Issue No. 675

Published 26 Apr 2024

Somaliland's Path to the 2024 Elections

Published on 26 Apr 2024 15:27 min

Somaliland's Path to the 2024 Elections

The date has been set for the third one-person, one-vote (OPOV) presidential election since Somaliland declared independence in 1991. After months of political wrangling and a controversial two-year term extension for incumbent President Muse Bihi, the Somaliland Electoral Commission has published an election timeline for combined presidential, party level, and local elections to take place before 13 November 2024. The robustness of Somaliland's democratic institutions after a challenging period can be cautiously celebrated, but there are still months to go before voters reach the ballot box, and plenty of developments that could derail this in the meantime.   

Somaliland's last elections were the competitive local council and parliamentary votes held in May 2021, in which Waddani and the Justice and Welfare Party (UCID) came together in an alliance to trump the Kulmiye party of President Muse Bihi. But unprecedented, this time around, presidential and party level votes are to be held on the same day. The three major parties, Kulmiye, Waddani, and UCID, will compete for the presidency. Additionally, ten other 'political associations' will vie for the opportunity to become one of three national parties permitted to participate in future national elections. After months of parliamentary ping-pong between the two chambers of Somaliland's legislature, a negotiated compromise emerged to which all significant parties and associations agreed. This, however, does carry some potential challenges to the two main opposition parties, including the rising Barwaaqo party, led by the well-known Habar Yunis politician Dr. Mohamed Abdi Gabose.

While President Bihi might enjoy the advantages of incumbency, the race is expected to be close, with the ruling Kulmiye party facing stiff opposition from Waddani. The latter’s base, historically Habar Yunis  and, more recently, some Garhajis, remains opposed to Bihi's presidency and the assertiveness with which he has wielded power. Waddani’s presidential candidate is set to be Abdirahman 'Irro,’ though some speculate that Party Chairman Hersi Ali Hassan is the real leader. Hersi is a member of the Habar Je'elo, one of two Isaaq sub-clans that traditionally form Kulmiye’s base of support. Hersi's appointment in November 2021 was seen as an attempt to draw votes from Kulmiye, though it has consequently served to undermine Waddani's standing among the Habar Yunis.

Kulmiye, on the other hand, has historically done well in the east of Somaliland among the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli. That constituency support has now been largely shattered by the intermittent violence in late 2022 and 2023 in Laas Aanood and its environs. Over 50,000 people are believed to have been displaced and hundreds killed in fighting between Somaliland government forces and the SSC (Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn)-Khaatumo militia– a predominantly Dhulbahante force. Moreover, Waddani is well positioned to mount a solid challenge to Muse Bihi due to some frustrations over the non-transparent handling of the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which initially gained the President serious support.

This will be the first election in Somaliland since the bombshell MoU was signed by Addis and Hargeisa on 1 January 2024. The agreement proposes the exchange of a 20km lease on the Bab al-Mandab Strait for sovereign recognition of Somaliland. Post-hoc attempts by Somaliland’s government to build consensus with the political opposition have run counter to its usual modus operandi of seeking consensus in advance, though both Waddani and UCID have since offered public support for implementation of the MoU. Still, if the agreement were to unravel-- due to Ethiopian reticence or Somaliland frustration with the sequencing implementation, this could prove fatal to Bihi's campaign for a second 5-year term. The MoU, and whether it moves forward, is likely to be a defining topic of the election, alongside questions over the future of the Sool region, and SSC-Khaatumo control of Laas Aanood.

Whether or not areas currently under SCC-Khaatumo control will participate in the November election is still uncertain, though it is reported that the Somaliland government has been preparing to include voting districts in Sool. The SSC-K has expressed the desire to be recognised as the 6th Federal Member State of Somalia and campaigned heavily to this effect in Mogadishu in 2023. It was later recognized by Mogadishu as an ‘administrative authority’ in Laas Aanood. Somaliland's published voter roll has indicated that there are nearly 50,000 registered voters in Laas Aanood. For the government of Somaliland, the question of control over the city is far from settled. Any attempts by Somaliland to ensure residents can vote in its November election will certainly be viewed as a provocation by the SSC-K.

Leaving aside SSC-Khaatumo, several others could seek to undermine the 2024 election. Possible spoilers could come in the form of unionists who have previously sought to undermine stability in Somaliland. Last year, Somalia's new Foreign Minister Ahmed Fiqi publicly admitted that Mogadishu had helped stoke discontent in Sool; he also voiced his support for those stirring up discontent in Somaliland's western Awdal region. With relations remaining poor between Hargeisa and Mogadishu, the latter has no desire to see a successful poll in Somaliland, particularly in that Somalia has not yet held a national OPOV vote. Nor should we forget that Al-Shabaab has established a presence in the environs of Laas Aanood and may yet attempt to carry out terrorist attacks or incite other violence to undermine Somaliland.

Despite all the rough-and-tumble politics that are sure to follow over the coming months, Somaliland has worked hard for peace and its OPOV system. Its public as well as its politicians are proud of its record of peaceful, democratic elections. Somaliland’s transitions of power have also been peaceful, leading one to assume that it will manage another credible, democratic vote in November. But nothing should be taken for granted.

By the Somali Wire team

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