Turkish Delight: Somalia's Embrace of Ankara
On 23 April, a Turkish naval warship, the TCG Kinaliada, docked in Mogadishu's Port while en route to Japan, the first such visit since the signing of the bilateral Framework Agreement for Defence and Economic Cooperation in February 2024. The vessel's arrival was welcomed by senior Somali officials, including President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), who said the arrival of the ship marked a "new dawn for Somalia's maritime security." Since the signing of the bilateral agreement, a flurry of diplomatic meetings has taken place between the close allies, including the signing of a new judicial cooperation agreement and a notable visit by Turkey's National Intelligence Organisation Director, Ibrahim Kalin, to Mogadishu.
The still-growing influence of Ankara in Somalia is part of a longer trend witnessed over successive Somali administrations since 2011. Like many countries, Turkey had nearly entirely disengaged from the country during the state collapse of the 1990s and 2000s, but Somalia's famine in 2011-2012 precipitated a reignition of interest by Somalia's former Ottoman ruler. In what was the first visit by a foreign head of state in decades, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his wife visited Mogadishu in 2011 to a rapturous welcome by Somalia's public. And during HSM's first term in office between 2012 and 2017, he forged close ties with Ankara, in part due to the ideological affinity between Erdogan's Justice and Development Party, known as the AK Party, and HSM's Damul Jadiid faction, including a kindred 'moderate' Islamism and a centralising development instinct.
Since then, Turkey has strategically invested in Somalia, reaping significant economic and political rewards for both countries. Turkish companies operate some of Somalia's most prominent infrastructure, including Favori LLC, which has operated Mogadishu's Aden Adde Airport since September 2013, and the Albayrak Group, which has managed Mogadishu Port since 2015. Further engagements are likely, with Turkey having now secured the much-sought-after oil exploration rights off Somalia's coast. According to Somali and Turkish officials, drilling is expected to begin in 2025, but such a timeline is highly aspirational given Somalia's dubious record on implementing projects. As part of the bilateral maritime economic and security agreement, it has been reported that Ankara is set to receive as much as 30% of any profits from any oil-- though Somali government ministers have since disputed that figure.
The security component of the agreement is sure to prove more complicated. While much was made of the arrival of the TCG Kinaliada into Mogadishu's Port, but it was just one stop of 24 ports that the Kinaliada made en route to Japan. Still, with the unpublished agreement stipulating joint military exercises and allowing for the Turkish navy to use Somalia's ports, we can likely expect to see more military vessels in Somalia's territorial waters in the coming months. One of the core components of the agreement is that Turkey will construct and sell ships to Somalia, as well as help Mogadishu to re-establish its navy. However, rebuilding Somalia's non-existent navy amid an advancing Al-Shabaab is a daunting prospect and most likely doomed to fail.
Moreover, while Mogadishu Port is nominally within the federal government's control despite vast amounts of contraband continuing to be smuggled through the port, there are broader questions about the remit of any deployed Turkish naval vessels in Somalia's territorial waters. The presence of the UAE-backed Puntland Maritime Police Force and Somaliland's navy will surely complicate the degree to which any Turkish vessels, or future federal Somali navy, will be able to deploy, particularly with relations between Puntland's regional government and Mogadishu at their lowest ebb in years. In the last week alone, Somaliland's Foreign Minister Essa Kayd told the BBC that "Turkey cannot enter our waters, and Mogadishu does not dictate our policies."
With relations also strained between Mogadishu and its Western allies due to frustrations with Villa Somalia's unilateral approach, Ankara has remained the 'all-weather' friend of Somalia. Erdogan's authoritarian-minded foreign policy has meant that Turkey has kept quiet on Somalia's domestic politics, preferring to reap economic rewards and not sacrifice its significant political capital. And even when Turkish-trained Gorgor forces become embroiled in controversy, such as in April 2021 when they were co-opted by Fahad Yasin and violently employed against the political opposition to former Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo's, Turkey's reputation has emerged generally unscathed. This was also the case when Ankara's popular Bayraktar TB2 drones were delivered to the Farmaajo government in contravention of the UN arms embargo. And in March 2024, when several civilians, including children, were killed in Afgooye by a Turkish strike after an Al-Shabaab ambush. Today, with the UAE having suspended air support for the Somali National Army following the Al-Shabaab attack at the General Gordon Base in Mogadishu, Turkish drone assistance may become more critical.
Despite Turkey's substantial security support to Somalia and the close economic ties they enjoy, Villa Somalia's return to Doha's orbit may prove more significant in the long run than its strong ties with Turkey. Qatar's interest in bringing Al-Shabaab into some kind of 'power-sharing' agreement in Mogadishu remains unabated, and they exert a far more corrosive political influence than that of its Turkish ally. In the meantime, Ankara looks set to remain relatively pragmatic in its dealings with Mogadishu, even if elements of the February 2024 agreement never come to fruition. Still, Villa Somalia should keep in mind that “there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies, only permanent interests.”
By the Somali Wire team
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