Issue No. 677

Demystifying the Ma'awiisley

Today's editorial in The Somali Wire is written by Sara Petrovski. It is the first of a three-part series by the author that shall be published every Friday on the Ma'awiisley and their future in Somalia.

Since the grass-root uprisings against Al-Shabaab in Galmudug and Hiiraan in June and July 2022, the clan militias known as the 'Ma'awiisley' have played a central role in the dislodging of Al-Shabaab from a swathe of territory in central Somalia. Though these uprisings began nearly two years ago, several misconceptions around the Ma'awiisley are still routinely touted. Among these is that these assorted militias pose a particular threat to civilians, be it through indiscriminate looting or by overstepping their territory and triggering inter-clan violence.

The reality is quite different. The relationship between the Ma'awiisley and their communities is certainly complex, but in-depth research has revealed that they have repeatedly sought to limit civilian casualties in their offensive operations. As Ma'awiisley are largely comprised of villagers who have taken up arms to protect their homes and families, they have a clear vested interest in protecting their communities from the adverse impacts of armed conflict. In this light, Ma'awiisley have typically refrained from looting, sought to incorporate consideration of civilian protection into their military planning, and, at times, even protected civilians from wayward government forces.

Indeed, current data from the now-badly stalled offensive reveals that Al-Shabaab has killed or injured more civilians than all clan militias, government forces, and inter-clan conflicts combined. This was even the case during the significant advance of the Ma'awiisley from mid-2022 until early 2023. Rather, the militias played a critical role in protecting civilians even amid the mass mobilisation of forces across central Somalia. Research has further revealed that the Ma'awiisley overwhelmingly avoid targeting known civilians in their fight against Al-Shabaab and have instead actively sought to remove civilians from the battlefield before any offensive action. Moreover, their intimate knowledge of the terrain and their communities allows them to carry out military operations often more competently than their SNA counterparts. Suspected Al-Shabaab militants have still been extrajudicially executed, however, and there have been reports of sexual violence by clan fighters.

Several of these militias have established comprehensive informant networks within their clan territory, allowing them to help limit civilian casualties and inform operations. One notable network that has helped the Ma'awiisley monitor across 100 km of Galmudug is comprised of sources ranging from fishermen to business figures. This system has allowed the Ma'awisley to detail Al-Shabaab positions and personnel, which is particularly important for preventing the militant group from disguising its fighters within the civilian population. In turn, this information has aided Ma'awiisley efforts to ensure civilians are not mistaken for hidden Al-Shabaab fighters by their forces and government soldiers. It is clear that while Ma'awiisley may have had no formal training in international humanitarian law, they continue to make active choices to differentiate between civilians and combatants. Still, aiding the Ma'awiisley poses a degree of danger to civilian informers, with Al-Shabaab increasing its retaliatory targeting of any community or individual linked to the varied forces.

Oversight of the protection of civilians during the Ma'awiisley's operations has typically fallen to clan elders, who take on several roles to protect them. This has ranged from applying 'xeer,' Somalia's clan justice system, to working as intermediaries between government forces, other clans, and civilians, among others. Moreover, while the Ma'awiisley has no formal structure, they are typically led by the more capable fighters who are routinely held accountable to their elders if anything goes awry. Clan elders, particularly in Hiiraan, have and continue to remove those who have committed violence against civilians.

When fighting, the Ma'awiisley are careful not to unduly damage the villages and towns in which they or their fellow clan members live, consciously avoiding the use of mortar shells, for instance. And while government soldiers have been repeatedly documented looting houses, the Ma'awiisley have largely avoided doing so. The militias have even protected civilians from SNA soldiers seeking retaliation for Al-Shabaab attacks. In one instance in Ga'lad town in Galgaduud following the killing of the well-known Danab commander Major Hassan Osman Mohamed 'Tuure' by Al-Shabaab, local Ma'awiisley intervented and prevented the SNA from continuing their retaliatory looting of the town.

The real danger to civilians from the Ma'awiisley is the inter-clan violence that typically resumes during lengthy offensive pauses– such as now. While these militias have overwhelmingly operated in areas controlled by their own clan, long-standing land and resource disputes have been seen to resurface when these clans are not focused on their common enemy. Notably, though some inter-clan clashes have now renewed with particular ferocity in recent weeks, for most of the stop-start offensive, revenge killings and clashes did not increase even while significant numbers of fighters were rallied to the frontline. Instead, there were examples of long-standing clan rivalries being laid aside for cooperation against Al-Shabaab, such as the Hawaadle and Habar-Gidr/ Ayr militias working together in Matabaan and elsewhere.

It is important not to over-romanticise the Ma'awiisley nor exaggerate the role they can play in operations against Al-Shabaab. Similarly, there remains a significant variation in the professionalism and conduct within these forces. There continue to be certain triggers that have been noted to drive the militia's exploitation of communities– particularly the increasingly limited supplies of money, food, and ammunition from the clan's networks that have sustained these forces for months on end. Many of the Ma'awiisley and their financiers and supporters within their respective clans are exasperated by the government's lack of support despite repeated promises by senior officials.

Limiting civilian casualties is rarely at the top of the agenda within the SNA. But for the Ma'awiisley, it is front and centre and has played a major role in the past successes of these ad hoc, varied forces in rural areas where Mogadishu has little influence. Incorporating the Ma'awiisley into planning, providing sustained operational and logistical support, and prioritising reconciliation are all absolutely critical if the military leadership hopes even to begin to stem the ongoing advance of Al-Shabaab in the coming months.

Sara Petrovski is a researcher and independent consultant on the East and Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes, with a special focus on Somalia and DR Congo, leading a series of research projects on protection of civilians, armed groups, security sector reform, migration and conflict analysis. 
Contact her: sara.petrovski84@gmail.com 
https://rs.linkedin.com/in/sara-petrovski-48251683

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