, the high level of ideological discipline maintained across Facebook, Telegram, X, TikTok, and YouTube is reflective of the centralised manner in which Al-Shabaab produces content through Al-Kataib. Still, Al-Shabaab has also shown adaptability to emerging social media platforms such as TikTok and 'OK.ru,' a Russian social network.
In recent years, Al-Shabaab has translated and diversified its content across multiple languages, including English, Arabic, Swahili, Oromo, and Amharic, to broaden its reach across East Africa and beyond. It has allowed Al-Shabaab to tailor its content towards specific marginalised groups in Kenya and Ethiopia-- rather than exclusively English or Somali speakers. For instance, Gaida Mtaani, an Al-Shabaab magazine that is circulated in Swahili in Kenya, has been repeatedly cited as influential in the radicalisation of several individuals. The use of English has further allowed Al-Shabaab to reach across the Somali diaspora and draw financial and ideological support from sympathetic communities.
While much of the Somali diaspora is highly technologically literate, within Somalia, it was estimated that there were just 1.95 million social media users in January 2023, just 10.9% of the country's population. Subsequently, dedicated Al-Shabaab operatives bring more sophisticated propaganda films to rural areas without internet access in Somalia for 'movie nights.' These films have been known to cover topics such as corruption in Mogadishu, historical grievances against Ethiopia, and video compilations of significant attacks. Following these screenings, villagers are routinely 'encouraged' to join the militant group. Somali's love of the radio has not been untouched by Al-Shabaab either, with affiliated radio stations such as al-Andulas and Al-Furqaan established to reach digitally unconnected audiences.
Attempts to shut down websites like Somalimemo and dozens of extremist WhatsApp accounts are much like playing whack-a-mole. While a website or account may be offline for a few hours, others quickly pop up in its place. This problem is not unique to Somalia, but a global issue of social media regulation that companies like Meta and others have struggled with for years. With Al-Shabaab's online propaganda not going anywhere, the targeting and combating of its extremist ideology must become more sophisticated as well.
By the Somali Wire team
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